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Abstract 
Post-event processing (PEP) can serve to maintain and worsen anxiety symptoms and negative 
interpretations of social events in Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD; e.g., Cody & Teachman, 2010, 
2011). However, little is known about the specific factors that might motivate individuals to 
engage in PEP. The aim of the current research was to investigate a novel theoretical framework 
in which positive metacognitive beliefs about the value of engaging in PEP, memory uncertainty, 
and perceptions of performance were hypothesized to contribute to the persistence of PEP among 
socially anxious individuals, and ultimately lead to more negatively biased recollections of past 
social events. A Pilot Study provided preliminary correlational evidence that social anxiety is 
related to both metacognitive beliefs and uncertainty for social events. Study 1 was designed to 
examine these constructs in the laboratory following a standardized social task among 
individuals with a diagnosis of SAD in comparison to anxious and healthy control participants. 
Results showed that relative to both control groups, individuals with SAD reported greater PEP 
in the days following the social task. Participants with SAD also rated their performance more 
negatively and felt greater uncertainty immediately after the task, although these ratings did not 
become worse over time. They also endorsed more metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of 
reviewing the social task. Importantly, bootstrapping mediation analyses suggested that both 
metacognitive beliefs and initial performance ratings significantly mediated the relationship 
between group status and PEP in the days following the event. Study 2 was an experimental 
study designed to investigate how repeatedly recalling a socially-relevant versus socially-
irrelevant task would impact performance and certainty ratings. It was expected that recollection 
of a socially threatening event would lead to an increased level of certainty at the expense of 
increasingly negative evaluations, although these hypotheses were not supported. Idiosyncratic 
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metacognitive beliefs were also explored and findings suggested that socially anxious individuals 
reported both perceived advantages and disadvantages to mentally reviewing the socially-
relevant task. The results of these studies are discussed in the context of theoretical implications 
and in relation to the studies’ clinical applications in the treatment of SAD.  
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Introduction 
Social Anxiety 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is among the most common psychiatric disorders 
(Kessler et al., 2005) and is characterized by an intense and persistent fear of social situations 
in which embarrassment, negative evaluation or rejection may occur (American Psychiatric 
Association , 2000, 2013). The social situations that are considered threatening are 
idiosyncratic but can involve both performance and interaction situations (e.g., public 
speaking, initiating a conversation). Individuals with SAD are likely to avoid anxiety 
provoking social situations when possible or otherwise endure them with extreme distress. The 
deleterious impact of SAD has been well established in the literature. Research has 
demonstrated that socially anxious individuals experience significant functional impairments in 
their interpersonal relationships (Heery & Kring, 2007; Shields, 2004), quality of life (Stein & 
Kean, 2000; Shields, 2004), recreation (Antony, Roth, Swinson, Huta, & Devins, 1998), and 
academic and occupational attainment (Bruch, Fallon, & Heimberg, 2003; Moitra, Beard, 
Weisberg, & Keller, 2011; Patel, Knapp, Henderson, & Baldwin, 2002; Tolman et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the economic consequences of SAD for both affected individuals and public 
healthcare are substantive (Acarturk, et al., 2009; Patel et al., 2002; Plaisier et al., 2010; 
Schneier et al., 1994).  
Cognitive Behavioural Models of Social Anxiety 
Cognitive behavioural models of social anxiety have provided a disorder-specific 
conceptual framework of the factors thought to contribute to the development and maintenance 
of symptoms. In their seminal work, Clark and Wells (1995) proposed that individuals with 
social anxiety hold negative self-perceptions which lead them to engage in maladaptive 
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cognitive and behavioural patterns that serve to maintain and worsen anxiety symptoms. They 
identified four key processes that interfere with the disconfirmation of negative beliefs. First, 
when in a socially threatening situation, individuals with SAD turn their attention inward (i.e., 
toward themselves) and engage in careful monitoring of their own physiological symptoms. 
This information is then used to generate an impression of how they believe they appear which 
is based on negative self-perceptions and does not incorporate objective information of others’ 
behaviour or feedback. Second, individuals with SAD engage in a wide range of strategies or 
safety behaviours designed to minimize the risk of negative social outcomes. Although 
designed to reduce anxiety, such behaviours prevent the individual from learning 
unconditionally that feared outcomes are not likely to occur; indeed, successful social 
interactions are attributed to the use of the safety behaviours. Furthermore, safety behaviours 
often have the unintentional effect of making feared outcomes more likely. For example, a 
socially anxious individual who, as a result of his fear that if he says something inappropriate 
during a social encounter others will reject him, may minimize his self-disclosure in a social 
interaction, which ultimately leads his interaction partners to view him unfavourably. Related 
to this, Clark and Wells (1995) argue that symptoms of anxiety, self-monitoring, and 
maladaptive coping strategies (e.g., use of safety behaviours) in social situations produce a 
pattern of negative social performance, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of negative 
evaluation. Finally, Clark and Wells (1995) described the important role of maladaptive 
cognitive processing both before and after social situations in the maintenance of symptoms. In 
advance of social situations, individuals with SAD experience anticipatory anxiety, which 
consists of a review of past social failures and predictions of negative performance. Such 
processing leads the socially anxious individual either to avoid the social interaction all 
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together, or to focus exclusively on negative aspects of the self and anticipate negative 
outcomes. Although leaving a social situation results in decreased anxiety, socially anxious 
individuals engage in post-event processing (PEP) during which they carefully review their 
performance in a ruminative and negatively biased manner that focuses excessive attention on 
the physiological anxiety symptoms they experienced during the social event, their negative 
self-evaluations, and perceived past failures. Such processing exacerbates individuals’ negative 
perceptions of self and maintains anxiety symptoms by providing evidence in support of the 
negative self-image that lies at the heart of the problem. 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) proposed a similar model to elucidate the mechanisms that 
maintain social anxiety symptoms. These authors suggested that when confronted with a social 
situation, individuals with SAD generate a mental representation of themselves which is based 
on long-term memory, internal cues (e.g., feeling shaky), and external threat-cues (e.g., others’ 
facial impressions). This mental representation is likely to be distorted as it is heavily 
influenced by individual’s own negative sensations as well as a hypervigilence to threats in the 
external environment. This representation is monitored and updated continuously and such 
monitoring is presumed to disrupt one’s ability to engage effectively in the social interaction 
and may paradoxically lead to more negative social outcomes. According to Rapee and 
Heimberg’s (1997) model, individuals compare their self-generated representations with 
perceived social standards which vary depending on the nature of the situation. Since the 
socially anxious individual’s representation is negatively distorted, they conclude as a result of 
this process that they are not performing up to audience standards. Finally, this model 
emphasizes that individuals with SAD overestimate the likelihood as well as the consequences 
of negative evaluation. In other words, socially anxious individuals assume that they are likely 
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to be evaluated negatively by audience members and that such evaluation will have 
catastrophic consequences. These predictions in turn contribute to their anxiety symptoms and 
serve to maintain the disorder.   
More recently, Hofmann (2007) consolidated and expanded on existing cognitive 
behavioural theories to develop a comprehensive and disorder-specific model of SAD. He 
identified a broad range of factors which may serve to maintain anxiety symptoms while also 
acknowledging that SAD is a heterogeneous disorder and that not all factors will be relevant 
for every individual. According to his model, individuals with SAD assume that others have 
high standards for their social performance which they do not feel equipped to meet. Hofmann 
(2007) also argued that socially anxious individuals have particular difficulty identifying and 
achieving appropriate social goals in anticipation of social encounters. As with the models 
outlined previously, Hofmann (2007) also implicated heightened attention and monitoring of 
the self, safety behaviours, avoidance, and negative self-perceptions as factors contributing to 
the maintenance of SAD. It is also argued that socially anxious individuals perceive their own 
social skills as poor and lack the self-efficacy to successfully engage in social interactions. 
Like Rapee and Heimberg (1997), Hofmann acknowledges that individuals with SAD perceive 
negative social outcomes as more likely to occur, and assume that such outcomes will have 
disastrous consequences. Hofmann (2007) also argues that socially anxious individuals believe 
they have limited control over their anxiety symptoms in socially threatening situations, and 
that this lack of control is readily observable to others. Finally, like the Clark and Wells (1995) 
model, Hofmann’s model highlights the role of PEP as a critical maintaining factor in SAD.  
Each of the cognitive behavioural models described above provides a theoretical 
framework for understanding the mechanisms responsible for the development and 
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maintenance of anxiety symptoms within the context of SAD. The specific components of 
these models and supporting empirical evidence pertinent to the current line of work are 
outlined in greater detail below.  
Interpretation Biases in Social Anxiety 
Interpretation biases are not directly addressed by the models outlined above, although 
biased processing in SAD is certainly implied. Early work by Beck, Emery and Greenberg 
(1985) proposed that pathological anxiety results from the activation of maladaptive cognitive 
schemas, which guide the way information is understood, organized and remembered. 
Interpretation biases are believed to occur when anxiety-related schemas are activated in 
response to threatening information. A number of studies have provided evidence for the 
existence of interpretation biases in social anxiety (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Constans, Penn, 
Ihen, & Hope, 1999; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & 
Gotlib, 2008; Stopa & Clark, 2000). For example, an early study by Amir, Foa and Coles 
(1998) examined interpretation biases for ambiguous events among individuals with and 
without SAD. In this study, participants were presented with ambiguous social events (e.g., 
“You see a group of friends having lunch, they stop talking when you approach ...”) and 
ambiguous non-social events (“You get your cable bill and notice that ...”). After each 
scenario, participants were provided with three possible interpretations (positive, negative and 
neutral) and asked to rank-order the likelihood that these interpretations would come to their 
mind and the likelihood that they would come to a “typical person’s” mind in a similar 
situation. The results suggested that compared to non-anxious controls, individuals with SAD 
were more likely to offer negative interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios, but only in the 
socially self-relevant condition. No differences between the SAD and non-anxious control 
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groups were observed when making interpretations for “a typical person.” Additionally, no 
group differences were observed for non-social events, suggesting that this bias is unique to the 
interpretation of social scenarios.  
Similarly, Stopa and Clark (2000) found that individuals with SAD demonstrated a 
clear bias in their interpretation of ambiguous social events even when interpretations were 
obtained with open-ended questions. Furthermore, these researchers demonstrated that 
individuals in the socially anxious group had a tendency to interpret mildly negative social 
events in a catastrophic manner. Compared to non-anxious controls and individuals with other 
anxiety disorders, socially anxious patients were more likely to assume that mildly negative 
social events were due to negative self attributes (e.g., “I was boring”) and that these events 
would have catastrophic long-term consequences (e.g., “I will lose all my friends”). A number 
of findings have confirmed that such interpretation biases are specific to social anxiety, as 
opposed to general distress or negative affect (Amir, Beard & Bower, 2005; Constans et al., 
1999). 
More recently, Hertel, Brozovich, Joorman and Gotlib (2008) examined how failing to 
distinguish between internally and externally generated events might lead individuals to 
commit memory errors based on interpretation biases. These researchers proposed that when 
recalling a prior ambiguous social event, socially anxious individuals would blur the distinction 
between their memory for the actual scenario and their interpretations of the event. To test this 
prediction, individuals with a diagnosis of generalized SAD and healthy control participants 
were presented with social and non-social neutrally-valenced scenarios and asked to generate 
one additional sentence to complete each story. After a distracter task, participants were 
provided with the first sentence of each scenario and asked to generate the remaining sentences 
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that had been provided to them in the original descriptions of each scenario. After participants 
finished recalling the scenarios, they were prompted to recall their own endings. Consistent 
with prior research, socially anxious individuals produced significantly more socially anxious 
continuations in response to the ambiguous social scenarios. Socially anxious continuations 
were defined as any mention of social evaluative threat (e.g., fear of embarrassment or negative 
evaluation) or the physical experience of social anxiety symptoms (e.g., experience of blushing 
while talking to someone). The authors then examined memory intrusions, which were defined 
as the addition of at least one new term that had not been presented in the original story.  
Interestingly, when overall intrusions were considered, regardless of their meaning, healthy 
controls actually reported a greater percentage of intrusions for social scenarios than 
individuals with SAD. This finding suggests that individuals with SAD are not less accurate in 
their recollections overall. However, when the meaning of the intrusions was taken into 
account, socially anxious individuals produced significantly more intrusions that were 
consistent with their initial continuations of the ambiguous scenarios. In other words, 
individuals with SAD produced a larger proportion of intrusions that reflected emotionally 
negative (but not other types of) continuations. These findings suggest that when socially 
anxious individuals are presented with a socially threatening situation, they have difficulty 
distinguishing between what actually happened during the social event and their interpretations 
of that event.  
Repetitive Negative Thinking 
Biased interpretations and thinking patterns that are repetitive have been identified in 
SAD as well as across a range of anxiety and mood disorders (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010; McLaughlin, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011) 
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and a large body of research suggests that repetitive thinking is associated with the onset and 
maintenance of both anxiety and mood symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema  & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden & Craske, 2000; Watkins, 
2008). Indeed, McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) identified repetitive negative thought 
as a transdiagnostic factor in anxiety and depression, finding that it accounts for a significant 
portion of overlap in anxiety and depression symptoms.   
In the depression literature, rumination has been defined as repetitive self-focused 
thinking which focuses on past perceived failures, depressed mood as well as the implications 
of these symptoms. Much like PEP, rumination is focused on negative thought content, occurs 
in a passive or uncontrolled manner and has been implicated in the onset and maintenance of 
the disorder (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). A large body of research has 
demonstrated that rumination in depression is associated with an increased risk of developing 
depressive symptoms (e.g., Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008), that 
it exacerbates negative mood (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), is associated with recall of negative memories (e.g., Direnfeld & 
Roberts, 2006; Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Matt, Vázquez, & 
Campbell, 1992), leads to the maintenance of depressive symptoms (e.g., Kuehner & Weber, 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and interferes with effective problem solving (e.g., Donaldson 
& Lam, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Worry is another form of repetitive thought that is a defining feature of Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Worry is defined as a chain of negatively affect-laden thoughts and 
images that are largely uncontrollable and center around potential risks and catastrophic 
outcomes (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Unlike depressive rumination 
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which is largely focused on the past, worry is focused on future uncertainties and potential 
threats. Chronic and excessive worry characteristic of GAD is associated with significant 
impairment in important areas of functioning and is accompanied by physical and 
psychological symptoms, including fatigue, irritability, difficulties concentrating, muscle 
tension, restlessness, and sleep disturbance (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 2013). 
Studies have shown that worry is associated with increased anxious and depressed negative 
affect (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998), catastrophic predictions (e.g., MacLeod, Williams, & 
Bekerian, 1991; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), reduced confidence in one’s problem solving 
abilities (e.g., Davey, Jubb, & Cameron, 1996), and that individuals with GAD view worrying 
as distressing and impairing (Ruscio, 2002).  
Post-Event Processing  
In the context of social anxiety, repetitive negative thinking occurs following socially 
threatening events and the cognitive models outlined above implicate such biased processing as 
a maintenance factor for the disorder (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). According to these models, individuals with SAD continue to process and 
ruminate about social events after they occur. During PEP, the socially anxious individual is 
likely to focus on anxious feelings and negative self-perceptions, since these were processed in 
detail during the social event. This process is problematic because the individual is prone to 
recalling the event as being more negative than it objectively was. Furthermore, it is proposed 
that during PEP, socially anxious individuals may bring to mind past instances of perceived 
social failures. As part of this process, the most recent social event is added to the long list of 
past failures, thereby leading to the maintenance of negative self-perceptions and social anxiety 
symptoms. The unfortunate consequence of this cognitive process is that the socially anxious 
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individual’s negative self-schemas are confirmed even in social interactions that appeared 
neutral or positive from an observer’s perspective. 
Research examining PEP in social anxiety using a variety of methods, including self-
report measures, diary records, social interaction exercises, social performance tasks, and 
experimental paradigms has consistently found that socially anxious individuals are more 
likely than non-anxious controls to engage in PEP after social encounters (see Brozovich & 
Heimberg, 2008 for review). An early study by Rachman and colleagues gathered basic 
descriptive information about PEP using the Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (PEPQ; 
Rachman, Grüter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000). The PEPQ consists of 13 items rated on a 100-
point visual analogue scale and assesses the extent to which individuals engage in PEP 
following an anxiety provoking event (e.g., “After the event was over, did you find yourself 
thinking about it a lot?”; “Did you try to resist thinking about the event?”). In this study, 130 
undergraduate students completed the PEPQ as well as the Social Phobia and Anxiety 
Inventory (SPAI, Turner, Beidel, Dancu & Stanley, 1989) and the Beck Depression Inventory 
II (BDI II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The results demonstrated that PEP was significantly 
associated with social anxiety (r = .40, p < .001). ), and this relationship remained significant 
even when symptoms of depression were statistically controlled (r = .32, p < .001). 
Furthermore, participants reported that PEP cognitions were intrusive and interfered with their 
ability to concentrate, and that they made attempts to resist having these thoughts.  
A subsequent study by Lundh and Sperling (2002) used a diary method to more 
thoroughly assess the nature of participants’ thought patterns while engaging in PEP. For a 
one-week period, an unselected sample of undergraduate students was asked to complete a 
written diary record reporting on socially distressing events as well as associated thoughts and 
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feelings about these events immediately after they occurred, thereby capturing PEP as it occurs 
in-vivo. The results of this study found that PEP is a ubiquitous phenomenon and that social 
anxiety (as measured by the Social Phobia Scale, Mattick & Clarke, 1998) was associated with 
PEP that occurred following events that had a social-evaluative component only, as opposed to 
social events more generally. These findings suggest some specificity of PEP’s relationship to 
socially threatening events, as opposed to other types of emotionally distressing scenarios. 
Fehm and colleagues also found evidence that PEP is specific to socially distressing situations 
relative to other emotionally distressing events (Fehm, Schneider & Hoyrt, 2007). More 
specifically, in a study using an unselected sample of students, these researchers found that 
social situations elicit greater levels of PEP than do phobic situations. Furthermore, they 
demonstrated that PEP was not predicted by more generalized anxiety or depression. 
Consistent with cognitive behavioural models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 
2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), Morgan and Banjerjee (2008) found that socially anxious 
individuals who engage in ruminative thinking are more likely to bring to mind anxious 
autobiographical memories. In this study, participants with high and low levels of social 
anxiety were asked to envision themselves in a hypothetical social scenario and then engage 
either in ruminative or reflective thought about the social event. The results showed that 
participants high in social anxiety who engaged in ruminative thinking about the imagined 
scenario recalled more anxious autobiographical memories relative to low socially anxious 
participants or high anxiety participants who engaged in a reflective recall. These findings 
provide preliminary evidence that the ruminative style adopted by socially anxious individuals 
during PEP in combination with elevated social anxiety symptoms leads individuals to retrieve 
anxiety provoking memories.     
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Although the content of PEP has received relatively little attention in the literature, a 
few recent studies have focused on exploring the nature of cognitions experienced by socially 
anxious individuals. Kocovski and colleagues examined the content of thoughts that occur 
during PEP in a sample of undergraduate students selected based on high and low scores on a 
social evaluation measure (Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett, 2005). Participants’ thoughts in 
response to socially relevant vignettes were recorded and their content was examined. Results 
indicated that individuals high in social anxiety were more likely to report negatively valenced 
thoughts and to report thoughts containing upward counterfactual statements (e.g., ‘if only’ 
statements about how the event could have gone better). A more recent study by Kocovski and 
colleagues further examined the content of PEP (Kocovski, MacKenzie, & Rector, 2011). 
Participants in this study consisted of a sample of unselected undergraduate students who were 
classified into high vs. low social anxiety groups based on the Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998). Participants completed a speech task and were randomly assigned to either a 
guided rumination or distraction condition. Written thought content from participants in the 
rumination condition was evaluated. Results showed that relative to the low social anxiety 
group, the high anxiety participants were more likely to report thoughts about physiological 
symptoms of anxiety (e.g., shaking, sweating), concerns about their posture as well as a trend 
(p = .06) towards lacking self-confidence. 
A study by Makkar and Grisham (2011a) examined the content of PEP following a 
standardized speech task in a community sample. The results showed that during PEP, elevated 
levels of trait social anxiety (controlling for depression and state anxiety) were associated with 
thoughts regarding negative self-perceptions (e.g., criticizing one’s speech performance) as 
13 
 
well as negative thoughts and regrets about the speech and the past more broadly (e.g., past 
failures, anxious sensations during the speech).  
Post-event processing has largely been conceptualized as a verbal process, although 
given recent research implicating the role of negative imagery in SAD (Hackmann, Clark & 
McManus, 2000; Hackmann, Suraway, & Clark, 1998; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, 
& Moscovitch, 2011), a few recent studies have also explored the effect of imagery on PEP. 
Makkar and Grisham (2011b) recruited a sample of undergraduate students and community 
participants who were selected if they scored high or low on a measure of social anxiety (Brief 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; Leary, 1983). While completing a speech task in the lab, 
participants were asked to hold either a negative or a relaxed image of themselves in mind. 
Measures of anxiety, cognitions, perceived performance and focus of attention were measured 
after the speech and PEP was assessed two days later. The results suggested that all 
participants who held a negative image in mind experienced increased anxiety, self-focused 
attention, negative self-relevant cognitions, and negative perceptions of their performance. 
Furthermore, holding a negative image in mind resulted in an increase in negative PEP and a 
decrease in positive PEP at the two-day follow up assessment. Participants holding the 
negative image in mind also reported more negative self-relevant cognitions during PEP in 
comparison to the participants that held a relaxed image in mind. These results highlight the 
deleterious effects of negative imagery in terms of both the frequency and cognitive content of 
PEP.  
Chiupka, Moscovitch and Bielak (2012) examined the nature and impact of mental 
images generated during anticipatory and post-event processing among individuals scoring 
high or low on a measure of social anxiety (Social Phobia Inventory, Connor et al., 2000). 
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These authors found that images were more likely to occur in anticipation, rather than in the 
aftermath, of an in-vivo social task. Additionally, in comparison to low socially anxious 
participants, high socially anxious individuals were more likely to endorse experiencing 
negative images, although the endorsement of images was common across the sample (with 
81% of participants experiencing images). Moreover, this study found important group 
differences in the way in which participants experienced negative imagery. Compared to the 
low socially anxious group, the high social anxiety participants experienced more negative 
consequences in reaction to their mental images (e.g., increased negative affect). Interestingly, 
this study also found that relative to images experienced during anticipation of a social threat, 
those experienced during PEP were associated with more negative perceptions of the self and 
the world. These findings suggest that while anticipatory anxiety may increase the frequency 
with which negative images occur, their presence during PEP is associated with the most 
negative emotional consequences, especially for individuals with social anxiety.  
Brozovich and Heimberg (2013) investigated the relationship between mental imagery 
and PEP. In this study, undergraduate students who scored either high or low on a trait measure 
of social anxiety were informed they would have to give an impromptu speech and were then 
assigned to one of three manipulation conditions: PEP-Semantic, PEP-Imagery, or a control 
condition. In the PEP-Semantic condition, participants were asked to review the meaning of 
how they performed on a prior speech task; this condition was intended to induce PEP about 
the overall quality of their performance and what that might mean for future social tasks. In the 
PEP-Imagery condition, participants were asked to use mental imagery to think about a prior 
speech task and were asked to describe the mental images as vividly as possible to the 
experimenter. Finally, in the control condition, participants were asked to complete a series of 
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cognitively taxing activities unrelated to their speech performance or PEP. These authors found 
that individuals in the imagery condition demonstrated the highest levels of anxiety; however, 
unlike in the Makkar and Grisham (2011b) study described above, these effects were only true 
for the high anxiety group.  
Predictors of Post-Event Processing 
Investigations of the factors predicting PEP have only recently begun receiving 
attention in the literature. Although studies have found support for engagement in PEP after 
various types of social situations (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Mellings & Alden, 2000), 
findings are mixed as to whether social performance (e.g., giving a speech) or interaction (e.g., 
having a conversation) situations result in greater levels of PEP. An early study by Fehm, 
Schneider and Hoyer (2007) found that participants reported greater PEP about previously 
experienced interpersonal situations relative to performance situations. In contrast, using a 
similar methodology, Kocovski and Rector (2007) found that performance situations resulted 
in a greater degree of PEP relative to interaction situations. However, participants in these 
studies were asked to select a socially stressful situation that was previously experienced and 
neither used a standardized social stressor task. As a result, the findings should be interpreted 
with caution as they may be influenced by memory or situation selection biases. Studies that 
have compared engagement in PEP following standardized performance and interaction tasks 
have found performance tasks to be associated with greater engagement in PEP (Kiko et al, 
2012; Makkar & Grisham, 2011a). 
A consistent finding across clinical and analogue samples has been that trait and state 
social anxiety are both significant predictors of PEP (Abbott & Rapee, 2004, Dannahy & 
Stopa, 2007; Kiko et al., 2012; Kocovski & Rector, 2007, 2008; Laposa & Rector, 2011). More 
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recently, researchers have begun exploring how additional factors implicated by cognitive 
models impact PEP. A study by Makkar and Grisham (2011a) examined a number of 
theoretically derived predictors of PEP among a sample of university students and community 
participants. In addition to social anxiety and state anxiety, higher frequency of negative 
cognitions, increased use of safety behaviours, greater self-focused attention, worse 
performance ratings, and stronger negative beliefs and assumptions were significant predictors 
of PEP, although only negative assumptions (e.g., ‘I have to appear intelligent’) remained 
significant after other relevant variables were accounted for (e.g., depression, state anxiety, 
performance ratings, etc.). Other studies have found that PEP is predicted by self-focused and 
inappropriately focused attention (i.e., attention towards negative evaluation, past experiences, 
and physical symptoms; Chen, Rapee, & Abbott, 2013; Gaydukevych & Kocovski, 2012), 
dysfunctional beliefs (Kiko et al., 2012), self-perceptions of performance and positive affect 
(Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Chen, Rapee, & Abbott, 2013; Perini, Abbott, & Rapee, 2006; Zou & 
Abbott, 2012), and self and trait perfectionism (Brown, 2011; Nepon, Flett, Hewitt, & Molnar, 
2011).   
Effects of Post-Event Processing over Time 
Research has also demonstrated that PEP can lead to the maintenance and worsening of 
negative self-perceptions over time amongst socially anxious individuals. Using a longitudinal 
design in an analogue student sample, Wong and Moulds (2012) demonstrated that PEP 
assessed at Time 1 significantly predicted maladaptive self-beliefs 1-4 weeks later over and 
above the effects of social anxiety, depression, general anxiety, and the strength of the original 
beliefs. In an experimental study on PEP, Abbott and Rapee (2004) instructed healthy controls 
and patients with SAD to engage in an impromptu speech task and evaluate their own 
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performance immediately after the speech and again one week later. Compared to healthy 
controls, individuals with SAD reported more negative self-ratings immediately after the 
speech and these were maintained in the week following the event. In contrast, the healthy 
control group’s rating actually became more positive in the week following the speech task. 
Dannahy and Stopa (2007) showed that relative to a low anxiety group,  individuals high in 
social anxiety rated their performance more negatively one week following a social interaction 
than immediately afterwards. Similarly, Brozovich and Heimberg (2011) demonstrated that 
socially anxious participants who had a high trait tendency to engage in PEP rated their 
performance of a social interaction more negatively one week after the interaction compared to 
immediately afterwards (again, this was not the case for the low social anxiety group).  
Cody and Teachman (2010) provided individuals high and low in social anxiety with 
standardized positive and negative feedback following a speech task. Participants’ memory for 
feedback was evaluated immediately after the task and again two days later, at which time 
engagement in PEP was also assessed. Surprisingly, results demonstrated that all participants 
remembered overall feedback as more positive than it actually was and that it became more 
positive over time, suggesting a positive recall bias. However, when positive items were 
examined separately, the results indicated that the high social anxiety group recalled their 
positive feedback as significantly more negative by the two day follow-up. The low social 
anxiety group did not show this pattern of results, suggesting that socially anxious individuals 
have a tendency to diminish positive feedback over time. The authors suggest that positive 
feedback may be particularly susceptible to distortion over time as it is likely to be 
incompatible with socially anxious individual’s existing self-schemas. In terms of negative 
feedback, individuals in the high social anxiety group remembered this feedback as being more 
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negative than the low anxiety group, although these ratings did not change over time. Post-
event processing predicted negatively biased memory recollections for negative, but not 
positive, feedback items at the 2-day follow-up assessment. This may be because the content of 
PEP in social anxiety is negative and the repeated activation of these memories solidifies the 
evaluations of poor performance. Given that cognitive models would not predict socially 
anxious individuals to be processing positive aspects of performance following a socially 
threatening situation, the lack of a predictive relationship with positive feedback items is not 
surprising. Furthermore, this study found that PEP mediated the relationship between trait 
social anxiety symptoms (as measured by the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998) and negatively biased memory recollections at the 2-day follow-up assessment.  
In other words, socially anxious individuals were more likely to remember a social event 
negatively after a delay because they engaged in greater PEP in the days immediately after the 
event.  
A second study by Cody and Teachman (2011) investigated how PEP might 
differentially impact various types of self-evaluations. More specifically, they examined 
differences between global (e.g., “I made a bad impression”) and local (e.g., “I stuttered”) 
evaluations. They proposed that PEP would be particularly detrimental to global evaluations 
since these evaluations might be especially likely to activate negative social anxiety schema. 
Local evaluations on the other hand, might be more accurately encoded and therefore less 
susceptible to distortion. To test these hypotheses, participants with high trait social anxiety 
and low trait social anxiety completed four speeches. Participants rated their own performance 
on various global and local items after the speech as well as after a 3-day delay. The results 
suggest that the high social anxiety group’s global ratings became more negative over time, 
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compared to the low social anxiety group and compared to both groups’ ratings for local 
information. These results suggest that global information may be particularly susceptible to 
distortion in individuals with social anxiety. Taken together, the findings from the studies on 
PEP highlight how perseverative thinking about a socially threatening event may serve to 
worsen self-perceptions and maintain negative self-perceptions in socially anxious individuals.   
Mechanisms Involved in Post-Event Processing 
The research presented thus far has clearly shown that PEP is a ubiquitous phenomenon 
in social anxiety, that a number of variables implicated by cognitive models predict 
engagement in PEP, and that it may serve to maintain anxiety symptoms because the types of 
negative cognitions that characterize SAD appear to become amplified with the passage of time 
as a result of PEP. However, the specific processes by which PEP might exacerbate such 
negative cognitions in social anxiety continue to be poorly understood. According to influential 
theories of memory, such as the component process model (Moscovitch, 1992), episodic 
memories are stored in the hippocampus and related areas of the medial temporal lobe and 
retrieved when internal or external cues trigger the associated memory. Importantly, each time 
a memory trace is reactivated or recalled, the information is freshly re-encoded within a novel 
context and stored as a separate memory trace in the brain. Schacter (2012) writes, “Human 
memory is not a literal reproduction of the past, but instead relies on constructive processes 
that are sometimes prone to error and distortion” (p. 7). Thus, memory is a reconstructive 
process, in which specific recollections are susceptible to manipulation over time. When a past 
event is recalled in a novel context, the memory for that event is pieced together in our minds 
from existing knowledge and beliefs and may therefore become modified, strengthened or 
expanded. Cognitive researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that memories for past events 
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can be influenced and distorted by pre-existing schemas and beliefs (Alba & Hasher, 1983; 
Loftus, 2005; Schacter, 1999). It is possible, therefore, that the repeated recollection of past 
social events in the context of PEP facilitates the process by which socially anxious 
individuals’ negative cognitions become amplified over time. Specifically, as the social event 
is recalled repeatedly during PEP it may become continually amenable to re-interpretation in a 
manner that is consistent with socially anxious individuals’ pre-existing negative cognitive 
self-schemas. 
Anxiety researchers have long been interested in the important role and potential 
negative impact of repetitive thoughts and actions on the maintenance of anxiety symptoms 
within the anxiety disorders. To this end, the literature on compulsive checking in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD) may be of particular relevance to our novel hypotheses about the 
function and impact of repetitive mental checking during PEP in social anxiety. Individuals 
with OCD who engage in repeated checking behaviour feel compelled to do so in a search for 
certainty that all threat has been removed from the situation (e.g., that the stove is in fact turned 
off). Although the act of checking can become quite burdensome for such individuals, it is 
reinforced by its anxiolytic properties (Rachman, 2002). Early researchers proposed that 
compulsive checking was the product of objective memory deficits, which result in an inability 
to recall previous checks (Tallis, 1995, 1997). Although there have been some mixed findings 
on this subject, most researchers now agree that OCD patients do not suffer from true memory 
impairments (Coles & Heimberg, 2002; MacDonald, Antony, Macleod, & Richter, 1997; 
McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003, 2004). Rather than objective memory deficits, the need to check repeatedly has been 
shown to occur when an individual lacks confidence in their ability to remember the previous 
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check (Hermans, Martens, DeCort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003). A series of experimental studies 
have demonstrated that the act of repeated checking does in fact lead individuals to feel less 
confident in their memories for past events, and to describe these memories as less vivid and 
less detailed (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Coles, Radomsky & Horng, 2006; Radomsky, 
Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003, 2004). These effects have also been 
replicated in tasks examining imagined or mental checking, in the absence of any physical 
checks. In a study by Radomsky and Alcolado (2010), participants were trained to either 
physically or mentally check a stove in a ritualized manner. The mental check contained all of 
the same elements as a physical check, but participants simply imagined completing the check 
in their minds. Consistent with previous research, greater physical and mental checking 
resulted in greater memory distrust, eroding  participants’ confidence in their memory for the 
vividness and detail of the stimulus checked. 
If PEP can be conceptualized as a repeated mental review or check of a prior social 
event, then we might expect that socially anxious individuals feel more uncertain about their 
social performance and engage in PEP in order to resolve feelings of uncertainty. Lack of 
certainty in one’s memory is expected to be problematic since it leaves the individual’s 
recollections susceptible to interpretations consistent with their pre-existing negative schemas. 
Furthermore, if socially anxious individuals are consistently reconstructing past events in a 
way that makes them more negative, this process will provide them with a large bank of 
negative social experiences, further contributing to their anxiety symptoms. Based on the 
research presented thus far, we expect that the repeated recollection that occurs during PEP 
distorts socially anxious individuals’ memories of past social events in a manner that is 
consistent with their negative social interpretation biases. However, given the negative 
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outcomes associated with PEP, it is not yet clear what factors might serve to initiate and 
maintain this negative thought process in the first place.  
Function of Post-Event Processing 
The Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model (Matthews & Wells, 2004; 
Wells & Matthews, 1994) articulates a process by which repetitive negative thought may be 
initiated and maintained in emotional disorders. The S-REF is a multi-level model of self-
regulation which identifies three levels of cognition that support information processing: 
knowledge and beliefs about the self that are stored in long-term memory, lower level 
automatic processing of external and internal stimuli, and controlled and voluntary processing 
that supports appraisals and initiates coping strategies. According to this model, incoming 
stimuli are processed automatically and may trigger intrusions in the form of self-referent 
beliefs. The S-REF model categories self-beliefs into two types: declarative and procedural. 
Declarative beliefs are evaluative beliefs about the self that are non-metacognitive in nature 
(e.g., “I’m worthless”, “I’m incompetent”). Procedural beliefs on the other hand are aimed at 
directing the activities of the controlled processing system and are therefore inherently 
metacognitive. Procedural beliefs can impact the processes that occur and the coping strategies 
that are utilized. For instance, two individuals with activation of the same negative declarative 
belief may respond differently to the threat based on the procedural beliefs that they hold. For 
example, in response to the belief “I’m inadequate”, one individual may engage in rumination 
as a coping strategy while the other may engage in active problem solving. The S-REF model 
therefore proposes that individuals with affective disorders engage in negative perseverative 
thinking because of the metacognitive beliefs they hold about such thought processes. The 
model further posits that both positive and negative metacognitive beliefs sustain engagement 
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in such repetitive thinking styles. It is suggested that positive metacognitive beliefs about the 
advantages of engaging in repetitive thought play an important role in initiating this 
maladaptive coping style (e.g., “thinking about personal inadequacies will help me gain greater 
insight into myself”). However, engaging in such thinking patterns in turn leads to the 
development of negative metacognitive beliefs about the disadvantages and uncontrollability of 
thought processes (“I cannot control my negative thoughts”). Therefore, according to this 
model, positive metacognitive beliefs play a central role in initial motivation to engage in 
negative thinking and serve to initiate this pervasive thought cycle. In turn, this process may 
paradoxically generate negative beliefs that such perseverative thinking is harmful, intrusive 
and out of the individual’s control.   
To date, a significant body of research has found support for the S-REF model and the 
role of metacognition in emotional disorders such as GAD and Major Depressive Disorder; 
however, metacognitive processes have received relatively little attention in relation to PEP in 
social anxiety. A preliminary study by Dannahy and Stopa (2007) used a modified version of 
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells’ (1997) Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) to assess the 
beliefs about cognitions that occur during PEP in individuals high and low in social anxiety. 
This measure consisted of four subscales: (1) cognitive self-consciousness (i.e., tendency to 
monitor one’s thoughts); (2) controllability of thoughts; (3) imagery; and (4) problem solving 
(i.e., positive beliefs about the usefulness of thinking about social performance after a social 
event). The results suggested that individuals with high social anxiety reported greater 
cognitive self-consciousness and experienced their thoughts as being more uncontrollable (a 
negative metacognitive belief). Individuals in the high social anxiety group also demonstrated a 
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trend towards experiencing more imagery during PEP, although this would not be considered a 
metacognitive belief per se.  
More recently, Wong and Moulds (2010) examined the relationship between social 
anxiety and positive metacognitive beliefs in two studies with unselected undergraduate 
students. In both studies, the researchers had participants complete a measure of social anxiety 
and depression as well as the Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale – Adapted for Social 
Anxiety (PBRS- SA; adapted from Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Sample items from the PBRS-
SA include “Thinking about my interactions with other people helps me understand past 
mistakes and failures” and “I need to think about social situations that have happened in the 
past to make sense of them”. The results of these studies demonstrated that social anxiety was 
associated with stronger endorsement of positive beliefs about PEP, even when gender, 
depression, and level of trait rumination were controlled for statistically.  
A follow-up study by Fisak and Hammond (2013) found similar results using an 
author-developed measure of positive metacognitive beliefs (Positive Beliefs About Post-Event 
Processing Questionnaire; PB-PEPQ), which they argued is a more comprehensive measure 
designed specifically to assess these beliefs in relation to PEP. In this study, a large unselected 
sample of undergraduate students completed the PB-PEPQ, a measure of PEP and a measure of 
social anxiety. The results indicated a significant relationship between positive metacognitive 
beliefs, PEP and social anxiety. Although these studies provide useful preliminary data, they 
employed a correlational design in unselected student samples and, therefore, further 
investigation of the nature of positive metacognitive beliefs in social anxiety is warranted. 
In addition to metacognitive beliefs, certainty is a second factor that may play an 
important role in maintaining and motivating PEP. Previous research has provided evidence 
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that individuals with high, compared to low, levels of social anxiety tend to report greater 
uncertainty about their own attributes and social accomplishments (Moscovitch, Orr, Rowa, 
Gehring Reimer, & Antony, 2009; Stopa, Brown, Luke, & Hirsch, 2010; Wilson & Rapee, 
2006). In one study, Wilson and Rapee (2006) examined beliefs about self-attributes as well as 
the level of certainty with which these beliefs were held among individuals with SAD and 
healthy controls. The results showed that not only do individuals with social anxiety hold fewer 
positive beliefs about their personality attributes, their views are also characterized by a greater 
level of uncertainty (this finding is true even when depression is controlled for statistically). 
Similarly, Moscovitch et al. (2009) had individuals with SAD and healthy controls rate 
themselves as well as their level of certainty on positive and negative self-attributes. Consistent 
with prior research, patients with SAD produced self-ratings that were significantly more 
negative than healthy controls. Additionally, these authors found that the healthy control group 
assigned greater certainty to positive self-attributes relative to negative self-attributes.  In 
contrast, individuals with SAD did not show this pattern, suggesting that they did not 
differentially ascribe certainty to either positive or negative self-characteristics. These findings 
suggest that individuals with SAD may lack a self-protective positivity bias which may 
increase self-esteem and positive affect among healthy controls. Finally, using a computerized 
“me/not me” self-descriptor task in which participants needed to respond “yes” or “no” to 
positive and negative self-attributes, Stopa, Brown, Luke, and Hirsch (2010) found that high 
socially anxious participants reported less confidence in their judgements and showed lower 
overall consistency in their ratings. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that 
socially anxious individuals may chronically doubt themselves and their ability to perform in 
social situations. However, to our knowledge, the impact of certainty has not been examined 
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with regards to specific social events, and it is not known whether or not feelings of uncertainty 
about specific aspects of one’s performance might motivate individuals to engage in PEP. In a 
search for certainty, individuals with social anxiety may repeatedly call to mind their memory 
of the event in an attempt to identify whether feared outcomes occurred. Although this process 
may ultimately lead them to feel more certain, it also provides an opportunity for the 
recollections to be reconstructed in a manner consistent with the individual’s existing negative 
self-schemas.  
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Research Questions  
Research on PEP to date has focused primarily on describing the phenomenon and 
examining the frequency, valence and consequences of engaging in repetitive thinking after a 
social event. However, few studies have investigated the specific factors which might maintain 
PEP. The goal of the proposed studies is to examine a novel theoretical model of PEP (see 
Figure 1). This model proposes that in the aftermath of a threatening social event, socially 
anxious individuals experience: (a) feelings of uncertainty regarding specific aspects of the 
events (e.g., “did I say something stupid?”); (b) motivation to mentally “check” or review their 
memories to determine whether feared outcomes occurred (e.g., “reviewing the social event 
will help me figure out whether I said something stupid”); (c) positive metacognitive beliefs 
about the value of repeatedly reviewing one’s social encounters (e.g., “reviewing the task will 
help me do better next time); and (d) consistent with previous studies, socially anxious 
individuals are expected to perceive their performance in a more negative and biased manner. 
Each of these factors is proposed to motivate socially anxious individuals to engage in PEP 
about the event. However, although PEP may be reinforcing because it helps to resolve 
uncertainty (e.g., “Ok, I am sure I did say something stupid”) and is viewed as a productive 
thought process (e.g., “I will be more prepared next time”), it may ironically provide an 
opportunity for memories to become reconstructed in line with existing negative beliefs and 
schemas about the self, thus leading to less accurate or more negatively biased recollections. 
Alternately, as might be predicted from the existing literature on OCD, it is possible that 
engagement in PEP will result in prolonged feelings of doubt and uncertainty that persist over 
longer periods of time and this possibility will also be evaluated in the current research. 
However, cognitive behavioural models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; 
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Hofmann, 2007) and anecdotal evidence from clinical work suggests that socially anxious 
individuals generally report strong conviction in their poor assessments of past performance 
and perceived social failures; we therefore speculate that the sense of uncertainty may be a 
temporary phenomenon that is eventually resolved based on existing beliefs and self-
knowledge.  
Three studies were designed to evaluate the proposed model. The current research 
focused on positive, rather than negative metacognitive beliefs, given their hypothesized role in 
the initiation of repetitive thought. A Pilot Study provided a preliminary investigation of the 
constructs of memory uncertainty and positive metacognitive beliefs and the relation between 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized theoretical model examining the association between uncertainty, 
mental checking, metacognitive beliefs, perceptions of performance and post-event processing 
in social anxiety. 
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these constructs and social anxiety. Study 1 was designed to examine the proposed model 
within the context of a controlled study in which the hypothesized mechanisms were evaluated 
as they unfolded following a standardized social task in the lab among individuals with a 
principal diagnosis of SAD, individuals with a principal anxiety disorder diagnoses other than 
SAD, and non-anxious controls. Finally, Study 2 was an experimental study on socially 
anxious undergraduate students designed to test empirically the assumption that repeated 
socially-relevant mental recall directly impacts certainty and performance ratings in the manner 
proposed by the model.  
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Pilot Study – A Preliminary Investigation of the Relationships between Social Anxiety, 
Metacognitive Beliefs, and Memory Uncertainty 
 The primary goal for the Pilot Study was to provide a preliminary understanding of the 
nature of memory uncertainty and positive metacognitive beliefs in relation to PEP in social 
anxiety. A secondary goal was to evaluate an author compiled questionnaire, the 
Metacognition and Certainty Scale (MACS), as a means of investigating these constructs. The 
MACS and a measure of social anxiety were administered to two large samples of 
undergraduate students. Based on the proposed framework, we expected that higher levels of 
social anxiety would be significantly correlated with endorsement of metacognitive beliefs and 
feelings of uncertainty in relation to previously experienced past social events.    
Method 
Participants 
Participants for this study consisted of two groups of non-overlapping University of 
Waterloo undergraduate students recruited through a research pool in exchange for course 
credit (Sample 1, n = 483; Sample 2, n = 708). No exclusion criteria were used. Of the total 
sample, the majority were female (69.3%) and the average age was 20.02 (SD = 3.60). Forty 
nine point six percent of participants were White, 27.7% were Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean), and 22.7% were classified as “Other” (e.g., Aboriginal, Black, Hispanic). A summary 
of participant characteristics in each sample can be found in Table 1.  
Procedure 
Participants were undergraduates who completed the mass testing screening procedure 
at the University of Waterloo. As part of a large online questionnaire battery, participants 
completed a measure of social anxiety and a measure assessing metacognitive beliefs and 
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degree of certainty in social situations. Questionnaires were administered in a randomized 
order, and participants were provided with course credit as remuneration.  
Measures 
Social Phobia Inventory (Connor et al., 2000; SPIN). The SPIN is a 17-item self-
report questionnaire used to asses social anxiety symptoms characteristic of SAD. Sample 
items include: “Parties and social events scare me” and “I would do anything to avoid being 
criticized”. The SPIN has been shown to differentiate between individuals with and without 
SAD, to have strong test-retest reliability (r = .86; Antony, Coons, McCabe, Ashbaugh, & 
Swinson, 2006), and excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α ranging from .87 to .94; 
Antony et al., 2006; Connor et al., 2000). Cronbach’s alpha for the SPIN in the current study 
was .92.  See Appendix 1 for a copy of the SPIN.  
 
Table 1 
Pilot Study Demographic Characteristics by Sample 
 
Variable     Sample 1 (n = 483)  Sample 2 (n = 708) 
 
Age       20.12 (3.5)   19.95 (3.67) 
Gender (% female)    68.3%    69.9% 
Ethnicity 
 White     48.4%    48.0% 
 Asian     25. 7%    27.8% 
 Other      22.4%    21.9% 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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The Metacognition and Certainty Scale (MACS). The MACS was developed by the 
authors as a general measure of positive metacognitive beliefs and memory certainty. The 
MACS items were adapted from the Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton 
& Wells, 1997) and the Why Ruminate Scale (WRS; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). The original 
MCQ and WRS scales were developed to examine metacognitive beliefs about worry and 
ruminative thought typical in GAD and Major Depressive Disorder respectively. Items from 
these scales were modified so as to be relevant to participants’ reactions in social situations. 
The scale consisted of 20 items composed of two subscales: metacognitive beliefs (e.g., 
“repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me gain new insights”) and memory 
uncertainty (e.g., “I’m usually certain I remember everything important about prior social 
situations after they happen” – reverse scored). All items were scored on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). See Appendix 2 for a copy of the 
MACS used in the Pilot Study. 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 Data from the two samples were analyzed separately. First, principal component 
analysis was conducted on the MACS in order to examine its factor structure. Next, reliability 
analyses were conducted for each subscale of the MACS.  Finally, relationships among social 
anxiety, metacognitive beliefs, and memory uncertainty were assessed using bivariate 
correlations.     
Principal Component Analyses  
Sample 1. Principal components analysis with an oblique rotation (direct oblimin) was 
used to examine the underlying structure of the MACS since the two hypothesized factors were 
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expected to be correlated with one another. One item (“I often check my memory after social 
events to evaluate how well I did”) was removed from the scale because it was theoretically 
related to the certainty scale but was loading onto the metacognitive beliefs factor. A second 
item (“There are disadvantages to going back and thinking about prior social events”) was 
likewise removed because it was the only item loading onto a third factor. An inspection of all 
eigenvalues greater than 1, as well as the scree plot (See Figure 2), indicated that a two-factor 
solution provided the best fit. Together, the two factors accounted for 54.45% of the variance. 
An examination of the factor loadings confirmed that the two obtained factors could be 
described as metacognitive beliefs (accounting for 41.49% of the variance) and memory 
uncertainty (accounting for 12.96% of the variance). Table 2 presents the factor loadings from 
the principal components analysis pattern matrix for each of the 18 items. Contrary to 
expectations, the two factors of the MACS were not significantly correlated (r = .02, p = .71).
1
 
Sample 2. Principal components analysis with an oblique rotation (direct oblimin) was 
used with a second sample to see if the factor structure could be replicated. The results 
revealed a nearly identical pattern of results. Once again, the two items removed from the 
Sample 1 data were not loading as expected and were therefore removed from the scale. An 
inspection of eigenvalues and the scree plot (See Figure 3) again indicated a two-factor 
solution with metacognitive beliefs (accounting for 41.96% of the variance) and memory 
uncertainty (accounting for 12.61% of the variance) emerging as two distinct factors. Table 3 
presents the factor loadings from the principal components analysis pattern matrix for each of 
                                                          
1
 Contrary to theoretically-derived hypotheses, the two scales on the MACS were not significantly correlated with 
each other. As such, the principal component analysis was repeated, using an orthogonal (varimax) rotation, 
which assumes that factors are unrelated. The two-factor model was supported for both samples using this 
approach.  
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the 18 items. Once again, the two factors of the MACS were not significantly correlated (r = 
.03, p = .47). 
Figure 2. Metacognition and Certainty Scale revealing a two factor solution in Sample 1 (Pilot 
Study). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
35 
 
Pilot Study Sample 1 Factor Loadings Pattern Matrix with Oblique Rotation (direct oblimin) 
for the Metacognition and Certainty Scale (MACS) 
Item 
No. 
 Metacognitive 
Beliefs 
Memory 
Uncertainty 
Metacognitive beliefs 
1. Repeatedly thinking about social interactions helps me 
figure out how well I did 
.81 -.01 
11. Repeatedly thinking about a prior social event helps me 
think about it more clearly 
.78 .03 
16. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me organize my thoughts 
.81 .06 
15. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me prepare for future social events 
.78 .03 
3. Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps 
me figure out whether I made certain mistakes  
.76 .03 
18. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me get things sorted out in my mind 
.78 .03 
13. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me gain new insights 
.77 -.08 
17. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me come to terms with how I performed 
.79 -.09 
12. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me avoid problems in future social encounters  
.70 -.02 
19. There are advantages to going back and thinking about 
prior social events  
.69 -.12 
4. Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps 
me remember the details of what happened  
.67 -.09 
2. Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps 
me figure out how poorly I did  
.64 .33 
14. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me cope with my emotions  
.66 .09 
Memory Uncertainty 
8. I usually have little confidence in my memory for social 
situations 
.03 .76 
9. I have trouble remembering important aspects of social 
situations I have been in 
.01 .76 
6. The more I think about prior social events, the more I 
forget important details of what happened  
-.08 .69 
5. I’m usually certain I remember everything important 
about prior social situations after they happen (Reverse 
Scored)  
-.43 .50 
7. I am often unsure about my performance in social 
situations 
.31 .54 
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Figure 3. Metacognition and Certainty Scale revealing a two factor solution in Sample 2 (Pilot 
Study). 
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Table 3 
Pilot Study Sample 2 Factor Loadings Pattern Matrix with Oblique Rotation (direct oblimin) 
for the Metacognition and Certainty Scale (MACS) 
 
Item 
No. 
 Metacognitive 
Beliefs 
Memory 
Uncertainty 
Metacognitive beliefs 
1. Repeatedly thinking about social interactions helps me 
figure out how well I did 
.81 .10 
11. Repeatedly thinking about a prior social event helps me 
think about it more clearly 
.81 -.05 
16. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me organize my thoughts 
.80 .00 
15. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me prepare for  future social events  
.79 .01 
3. Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps 
me figure out whether I made certain mistakes   
.79 .05 
18. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me get things sorted out in my mind    
.79 .00 
13. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me gain new insights 
.79 -.02 
17. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me come to terms with how I performed 
.79 .04 
12. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me avoid problems in future social encounters  
.76 .03 
19. There are advantages to going back and thinking about 
prior social events 
.66 -.11 
4. Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps 
me remember the details of what happened 
.64 -.17 
2. Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps 
me figure out how poorly I did 
.64 .25 
14. Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations 
helps me cope with my emotions 
.63 .07 
Memory Uncertainty 
9. I have trouble remembering important aspects of social 
situations I have been in 
-.02 .80 
8. I usually have little confidence in my memory for social 
situations  
.01 .76 
6. The more I think about prior social events, the more I 
forget important details of what happened  
.03 .65 
5. I’m usually certain I remember everything important 
about prior social situations after they happen 
-.42 .54 
7 I am often unsure about my performance in social 
situations 
.24 .46 
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Reliability Analyses. The metacognitive beliefs subscale of the MACS demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency across both samples. Cronbach’s alpha for the 13-item subscale 
in both samples was .93. Internal reliability for the 5-item memory uncertainty subscale was 
substantially lower across both samples, with Cronbach’s alpha of .65 in Sample 1 and .67 in 
Sample 2. 
Relationship between Metacognitive Beliefs, Memory Uncertainty and Social 
Anxiety. Correlations were computed to examine the relationship between social anxiety and 
the MACS subscales. For Sample 1, the correlation between SPIN scores and metacognitive 
beliefs was modest but significant, r = .25, p < .01, as was the relationship between SPIN 
scores and memory uncertainty, r = .27, p < .001. Similar results were observed for Sample 2, 
with a correlation of r = .20, p < .001 between the SPIN and metacognitive beliefs and a 
correlation of r = .28, p < .001 between the SPIN and memory uncertainty.  
Discussion 
The Pilot Study provided a preliminary correlational test of the hypothesized 
relationships between social anxiety, memory uncertainty, and metacognitive beliefs. As 
expected, social anxiety was associated with greater endorsement of positive metacognitive 
beliefs about PEP. That is, the higher their social anxiety symptoms, the more likely 
participants were to hold beliefs that engaging in repetitive thinking about past social events 
would result in positive outcomes, such as greater insight, more effective coping with 
emotions, and enhanced ability to organize their thoughts.  
Similarly, self-reported social anxiety symptoms were significantly correlated with 
memory uncertainty for past social events. Individuals with elevated social anxiety symptoms 
were more likely to report difficulties remembering aspects of past social situations as well as a 
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lack of confidence in their memories for these events. This finding provides preliminary 
evidence that feelings of uncertainty about one’s performance in a social task may lead socially 
anxious individuals to use PEP to scan their memory in an effort to increase their level 
certainty.  
Interestingly, the constructs of memory uncertainty and metacognitive beliefs were not 
correlated with one another. This finding suggests that these are orthogonal processes that are 
uniquely related to social anxiety and may therefore also exert independent influence on PEP. 
It is possible that one or both of these factors will emerge as independent predictors of PEP in 
socially anxious individuals. In other words, it is possible that socially anxious individuals may 
hold positive metacognitive beliefs and experience feelings of uncertainty, each of which 
contributes to greater engagement in PEP. Alternately, it may be that one of these factors 
emerges as a more significant contributor to this cognitive thought process. Further study is 
needed to determine the relative importance of each of these factors, and Studies 1 and 2 will 
seek to evaluate the contribution of each in an experimental design.  
The MACS was developed for the current study as a means of assessing memory 
uncertainty and metacognitive beliefs, and the results largely support its continued validation 
and use. However, the internal consistency of the memory uncertainty scale fell just below 
what is typically considered an acceptable value (George & Mallery, 2003), and results should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. However, as Iacobucci and Duhachek (2003) point out, 
poorer reliability of a scale typically makes statistical tests more conservative and does 
therefore not undermine our confidence in the significant relationships observed among 
variables.  
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The results of the Pilot Study are preliminary and should be interpreted within the 
context of its limitations. First, the Pilot Study relied entirely on retrospective recall and 
participants could report on their experiences of metacognitive beliefs and memory uncertainty 
with respect to any kind or number of social situations they chose (i.e., it lacked 
standardization). In addition, the current study was conducted with an analogue student sample, 
and results may not therefore generalize to clinical populations with SAD.
2
 The findings from 
this study provide justification for additional investigation, and Studies 1 and 2 were designed 
to address these limitations and evaluate the proposed theoretical framework in a more 
empirically rigorous manner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Future directions and limitations of this study and Studies 1 and 2 will be discussed in the General Discussion 
section.  
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Study 1 – Examining the Impact of Metacognitive Beliefs and Uncertainty on PEP 
following a Standardized Social Stressor 
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine experimentally what motivates individuals to 
engage in PEP following a standardized socially threatening event, with a focus on exploring 
the influence of metacognitive beliefs and uncertainty in a clinical sample of individuals with 
SAD in comparison to anxious and healthy control participants. Following a standardized 
speech task, participants were asked to provide performance and certainty ratings and to 
complete a modified version of the MACS. Follow-up assessments of performance and 
certainty were assessed 1, 4, and 7 days after the speech task, as was PEP. The study was 
designed to test the following hypotheses: 
1. Consistent with prior studies, it was expected that relative to anxious and healthy controls, 
individuals in the SAD group would rate their performance more negatively, less 
positively, and less accurately both immediately after the speech task and over time. 
Furthermore, as has been found in other studies (e.g., Cody & Teachman, 2011), we 
expected that performance ratings for the SAD group would become more negative and 
increasingly more biased over time relative to the control groups.  
2. Individuals in the SAD group would report greater uncertainty about their performance on 
the speech task immediately after the task.  
3. Compared to both control groups, individuals with SAD would more strongly endorse 
metacognitive beliefs, including the belief that mentally reviewing or “checking” their 
memory will help them achieve greater certainty. Although metacognitive beliefs have 
been identified across a number of anxiety disorders, it was theorized that beliefs specific 
to PEP about a social stressor would be unique to social anxiety.  
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4. As was proposed in the theoretical model, we expected that individuals in the SAD group 
would become more certain about their performance over time (i.e., by the 7-day follow-
up), as perception of how they actually performed worsens (i.e., they become more certain 
that they performed poorly), whereas the certainty and performance ratings for the anxious 
and healthy controls would remain constant.   
5. It was expected that PEP would be greatest in the SAD group relative to both control 
groups. Although it is well established that individuals with SAD engage in greater PEP 
relative to healthy controls or in analogue samples with high and low socially anxious 
participants, this is the first study to directly compare PEP in SAD relative to a clinical 
control sample following a standardized social stressor.  
6. Finally, it was expected that a diagnosis of social anxiety would lead participants to 
experience poorer perceptions of performance, greater metacognitive beliefs, feelings of 
uncertainty, and motivation to mentally review their memories after a social stressor, which 
would, in turn, motivate people to engage in more PEP. Engaging in more PEP would, in 
turn, result in greater attainment of certainty, but at the expense of worsening perceptions 
of performance. To test these predictions, two mediation models were hypothesised. First, a 
model was proposed in which metacognitive beliefs, uncertainty, mental checking, and 
perception of performance immediately after the speech would mediate the relationship 
between diagnostic group status, on one hand, and PEP in the days following the speech, 
on the other. Second, it was hypothesised that PEP would mediate the relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs and uncertainty, on one hand, and increased certainty and more 
biased recall in the days following the speech (see theoretical framework represented in 
Figure 1). 
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Method 
Participants 
The study sample consisted of three groups of participants: (1) SAD = individuals who 
met DSM-IV criteria for a principal diagnosis of SAD; (2) anxious controls = individuals who 
met diagnostic criteria for a principal anxiety disorder other than SAD (e.g., OCD, GAD) and 
had no significant social anxiety symptoms; and (3) healthy controls = individuals without a 
history of mental health concerns. The principal diagnoses of individuals in the SAD and 
anxious control groups are presented in Table 4. Participants were recruited from two sources. 
A large majority of the clinical participants (83.8%) were recruited from the Anxiety Studies 
Division (ASD) at the University of Waterloo’s Centre for Mental Health Research. The ASD 
is a collaborative research group that functions to recruit community participants with anxiety 
disorders into ongoing research studies.  Due to initial difficulties recruiting anxious control 
participants from the ASD in an expeditious manner, some of the participants in this group 
were also recruited from the Anxiety Treatment and Research Clinic (ATRC) at St. Joseph’s 
Healthcare Hamilton. All clinical participants were assessed using a structured clinical 
interview by trained graduate-level clinicians. Participants recruited through the ASD were 
assessed with the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998) 
and participants recruited from the ATRC were assessed with the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV Disorders (SCID-I; First et al. 1996). Individuals who endorsed active and 
interfering symptoms of mania, psychosis, significant suicidality, and substance abuse or 
dependence  
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Table 4 
 
Study 1 Demographic and Clinical Characteristics by Group  
 
 
Variable    SAD     Anxious  Healthy 
     (n = 24)  (n = 24)  (n = 25) 
 
 
Gender (% female)   62.5%   75.0%   80.0% 
Age – M (SD)    31.54 (12.69)  30.38 (9.43)  30.04 (9.50) 
Marital Status 
  Married or common-law  33.3%   45.8%   36.0% 
  Widowed    4.2%   0.0%   0.0% 
  Divorced/annulled   4.2%   4.2%   0.0% 
  Separated    4.2%   0.0%   8.0% 
  Never married    54.2%   50.0%   56.0% 
Ethnicity 
  Asian     12.5%   0.0%   0.0% 
  South Asian    4.2%   8.3%   4.0% 
  Black     4.2%   4.2%   0.0% 
  Latin American   0.0%   8.3%   0.0% 
  White     75.0%   70.8%   96.0% 
  Other     0.0%   4.2%   0.0% 
Psychotropic medications   20.8%   58.3%   0.0% 
Principal Diagnosis 
  SAD     100% 
  OCD        62.5% 
  GAD        16.7% 
  PDA        12.5% 
  Specific Phobia      8.3% 
# of comorbid diagnoses – M (SD) 0.83 (1.34)  0.83 (.83)   
  Comorbid anxiety disorder
a
  25.1%   45.9%    
  Comorbid mood disorder
b
  29.2%   20.8%    
  Other
c 
    8.4%   8.4%    
 
Note. SAD = Social Anxiety Disorder; OCD = Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; GAD = Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder; PDA = Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia.  
 
a
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (n = 11); Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (n = 1); Panic Disorder with 
Agoraphobia (n = 2); Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia (n = 1); Specific Phobia (n = 2). 
 
b
Bipolar II Disorder (n = 1); ; Dysthymia (n = 2); Major Depressive Disorder (Single, Recurrent, and In 
Partial Remission; n = 8). 
c 
Alcohol Dependence (n = 1); Anorexia Nervosa (n = 1); Bulimia Nervosa (n = 1); Substance Abuse (n 
= 1). 
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were excluded from participating. Healthy control participants were recruited from the ASD, 
and were included if they reported no current mental health difficulties. Consistent with 
previous studies (Moscovitch et al., 2009), healthy control participants were assessed using a 
semi-structured diagnostic phone interview (based on the MINI) which was conducted by a 
trained research assistant.  
Eighty participants completed the current study (SAD = 26; anxious control = 27; 
healthy control = 27). Participants’ group status was confirmed based on SPIN scores 
completed during the lab portion of the study. Seven participants were excluded from analyses 
for the following reasons: scores on the SPIN inconsistent with diagnostic group status (e.g., 
high SPIN score in healthy control group; n = 4); missing phone screen assessment for healthy 
control group (n = 1); and significant concerns about participant’s ability to engage in lab tasks 
(n = 2; one was due to difficulties with language comprehension and the second due to 
significant OCD rituals in which the participant reported and was observed engaging in 
throughout the session). The final sample size consisted of 24 SAD, 24 anxious control, and 25 
healthy control participants.     
Procedure 
 Eligible participants were contacted by telephone or email and provided with details of 
the study. Interested participants underwent a 15-20 minute diagnostic reassessment by a 
graduate level clinician to ensure that their symptoms had not changed significantly since the 
time of their initial diagnostic interview and to confirm their social anxiety symptom status. 
Participants in the control groups who endorsed any significant degree of social anxiety 
concerns, even sub-clinical levels, were excluded at this stage of recruitment. Eligible 
participants recruited from the ASD completed the study in an office in the Moscovitch 
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laboratory at the University of Waterloo and participants recruited from the ATRC completed 
the study in an office in the Fontbonne building at St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton. 
 Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to examine the thought 
patterns that occur following social events. Written consent was provided by all participants 
prior to beginning the study. Participants then completed a battery of questionnaires assessing 
demographic information and symptom measures (e.g., social anxiety, depression, state 
anxiety). Following this, they were provided with a 3-minute period to review eight possible 
speech topics and prepare for the standardized speech task. The topics were designed to be 
controversial (e.g., euthanasia, death penalty) so as to maximize feelings of anxiety (see 
Appendix 3 for the list of topics). Participants were advised that they would have 10 minutes to 
complete the speech. They were encouraged to use the full time limit although they were 
permitted to terminate the task early by ringing a bell if they chose. Participants were permitted 
to speak about any number of the topics provided (i.e., they could focus on a single topic or 
cover all eight), and were instructed that the goal was to provide their opinion as well as any 
relevant arguments.  
Following the preparation period, participants were introduced to a new researcher who 
they were informed would be observing the speech and gathering objective data on their 
performance. Participants were instructed to treat this individual as an audience member and to 
not engage them in conversation. The observer was instructed to maintain a neutral facial 
expression and to refrain from showing signs of approval/disapproval (e.g., smiling, nodding, 
frowning) during the duration of the speech. Observers were similarly instructed to monitor 
their non-verbal behaviour and to refrain from excessive movement (e.g., fidgeting). The 
observer made objective ratings of the participant’s performance during the speech task, which 
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were not visible to the participant. In addition, the speech task was video recorded to increase 
evaluative threat and to allow for further coding of speech performance by objective observers. 
The camera was located in front of the participant, in their line of sight. After the speech task 
finished (either because 10 minutes elapsed or because the participant terminated the task 
early), participants completed a second questionnaire battery which assessed state anxiety, 
perception of performance, certainty of performance, and metacognitive beliefs.  
Following this, participants were provided with $15 in remuneration. They were also 
provided with detailed information regarding the online component of the study. Participants 
were instructed that they would receive an email with a link for completing the questionnaires 
in 1, 4 and 7 days. They were instructed that the email would be sent in the morning and they 
were encouraged to complete the querstionnaires before midnight on the same day it was sent. 
If this was not possible, participants were asked to complete the follow-up as soon as they were 
able. As an incentive, participants received a $5 gift card for each of the follow-ups completed 
(for a maximum of $15). Furthermore, participants were advised that individuals who 
completed all 3 online follow-ups would be entered into a cash prize draw for $100 to take 
place once the study was complete.  
The online follow-ups were emailed to participants by the principal investigator 1, 4, 
and 7 days after the speech task. Participants were provided with a web address and unique 
log-in information. Follow-up questionnaires were compatible with smart phones and tablets 
for ease of completion.  The follow-ups assessed PEP, performance and certainty ratings. 
Participants were provided with an electronic feedback letter immediately after completing the 
final follow-up, which included additional details about the goals of the study as well as 
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treatment resources. Gift cards and a paper copy of the feedback letter were mailed within one 
week of the participants’ completion of the study.  
Measures 
Social Phobia Inventory (Connor et al., 2000; SPIN). The SPIN was administered as 
part of a questionnaire battery at the beginning of the study to assess symptoms of social 
anxiety and confirm participants’ diagnostic status (see Study 1 for a detailed description of the 
measure and Appendix 1 for a copy of the measure). In the current study, the scale 
demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .97).  
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale – Short Version (DASS 21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS is a 21-item self-report questionnaire assessing symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and stress experienced in the past week. Items are rated on a scale from 0 
to 3 (0 = did not apply to me at all; 3 = applied to me very much, or most of the time). Sample 
DASS items include “I felt that I had nothing to look forward to” and “I found it difficult to 
relax”. The DASS has been found to differentiate well between features of depression, physical 
arousal, and psychological tension and agitation and has demonstrated excellent internal 
consistency and concurrent validity (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). In the 
current study, all three DASS subscales had good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas 
of .90 for stress, .79 for anxiety and .93 for the depression subscale. See Appendix 4 for a copy 
of the DASS.   
Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty (PSPC; Cody & Teachman, 
2011; Rapee & Lim, 1992). The PSPC consists of 23 items relevant to speech performance 
and assesses both positive (e.g., appeared confident) and negative (e.g., bored the audience) 
domains. The original 17-item scale upon which the PSPC is based has shown adequate 
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internal consistency (α = .75 and higher) and inter-rater reliability (Brozovich & Heimberg, 
2011; Rapee & Hayman, 1996; Rapee & Lim, 1992). Six additional items developed by Cody 
and Teachman (2011) were added to the existing scale. These items were designed to assess a 
greater number of general performance domains in order to provide a more comprehensive 
evaluation of speech performance.  The additional items were as follows: was a good public 
speaker, used sophisticated vocabulary, smiled appropriately, made a bad impression, was not 
convincing, and bored the audience. 
 Participants rated each item on two separate subscales: performance and certainty, 
with higher scores indicating better performance ratings and greater certainty. On the 
performance subscale, participants were asked to rate how they believed they did on each item 
on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). On the certainty subscale, participants were 
asked to rate how certain they were of their performance rating ranging from 0 (not at all 
certain) to 4 (extremely certain). For example, if the participant rated the item “content was 
understandable” as moderately, they were asked to rate how certain or confident they felt about 
this rating. Written and verbal instructions, including a standardized example, were provided to 
each participant in order to ensure they understood how to rate each subscale. Positive and 
negative subscales were examined separately in relation to study hypotheses, as we expected 
that valence could influence performance and certainty ratings. The PSPC was administered 
immediately after the speech task as well as at the 1, 4 and 7 day follow-ups. In the current 
study, both subscales demonstrated excellent internal consistency across all timepoints, ranging 
from .86 to .93 for the performance subscale and from .87 to .92 for the certainty subscale. A 
copy of the PSPC can be found in Appendix 5.  
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Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958). The SUDS (see Appendix 
6) measures participants’ level of state anxiety/distress and is rated from 0 (not at all anxious) 
to 100 (extremely anxious).  The SUDS is face-valid, quick to administer and has been widely 
used in research studies and clinical settings (e.g., Cody & Teachman, 2010; Laposa & Rector, 
2011). Participants’ rated their level of state anxiety on the SUDS immediately before and after 
the speech task.  
 Metacognition and Certainty Scale – Post-Speech Version (MACS-PS). The 
MACS-PS is an author-compiled questionnaire designed to assess positive beliefs about 
engaging in PEP, memory uncertainty and mental checking and was adapted from the measure 
of the MACS described in the Pilot Study.
3
 The MACS-PS used in the current study differed in 
a number of important ways from the MACS used in the Pilot Study. First, whereas the MACS 
assessed beliefs about social situations more generally, the MACS-PS items were designed 
specifically in reference to the speech task completed in the lab. For example, the item 
“Repeatedly thinking about prior social situations helps me remember the details of what 
happened” was re-worded as “Thinking about this speech will help me remember the details of 
what happened.”  Furthermore, several items were added to the current version of the scale in 
order to assess the construct of mental checking, which was of interest for the current study, 
and was hypothesized to be theoretically distinct from the other two factors. Finally, the two 
                                                          
3
 The MACS and MACS-PS were developed concurrently, and although the content of most items is consistent 
across both versions of the scale, a few of the items do differ and should be noted. The MACS contains two items 
not found on the MACS-PS (“Repeatedly thinking about a prior social event helps me think about it more clearly” 
and “The more I think about prior social events, the more I forget important details of what happened”) and the 
MACS-PS contains one item not found on the MACS (“I have doubts about my performance on the speech task”). 
Of note, the factor structure of the MACS-PS was not examined in the context of the present study because the 
Study 1 sample size was relatively small for employing this analytic strategy, but the strong internal consistency 
of each of the three subscales provides promising evidence for its use. Future research is needed to investigate the 
factor structure of the MACS-PS.  
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items that were not supported by the factor analysis of the MACS in the Pilot Study are not 
included in the MACS-PS.  
The MACS-PS therefore consists of 3 subscales: a) Metacognitive Beliefs (12 items), 
which measures positive beliefs about engaging in PEP about the speech task (e.g., “I need to 
think about this speech in order to avoid problems in the future”); b) Memory Uncertainty (5 
items), which assess the extent to which participants have doubts or uncertainty about their 
memories for the speech task (e.g., “I have little confidence in my memory for the speech 
task”); and c) Mental Checking (3 items) which assess participants’ beliefs that reviewing the 
speech task will provide them with a means of checking whether certain events occurred (e.g., 
“Thinking about this speech will give me an opportunity to go back and check how the 
audience member reacted”). The MACS-PS was administered in the lab following the speech. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .89 for the Metacognitive Beliefs subscale, .84 for the Memory 
Uncertainty subscale, and .82 for the Mental Checking subscale. See Appendix 7 for a copy of 
the MACS-PS used in the current study.  
 Post Event Processing Questionnaire – Revised (PEPQ-R; McEvoy & Kingsep, 
2006). The PEPQ-R is a 14-item scale assessing the extent to which individuals engaged in 
PEP following an anxiety provoking event and was used in the current study to assess 
engagement in PEP in the week following the speech task. Sample items include “did you find 
it difficult to forget about the event” and “did you ever wonder about whether you could have 
avoided or prevented your behaviour/feelings during the event”? The scale has demonstrated 
good internal consistency (α = .87) and construct validity (Makkar & Grisham, 2011a; McEvoy 
& Kingsep, 2006). The PEPQ-R was completed at the 1, 4 and 7 day follow-ups and showed 
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excellent internal consistency across all time points (α ranging from .89-.90). See Appendix 8 
for a copy of the PEPQ-R.  
Objective Ratings of Performance 
In order to obtain an objective assessment of speech performance, four research 
assistants, blind to the diagnostic status of the participant or study hypotheses, were involved in 
providing objective ratings of  participants’ speech performance. Each  participants’ 
performance was rated by three of the four available observers. One of the raters was a 
research assistant who observed the participants’ speech live (i.e., the audience member). The 
other observers rated video recordings of the speech task. Although several of the research 
assistants were involved in both the live observation and video ratings, no single participant 
was rated by the same observer more than once to ensure independent observations.  Observers 
used the Performance subscale of the PSPC so that their ratings could be directly compared to 
participants’ self-evaluations of performance. All observers were trained by the principal 
investigator to objectively evaluate speech performance and were provided with detailed rating 
guidelines. Sample videos were used as part of the training process to help observers calibrate 
their ratings. 
 Inter-rater reliability was assessed using the intra-class correlation (one-way, mixed 
effects model for the consistency of average measures; ICC), which is appropriate for studies 
with more than two coders and for designs that are not fully-crossed (i.e., a different subset of 
coders is selected to evaluate each participant; Hallgren, 2012). Commonly-cited cut-offs 
provided by Cicchetti (1994) indicate that ICC values less than .40 are considered poor, values 
between .40 and .59 are fair, values between .60 and .74 are good, and values between .75 and 
1.0 are excellent. The ICC value in the current study was .78.  
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 In order to evaluate self-observer discrepancy, a standardized residual score was 
calculated (Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Taylor & Alden, 2011) which uses participant’s own 
speech ratings with observer ratings partialled out. As noted by Rodebaugh & Rapee (2005), 
although standardized residual and simple difference scores will generally yield similar results, 
a standardized residual score is conceptually more appropriate as it measures the extent to 
which self-ratings cannot be predicted from observer ratings. In order to calculate the 
discrepancy scores, observer ratings were first averaged across the three raters. To obtain the 
standardized residual, the rater’s average score was entered as a predictor of participant self-
ratings on the PSPC performance subscale into a regression analysis. The standardized residual 
output for this equation is a measure of the self-observer discrepancy, with scores below zero 
indicating that participants are negatively biased and scores above zero indicating that 
participants are positively biased relative to objective observers; thus, larger residual scores 
reflect greater bias.  
Results 
Data Screening  
Normality of variables was explored by examining absolute values of skewness and 
kurtosis and with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality. Guidelines provided by 
Lei and Lomax (2005) suggest that absolute skewness and kurtosis values below 1.0 indicate 
minimal nonnormality, values between 1.0 and 2.3 suggest moderate nonnormality and values 
beyond 2.3 indicate severe nonnormality. The K-S test was also examined, which compares 
observed scores to a sample of normally distributed scores with the same mean and standard 
deviation. Significant values on the K-S test indicate potential deviations from normality. 
However, as Field (2009) highlights, the K-S test is likely to be significant with larger samples 
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and a significant result does not necessarily indicate serious deviations from normality. Data 
should therefore be explored using both statistical tests and via visual examination with Q-Q 
plots.  
Examination of the skewness, kurtosis values, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and 
Q-Q plots (see Table 5) suggested that several variables had moderate or severe distribution 
problems.
4
 Although some studies have shown that the F statistic is robust to departures from 
normality when group sizes are equal (Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972; Harwell, 1992), 
control of the Type I error rate and statistical power can be diminished when this assumption is 
violated. Considering recent recommendations highlighting problems with transforming 
variables (García-Pérez, 2012) and the challenge of interpreting transformed variables, the non-
normal distributions were left untransformed. However, in order to ensure the integrity of 
obtained findings, results from all one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and t-test statistics 
were confirmed using a 95% bias-corrected confidence-interval bootstrapping procedure in 
SPSS (Efron & Tibshirani, 1985; Preacher & Hayes, 2004) and the pattern of results remained 
unchanged. Bootstrapping methods are more statistically powerful tests and are not dependent 
on normally distributed data (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). For statistical analyses that do not 
currently offer the bootstrapping procedure in SPSS (e.g., repeated measures ANOVA), a more 
conservative significance test (p = .01) was applied in order to avoid Type I errors and this will 
be highlighted in relevant analyses.  
                                                          
4
 Given that we had 3 groups of participants, there is reason to expect that the overall distribution for variables 
would not be normal because the scores come from different populations. The assumption of normality was 
therefore examined separately in each of the groups; the results of these analyses confirmed that the assumption of 
normality was not upheld for several of the variables. 
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Table 5 
 
Normality Indexes for Study 1 Descriptive and Dependent Measures 
 
Variable    N  Skew  SEskew  Kurtosis    SEkurtosis K-S      p 
 
Baseline 
  SPIN    73  0.83  0.28  -0.35  0.56  0.17  <.001  
  DASS - Depression  72  1.43  0.28  1.36  0.56  0.20  <.001 
  DASS - Anxiety   72  1.44  0.28  2.44  0.56  0.17  <.001 
  DASS - Stress   72  0.71  0.28  -0.22  0.56  0.14  .002 
  SUDS     73  0.56  0.28  -0.56  0.56  0.20  < .001 
Post-speech   
  SUDS    73  0.58  0.28  -0.74  0.56  0.24  < .001 
  PSPC Performance Total  72  -0.42  0.28  -0.88  0.56  0.17   < .001 
  PSPC Performance Positive 73  -0.11  0.28  -0.91  0.56  0.11  .08 
  PSPC Performance Negative 72  -0.60  0.28  -0.44  0.56  0.11  .05 
  PSPC Certainty Total  73  -0.86  0.28  1.02  0.56  0.10  .09 
  PSPC Certainty Positive  73  -0.87  0.28  1.34  0.56  0.12  .015 
  PSPC Certainty Negative  73  -1.26  0.28  1.78  0.56  0.17  <.001 
MACS-PS   
  Metacognition   73  0.22  0.28  -0.05  0.56  0.08  .200
a
 
  Memory Uncertainty  73  -0.27  0.28  -0.62  0.56  0.08  .200
a
 
  Mental Checking  73  0.52  0.28  -0.40  0.56  0.12  .007 
Day 1 Follow-Up 
  PSPC Performance Total  67  -0.60  0.29  0.01  0.58  0.09  .200
a
 
  PSPC Performance Positive 69  -0.09  0.29  -0.66  0.57  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Performance Negative 67  -0.89  0.29  -0.35  0.58  0.18  <.001 
  PSPC Certainty Total  73  -0.58  0.28  0.22  0.56  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Certainty Positive  73  -0.57  0.28  0.35  0.56  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Certainty Negative  73  -0.48  0.28  0.00  0.56  0.09  .200
a
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  PEPQ-R   69  0.87  0.29  -0.45  0.57  0.17  < .001 
Day 4 Follow-Up 
  PSPC Performance Total  67  -0.49  0.29  -0.47  0.58  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Performance Positive 68  -0.12  0.29  -0.43  0.57  0.10  .200
a
 
  PSPC Performance Negative 67  -0.75  0.29  -0.71  0.58  0.16  <.001 
  PSPC Certainty Total  68  -0.33  0.29  0.22  0.57  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Certainty Positive  68  -0.35  0.29  0.41  0.57  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Certainty Negative  68  -0.34  0.29  -0.03  0.57  0.06  .200
a
 
  PEPQ-R   68  0.87  0.29  -0.48  0.57  0.18  < .001 
Day 7 Follow-Up 
  PSPC Performance Total  68  -0.74  0.29  0.81  0.57  0.10  .17 
  PSPC Performance Positive 68  -0.21  0.29  -0.42  0.57  0.12  .03 
  PSPC Performance Negative 68  -0.88  0.29  -0.09  0.57  0.15  .002 
  PSPC Certainty Total  68  -0.23  0.29  -0.34  0.57  0.08  .200
a
 
  PSPC Certainty Positive  68  -0.23  0.29  -0.15  0.57  0.10  .200
a
 
  PSPC Certainty Negative  68  -0.22  0.29  -0.36  0.57  0.06  .200
a
 
  PEPQ-R   68  1.06  0.29  -0.04  0.57  0.22  < .001 
   
a 
This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
 
Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; PSPC = Perception of Speech 
Performance and Certainty; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty Scale-Post Speech; PEPQ-R = Post-Event Processing Questionnaire – Revised. * p <.05, 
** p < .01.
57 
 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was explored using Levene’s test. 
Although this assumption was generally upheld, it was violated with some variables and the 
results of these tests are reported with relevant analyses. When this assumption was violated in  
one-way ANOVA and t-test analyses, Welch’s F was reported as an alternative version of the 
F-ratio, as Welch’s F does not require equal variances. Similarly, although group differences 
were generally explored with Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests, when the violation of homogeneity 
could not be assumed, the Games-Howell procedure was used as it is robust to violations of 
this assumption.  
Preliminary Results 
Sample Characteristics 
Summary demographic and clinical characteristics for each of the diagnostic groups
5
 
are provided in Table 4. Participants did not differ across groups in age, F(2, 70) = .13, p = .88, 
partial η2 = .004, gender, χ² (2) = 1.99, p = .37, Cramer’s V = .17, marital status, χ²(8) = 5.62, p 
= .69, Cramer’s V = .20, or ethnicity, χ²(8) = 11.09, p = .20, Cramer’s V = .28. There were 
significant group differences in reported use of psychotropic medications, χ²(2) = 22.14, p < 
.001, Cramer’s V = .55. Inspection of the standardized residuals revealed values exceeding the 
critical value of 1.96 for the anxious control and healthy control groups (SAD = -.5; anxious 
control = 3.1; healthy control = -2.6). These results suggest that compared to expected 
frequencies, the anxious controls were significantly more likely and the healthy controls were 
significantly less likely to report taking psychotropic medications. Participants in the SAD and 
anxious control groups did not differ on number of comorbid DSM-IV diagnoses, t(45) = 0.02, 
p = .98.  
                                                          
5
 Anxious control participants from the two recruitment sites did not differ on any demographic variables, 
including age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, or medication status, (all p’s >.18). The two groups also did not 
differ on any of the trait measures, including social anxiety, depression, anxiety, or stress (all p’s > .06). 
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The means and standard deviations for all state and trait measures are presented in 
Table 6 and the correlations between the variables are presented in Table 7. A series of one-
way ANOVAs with post hoc tests were conducted to identify differences between groups on 
trait variables. Levene’s test was significant for the SPIN and DASS (Depression, Anxiety and 
Stress subscales) and Welch’s F statistic is therefore reported. As expected, there were 
significant group differences on the SPIN, Welch’s F(2, 40.39) = 94.51, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.76. Follow up post-hoc test using the Games-Howell procedure indicated that the SAD group 
had significantly higher SPIN scores than both control groups (p < .001). The anxious controls 
also reported significantly higher scores relative to the healthy controls (p < .001). The 
Depression subscale on the DASS also showed significant group differences, Welch’s F(2, 
35.76) = 22.86, p < .001, partial η2 = .36. Follow-up with Games-Howell suggests that as 
expected, relative to the healthy controls, the SAD (p < .001) and anxious control (p < .001) 
groups reported significantly greater depression than the healthy (p < .001) controls. The SAD 
group also reported significantly more depression than the anxious controls (p = .02). There 
were significant group differences on the anxiety subscale of the DASS, Welch’s F(2, 36.73) = 
30.10, p < .001, partial η2 = .39. Follow-up post-hoc analyses with Games-Howell suggests 
that the SAD group reported marginally significantly more anxiety relative to the anxious 
controls (p = .06) and significantly more relative to the healthy controls (p < .001). The 
anxious and healthy control groups also differed significantly, (p < .001). The groups differed 
significantly on the Stress subscale of the DASS, Welch’s F(2, 40.48) = 40.26, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .46. Follow-up analyses with Games-Howell indicated that the mean difference between 
the SAD and anxious control group was marginally significant (p = .06) and the difference 
between the SAD group and the healthy controls (p < .001) was statistically significant. The  
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Table 6 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Study 1 Variables by Group 
 
 
Measure   SAD          Anxious    Healthy  Scale Range 
 
 
SPIN    40.54 (11.63)       13.88 (8.28)  5.48 (4.71)        0-68 
DASS-Depression  8.16 (5.87)       4.08 (3.71)  0.92 (1.41)        0-21 
DASS-Anxiety   6.21 (3.92)       3.88 (2.94)  0.72 (1.17)        0-21 
DASS-Stress   11.47 (5.05)       8.13 (4.84)  2.20 (2.42)        0-21 
PSPC-Performance  39.87 (12.52)       54.25 (13.52) 62.08 (10.35)        0-92 
PSPC-Certainty   57.10 (16.38)       66.58 (11.26) 69.03 (9.87)        0-92 
MACS-PS-Metacognition 34.29 (11.79)       24.67 (12.08) 20.76 (9.87)        0-60 
MACS-PS-Uncertainty  15.42 (4.64)       10.42 (5.86)  9.65 (4.81)        0-25 
MACS-PS-Mental Checking 5.54 (3.59)       4.58 (4.09)  4.24 (3.03)        0-15 
SUDS-Pre-speech  38.88 (23.26)       25.42 (21.62) 11.84 (12.73)        0-100 
SUDS-Post-speech  50.89 (28.22)       30.42 (24.45) 16.80 (18.08)        0-100 
PEPQ-R-Day 1   66.65 (25.33)       38.78 (22.28) 28.98 (15.76)        0-140 
PSPC-Performance Day 1 45.87 (11.10)       56.62 (9.92)  62.39 (9.01)        0-92 
PSPC-Certainty Day 1  58.69 (14.36)       59.23 (13.57) 62.00 (16.00)        0-92 
PEPQ-R-Day 4   64.79 (28.08)       37.68 (22.61) 27.09 (15.55)        0-140 
PSPC-Performance Day 4 45.46 (11.00)       56.91 (11.09) 62.00 (10.36)        0-92 
PSPC-Certainty Day 4  59.42 (15.87)       58.85 (14.30) 61.64 (16.94)        0-92 
PEPQ-R-Day 7   56.17 (26.81)       30.90 (18.90) 25.38 (12.74)        0-140 
PSPC-Performance Day 7 42.52 (12.26)       54.29 (12.03) 59.71 (9.59)        0-92 
PSPC-Certainty Day 7  58.00 (17.08)       58.32 (14.83) 61.46 (16.27)        0-92 
 
 
Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; PSPC = 
Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty 
Scale-Post Speech; SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; PEPQ-R = Post-Event 
Processing Questionnaire-Revised. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
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Table 7 
 
Correlations amongst Study 1 Variables 
 
 
Measures    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10      11  
 
 
1. SPIN    — .61** .66** .66** -.61** -.32** .45** .46** .20 .61** .61** 
2. DASS-Depression    — .66** .77** -.45** -.09 .28* .23* .09 .55** .47** 
3. DASS-Anxiety     —  .72** -.56** -.21 .29* .35** .17 .58** .59** 
4. DASS-Stress      — -.56** -.23* .22 .32** .09 .64** .61** 
5. PSPC-Performance      — .11 -.27* -.50** -.10 -.51** -.67** 
6. PSPC-Certainty        — -.11 .28* .01 -.38** .22 
7. MACS-PS-Metacognition        — .26* .73** .33** .32** 
8. MACS-PS-Memory Uncertainty        — .03 .32** .37** 
9. MACS-PS-Mental Checking         — .14 .18 
10. SUDS-Pre-speech            — .70** 
11. SUDS-Post-speech             — 
 
 
Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; PSPC = Perception of Speech Performance and 
Certainty; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty Scale-Post Speech; SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale. * p <.05, ** p < 
.01 
61 
 
two control groups also differed significantly (p < .001), with the anxious controls reporting 
greater stress. 
Speech Length 
Participants were encouraged to speak for a full 10 minutes (600 seconds) for the 
speech task, although were permitted to terminate the task early by ringing a bell. A one-way 
ANOVA indicated that there were marginally significant group differences in speech length, 
F(2, 70) = 2.93,  p =.06, partial η2 = .08. Levene’s test was not significant, p = .11. Tukey HSD 
post hoc tests indicated that the only significant difference was between the SAD (M = 454.38, 
SD = 140.24) and healthy control (M = 542.12, SD = 111.98, p = .05) groups. The anxious 
controls (M = 492.17, SD = 128.92) were not significantly different from the SAD (p = .56) or 
healthy control (p = .36) groups.  
PEP Interval Length  
Most participants completed the online follow-up sessions on the appropriate days (day 
1: 87.0%; day 4: 79.1%; day 7: 76.5%). The average completion time was 1.22 (SD = .66) days 
for the  day 1 follow-up, 4.30 (SD = .65) days for the 4 day follow-up, and 7.53 (SD = 1.46) 
days for the 7 day follow-up. There were no significant group differences in the length of time 
interval for the day 1 [F(2, 66) = 1.20, p =.31, partial η2 = .03], day 4 [F(2, 64) = 2.07,  p =.14, 
partial η2 = .0], or day 7 [F(2, 65) = .29,  p =.75, partial η2 = .0] follow-ups. 
State Anxiety 
A 3 (group: SAD, anxious controls, healthy controls) × 2 (time: pre-speech, post-
speech) mixed-measures ANOVA was conducted with SUDS ratings as the dependent variable 
to assess whether there were any group differences or changes in anxiety from pre- to post-
speech. As expected, results demonstrated a significant main effect of group, F(2, 70) = 15.07, 
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p < .001, partial η2 = .30. There was also a significant main effect of time, F(1, 70) = 10.00, p = 
.002, partial η2 = .13, with higher levels of anxiety reported after the speech relative to before 
the speech. There was no group × time interaction, F(2, 70) = 1.02, p = .37, partial η2 = .03, 
suggesting that the speech task increased state anxiety equally for all groups. Levene’s test 
indicated that the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated for the pre-speech rating 
(p = .04) but not for the post-speech rating (p = .09).  
To explore the nature of group differences at the two time points, two follow-up one-
way ANOVAs with post hoc tests were conducted. Given that Levene’s test for the SUDS 
rating was significant at pre-speech, differences in anxiety were explored using Welch’s F. 
Results from this test indicated significant group differences in state anxiety prior to the 
speech, Welch’s F (2, 42.35) = 13.53, p < .001, partial η2 = .25. Post-hoc tests using the 
Games-Howell procedure suggest that the SAD group (M = 38.88, SD = 23.26) experienced 
significantly greater state anxiety prior to the speech task relative to the healthy (M = 11.84, SD 
= 12.73, p <.001) but not the anxious controls (M = 25.42, SD = 21.62, p = .11). The anxious 
and healthy control groups were also significantly different from one another on state anxiety 
immediately before the speech, p = .03.  
A second ANOVA exploring group differences in state anxiety at post-speech again 
indicated significant differences, F (2, 70) = 12.62, p < .001, partial η2 = .27 (the homogeneity 
of variance assumption was met for this variable and the test is therefore reported as usual). 
Post-hoc tests using Tukey’s HSD test indicate that the SAD group (M = 50.89, SD = 28.22) 
reported significantly greater state anxiety at post-speech relative to the anxious (M = 30.42, 
SD = 24.45, p <.01) and healthy controls (M = 16.80, SD = 18.08, p <.001), although the two 
controls groups did not differ significantly (p = .12).  
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Primary Analyses
6
 
Perception of Speech Performance (Hypothesis 1 and 4) 
Overall Performance. Participants’ perception of speech performance (as reported on 
the performance subscale of the PSPC) was assessed immediately after the speech, as well as at 
each of the follow-ups (See Figure 4 a). A 3 × 4 mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on 
individual’s performance ratings with group (SAD, anxious controls, healthy controls) as the 
between-subjects factor and time (post-speech, day 1, day 4, day 7) as the within-subjects 
factor. Levene’s test indicated that variances were homogeneous for all levels of the 
performance variable (all p’s > .09). Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant suggesting 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) = 51.36, p  <.001, and a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was therefore employed on the repeated measures variables. There was a 
significant main effect of time, F(1.85, 107.35) = 13.17, p < .001, partial η2 = .19 and the 
within-subjects contrast showed that this effect was quadratic in nature, F(1, 58) = 47.36, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .45 (the linear effect was non-significant, F(1, 58) = .09, p =.77, partial η2 = 
.00). The effect was such that all participants reported an improvement in overall perception of 
performance at the day 1 and day 4 follow-ups, before reporting a decline in performance 
perception at day 7. As expected, there was also a significant main effect of group, F(2, 58) =  
                                                          
6
 Given that the SAD group reported significantly higher scores on the DASS depression subscale, to rule out the 
influence of depression on results, all of the primary ANOVAs were repeated as an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) with DASS depression subscales entered as a covariate. Although a few significant effects of 
depression did emerge, the inclusion of depression as a covariate did not impact the overall pattern of results and 
our interpretation of them. For example, depression was significantly related to state anxiety, F(1, 69) = 8.63, p 
=.02, partial η2 = .11, but the main effect of group remained significant even when controlling for depression 
scores, F(2, 69) = 4.13, p =.02, partial η2 =.11. These analyses are not highlighted in the current work, as Miller 
and Chapman (2001) have argued that attempting to “remove” or “control” variables that are conceptually and 
non-randomly related is problematic and removes important shared variance. These authors argue that ANCOVA 
is an appropriate statistical approach when the covariate does not systematically differ between groups. However, 
when a variable differs in a meaningful way across groups, attempting to remove or covary out its effect is 
problematic as it compromises the grouping variable itself as well as the interpretation of results. Given that 
depression and anxiety share many underlying symptoms and have high rates of comorbidity, attempting to 
separate the effects of depression in the current study is inappropriate and is therefore not emphasized. 
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Figure 4. Study 1 PSPC performance ratings in SAD, anxious controls and healthy controls at 
post-speech, 1, 4, and 7 day follow-ups for a) overall perception of performance, b) perception 
of performance for positive items, and c) perception of performance for negative items. Higher 
scores indicate better perceived performance.  
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13.62 p < .001, partial η2 = .32, although the group × time interaction did not reach 
significance, F(3.70, 107.35) = 1.89, p = .12, partial η2 = .06. 
To examine the group effect at each time point, four follow-up one way ANOVAs with 
post hoc test examining group differences were conducted. Levene’s test indicated that 
variances were homogeneous for all variables (all p’s > .11). The pattern of results was similar 
across all time-points, with socially anxious individuals reporting significantly poorer 
perception of performance relative to both control groups. The first ANOVA examining 
performance scores immediately after the speech showed significant group differences, F (2, 
69) = 20.36, p < .001, partial η2 = .37. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean score for the SAD group (M = 1.73, SD = .54) was significantly lower 
(indicating worse perceived performance) than the anxious (M = 2.36, SD = .59) and healthy 
(M = 2.70, SD = .45) control groups at p =.001 level of significance. The anxious and healthy 
controls did not differ significantly, p = .07. These analyses were repeated at the 1-day [F (2, 
66) = 15.98, p < .001, partial η2 = .33], 4-day [F (2, 66) = 14.17, p < .001, partial η2 = .31], and 
7-day [F (2, 65) = 14.06, p < .001, partial η2 = .30] follow-ups. Post hoc comparisons indicated 
that the SAD group reported significantly worse overall performance than both the anxious and 
healthy control groups at each follow-up (all p’s ≤ .003), while the anxious and healthy control 
groups did not differ significantly at any of the follow-up assessments (all p’s > .15).  
Positive and Negative Aspects of Performance. Next, positive and negative items on 
the PSPC performance subscale were examined separately, as we expected that the groups may 
differentially recall positive and negative aspects of performance (See Figure 4, b and c). A 3 
(group: SAD, anxious controls, healthy controls) × 4 (time: post-speech, day 1, day 4, day 7) 
mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with positive PSPC items only. Mauchly’s Test of 
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Sphericity was significant suggesting that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) 
= 83.04, p  <.001, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed on the repeated 
measures variables. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was violated at the post-speech assessment and 1 day follow-up (both p’s < .05). Since there is 
no robust F-statistic available for mixed measures designs in SPSS, Field (2009) recommends 
following up a significant Levene’s statistic with Hartley’s FMAX, which provides an alternate 
test of differences in group variances since Levene’s test can be biased in larger sample sizes. 
The FMAX examines the ratio of the variances between the group with the biggest and smallest 
variance and compares this to critical values published by Hartley (1950). It can be assumed 
that the variances are homogeneous if the calculated FMAX value is smaller than the value in the 
published table (based on the number of groups and the number of cases per group minus 1). In 
the variables of interest, the calculated FMAX values were smaller than the critical FMAX value 
of 2.95 (at .05 level of significance); we therefore proceeded with the analyses. For perception 
of positive items, there were no main effects of time, F (1.64, 99.85) = 0.23, p =.75, partial η2 
= .00, or group, F (2, 61) = 2.12, p =.13, partial η2 = .07. However, the group × time interaction 
was significant, F (3.27, 99.85) = 5.00, p = .002, partial η2 = .14.  
To further examine the nature of this interaction effect, one way ANOVAs with post 
hoc tests were conducted. Levene’s test was not significant (all p’s > .06) with the exception of 
the day 1 follow-up (p = .003). In this case, Welch’s F test is reported. The first ANOVA 
examining the positive PSPC items immediately after the speech showed significant group 
differences, F(2, 70) = 11.67, p < .001, partial η2 = .25. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey 
HSD suggested that the SAD group (M = 1.26, SD = .57) reported significantly less positive 
perception of performance than the anxious (M = 1.76, SD = .77; p = .02) and healthy (M = 
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2.14, SD = .56; p < .001) control groups. The anxious and healthy control participants did not 
differ significantly, p = .10. Additional one way ANOVAs at the 1-day [Welch’s F(2, 42.47) = 
2.29, p =.11, partial η2 = .04], 4-day [F(2,65) = 1.06, p =.35, partial η2 = .03], and 7-day 
[F(2,65) = 1.63, p =.20, partial η2 = .05] follow-ups suggested no significant group differences. 
Next we examined negative aspects of performance using a 3 (group: SAD, anxious 
controls, healthy controls) × 4 (time: post-speech, day 1, day 4, day 7) mixed-design ANOVA 
with negative PSPC items only. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant for the repeated 
measures variables, χ2(5) = 33.37, p  <.001, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
employed. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated 
at the 1, 4 and 7 day follow-ups (all p’s < .01). Hartley’s FMAX values exceeded the 
recommended critical values for the 1 and 7 day follow-ups, confirming the violation of this 
assumption. As such, a more conservative significance cut-off of p < .01 was adopted for the 
following analyses. Results of the ANOVA suggested that even with the more stringent 
significance test, there was a main effect of time, F(2.18, 126.42) = 15.48, p <.001, partial η2 = 
.21, and the within-subjects contrast showed that this effect was best described as linear in 
nature, F(1, 58) = 28.53, p <.001, partial η2 = .33 (the quadratic effect was also significant 
although had a smaller effect size, F(1, 58) = 7.84, p <.007, partial η2 = .12). The main effect 
of group was also highly significant, F(2, 58) = 25.51, p <.001, partial η2 = .47. The group × 
time interaction showed an interesting trend, although did not reach statistical significance, 
F(4.36, 126.42) = 1.99, p = .09, partial η2 = .06. As can be seen in Figure 4 c, the results are 
such that both anxious and healthy controls show an improvement in negative aspects of 
performance ratings from post-speech to Day 1 which are maintained over the course of the 
week, whereas the SAD groups ratings remain consistent across all assessment time-points.  
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One way ANOVAs with post-hoc tests were conducted at each time point to examine 
group differences in negative perception of performance items. Levene’s test was significant 
for all 3 follow-up time points (all p’s < .01); thus Welch’s F is reported for these results. The 
results suggest that the groups differed immediately after the speech [F (2, 69) = 22.14, p 
<.001, partial η2 = .39], as well as at the 1-day [Welch’s F(2, 40.55) = 20.61, p <.001, partial η2 
= .46], 4-day [Welch’s F(2, 41.39) = 24.90, p <.001, partial η2 = .48], and 7-day [Welch’s F(2, 
38.84) = 25.72, p <.001, partial η2 = .48] follow-ups. Post hoc comparisons with the Games-
Howell test suggested that the SAD group rated their performance significantly more 
negatively (all p’s <.001) than both control groups at each of the time points. The anxious and 
healthy groups did not significantly differ (all p’s >.09). 
Self-Observer Performance Discrepancy (Hypothesis 1) 
To analyze accuracy of participant ratings of performance across time, a 3 (group: 
SAD, anxious controls, healthy controls) × 4 (time: post-speech, day 1, day 4, day 7) mixed-
design ANOVA was conducted with the standardized residual discrepancy scores at each time 
point (See Figure 5).  The homogeneity of variance assumption was met according to Levene’s 
test (all p’s > .05). Because Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant, χ2(5) = 37.83, p  
<.001, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was implemented. There was no main effect of time on 
discrepancy ratings, F(2.03, 117.59) = .99, p =.40, partial η2 = .02. There was a significant 
main effect of group, F(2, 58) = 12.85 p < .001, partial η2 = .31, but the group × time 
interaction did not reach significance, F(4.06, 117.59) = .71, p = .64, partial η2 = .02.  
 
Group differences in self-observer discrepancy ratings were further explored with four 
one way ANOVAs with post hoc tests at each time point. Levene’s test indicated that variances 
were homogeneous for all variables (all p’s > .14). The pattern of results was consistent at each  
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time-point, with socially anxious individuals reporting more negatively biased performance 
ratings relative to both control groups. The first ANOVA examining degree of discrepancy 
immediately after the speech showed significant group differences, F(2, 69) = 19.61, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .36. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score 
for the SAD group (M = -.82, SD = .77) was significantly more negatively biased than the 
anxious (M = .16, SD = .92) and healthy (M = .61, SD = .71) control groups at p < .001 level of 
significance. The anxious and healthy controls did not differ significantly in their discrepancy 
ratings, p = .14. These analyses were repeated at the 1-day [F(2,64) = 13.76, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .30], 4-day [F(2,64) = 12.74, p < .001, partial η2 = .29], and 7-day [F(2,65) = 13.21, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .29] follow-ups. Further examination of group differences with post hoc tests 
 
 
Figure 5. Study 1 PSPC performance discrepancy ratings (standardized residual scores) for 
each of the groups across time. Relative to objective observers, scores above zero indicate 
positive bias while scores below zero indicate negative bias. The absolute value is an indicator 
of the degree of bias, with larger scores indicating greater bias. 
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suggests that relative to both control groups, the SAD group’s ratings were significantly more 
discrepant from objective observers at each follow-up assessment (all p’s ≤ .001). There were 
no significant differences between the anxious and healthy control groups (all p’s > .14). These 
results indicate that participants in the SAD group had more negatively biased perception of 
performance across time, relative to the control groups. However, contrary to predictions, 
perceptions did not become more biased in the week following the speech. 
Certainty (Hypothesis 2 and 4) 
Overall Certainty. Participants rated the extent to which they felt certain about each of 
the items on the PSPC certainty subscale; these ratings were immediately after the speech as 
well as at each of the follow-ups. A 3 (group: SAD, anxious controls, healthy controls) × 4 
(time: post-speech, day 1, day 4, day 7) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on the PSPC 
certainty scores to examine group differences in certainty ratings as well as changes over time. 
According to Levene’s test, the homogeneity of variance assumption was met for all variables 
(all p’s > 15). The test of Sphericity was significant, χ2(5) = 39.47, p  <.001, so a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction used. There was a small main effect of time F(2.10, 130.06) = 3.39, p < .04, 
partial η2 = .05, and the group × time interaction approached significance, F(4.20, 130.06) = 
2.08, p = .08, partial η2 = .06. The main effect of group was not significant, F(2, 62) = 1.39,  p 
=.26, partial η2 = .04. As can be seen in Figure 6, the SAD group felt greater uncertainty about 
their speech immediately after the speech compared to both control groups and these ratings 
remained unchanged over time; in contrast, control participants’ higher initial certainty ratings 
gradually declined in the week following the speech task. 
 To examine the marginally significant group interaction and further explore group 
differences, four one-way ANOVAs with group as the between subjects factor and the PSPC 
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certainty scores at each time point were conducted. Levene’s test indicated that variances were 
homogeneous for all variables (all p’s > .38). These analyses revealed a significant difference 
between groups immediately after the speech, F (2, 70) = 4.82, p =.01, partial η2 = .12. Tukey 
HSD post hoc tests showed that the SAD group (M = 2.48, SD = .71) reported marginally less 
overall certainty relative to the anxious controls (M = 2.90, SD = .49, p = .06) and significantly 
less certainty relative to the healthy controls (M = 3.00, SD = .62, p = .01). The two control 
groups did not differ from one another (p = .82). These analyses were repeated at each of the 
follow-up time points and indicated no significant group differences (all F’s < .36, all p’s > 
.70).  
 
 
Figure 6. Study 1 PSPC certainty ratings in SAD, anxious controls and healthy controls at 
post-speech, 1, 4, and 7 day follow-ups. Higher scores indicate greater certainty. 
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Positive and Negative Aspects of Certainty. Certainty on positive and negative PSPC 
items was examined separately to determine whether participants felt more certain depending 
on the valence of the items. A one-way ANOVA with group as the between subjects factor 
indicated that participants differed significantly in their certainty for positive aspects of speech 
performance, F(2, 70) = 11.67, p <.001, partial η2 = .25. Post hoc comparisons with Tukey 
HSD indicated that the SAD group (M = 1.26, SD = .57) reported significantly less certainty 
than both the anxious (M = 1.76, SD = .77, p = .02) and healthy (M = 2.14, SD = .56, p <.001) 
control groups. The mean difference between the anxious and healthy control groups was not 
significant (p =.10). A second one-way ANOVA conducted with negative PSPC certainty 
items as the dependent variable showed similar results, F(2, 69) = 22.14, p <.001, partial η2 = 
.39. The Tukey HSD test indicated that the SAD group (M = 2.09, SD = .64) reported 
significantly less certainty on negative items than both the anxious (M = 2.82, SD = .57, p 
<.001) and healthy (M = 3.13, SD = .43, p <.001) control groups. The group difference 
between the anxious and healthy controls did not reach significance (p =.12).  
Certainty for positive relative to negative items was explored with a 3 (group: SAD, 
anxious controls, healthy controls) × 2 (valence: positive, negative) mixed-design ANOVA at 
each of the time points and these results are presented in Figure 7. Levene’s test was not 
significant for any of the analyses, all p’s > .09. Immediately after the speech, as was already 
described, there was a significant main effect of group, with the SAD participants reporting 
significantly less certainty across both positive and negative items, F(1, 70) = 22.14, p <.001, 
partial η2 = .39. Interestingly, there was also a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 70) = 
4.16, p =.05, partial η2 = .06, suggesting that participants felt more uncertain about positive 
aspects of their performance. The group × valence interaction was not significant, F(2, 70) = 
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.76, p =.47, partial η2 = .02 indicating that immediately after the speech all participants felt 
more uncertain about positive aspects of performance.  
A second ANOVA was repeated at the 1-day follow-up, and as has already been found, 
the main effect of group was no longer significant, F(2, 70) = .31, p =.73, partial η2 = .01. 
Similar to post-speech, the main effect of valence was significant and was also a larger effect 
than had been found at post-speech, F(1, 70) = 21.72, p <.001, partial η2 = .24, as was the 
group × valence interaction, F(2, 70) = 3.37, p =.04, partial η2 = .09. To further explore the 
nature of the omnibus time × valence group interaction effects, paired-sampled t-tests were 
conducted within each group separately across the positive and negative certainty subscales. A 
Bonferroni correction was applied to control for multiple comparisons thus setting the new 
level of statistical significance to p = .02 (p = .05/3). Results indicated that one day after the  
 
Figure 7. Positive and negative PSPC certainty ratings in the SAD, anxious and healthy control 
groups across time (Study 1).  Higher scores indicate greater certainty. Higher scores indicate 
greater certainty. 
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speech, participants in the SAD group felt equally certain about positive and negative aspects 
of performance, t(23) = .62, p =.54, r = .13. In contrast, the anxious control [t(23) = 3.43, p = 
.002, r = .58] and healthy control [t(24) = 3.96, p =.001, r = .63] participants continued to feel 
more uncertain about positive relative to negative aspects of performance (consistent with their 
ratings immediately after the speech). 
This same pattern of results was found at the 4-day follow up with a non-significant 
main effect of group [F(2, 65) = .21, p = .81, partial η2 = .01], a significant effect of valence 
[F(1, 65) = 16.81, p <.001, partial η2 = .21], and a significant interaction, [F(2, 65) = 3.12, p = 
.05, partial η2 = .09]. Once again, the interaction was explored with paired-samples t-tests, 
applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (p = .02), and showed a pattern 
consistent with Day 1 follow-up. Once again, the SAD group was equally certain regardless of 
valence of items, [t(23) = .72, p = .48, r = .15], whereas the anxious [t(21) = 3.90, p = .001, r = 
.65] and healthy [t(21) = 2.21, p = .04, r = .43] controls were less certain about positive relative 
to negative aspects of performance.  
The pattern was similar by the 7-day follow-up, with no main effect of group, [F(2, 70) 
= .76, p = .47, partial η2 = .02], no main effect of valence, [F(2, 65) = .30, p = .74, partial η2 = 
.009], and a significant interaction, [F(2, 65) = 5.80, p = .005, partial η2 = .15]. Follow-up 
paired-samples t-tests (Bonferroni correction, p = .05) again indicated no difference in 
certainty in the SAD group across valence, [t(22) = .11, p = .92, r = .02], whereas the anxious 
[t(20) = 3.51, p = .002, r = .62] and healthy [t(23) = 5.04, p < .001, r = .72] controls reported 
less certainty about positive than negative aspects of performance.  
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Memory Uncertainty (Hypothesis 2) 
Consistent with the results obtained from the PSPC certainty subscale, there was a 
significant difference between groups on memory uncertainty reported after the speech task, 
F(2, 70) = 9.05, p < .001, partial η2 = .21. Specifically, socially anxious individuals (M = 3.08, 
SD = .93) reported greater uncertainty in their memory for the speech relative to the anxious 
(M = 2.08, SD = 1.17, p = .003) and healthy controls (M = 1.93, SD = .96, p = .001). The two 
control groups did not differ significantly from each other, p = .86. Levene’s test was not 
significant, p = .51.  
Metacognitive Beliefs (Hypothesis 3) 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate group differences in metacognitive 
beliefs. Levene’s test was not significant, p = .41. Results demonstrated a significant effect, 
F(2, 70) = 8.29, p < .001, partial η2 = .19, with Tukey HSD post hoc test showing that the SAD 
group (M = 2.63, SD = .93) reported significantly greater endorsement of such beliefs relative 
to both anxious (M = 1.91, SD = .98, p = .01) and healthy (M = 1.63, SD = .75, p < .001) 
controls. There were no significant differences between the two control groups, p = .50. 
Mental checking (Hypothesis 3) 
Differences in beliefs about mentally checking or reviewing the speech task were 
evaluated with a one-way independent ANOVA. Results revealed that there were no significant 
group differences in beliefs about mentally checking or reviewing the speech task, F(2, 70) = 
.86, p = .43, partial η2 = .02. Levene’s test was not significant, p = .34. 
Post-Event Processing (Hypothesis 5) 
Post-event processing was evaluated 1, 4, and 7 days after the speech task and a 3 
(group: SAD, anxious controls, healthy controls) × 3 (time: day 1, day 4, day 7) mixed-
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measures ANOVA was used to evaluate group differences and changes over time. As expected, 
there was a significant main effect of group, F(2, 61) = 18.42, p < .001, partial η2 = .38. There 
was also a significant main effect of time, F(2, 122) = 13.64, p < .001, partial η2 = .18, with 
PEP decreasing over the course of the week for all participants. The within-subjects contrast 
showed that the effect of time was linear in nature, F(1, 61) = 24.36, p < .001, partial η2 = .29 
(the quadratic effect was non-significant, F(1, 61) = 1.00, p = .32, partial η2 = .02). Contrary to 
expectations, the group × time interaction was not significant, F(4, 122) = .99, p = .42, partial 
η2 = .03. 
Group differences in PEP at each of the time points was further explored with three 
one-way ANOVAs with post hoc tests at each time point. Levene’s test indicated that the 
homogeneity of variance assumption was violated (all p’s <.003), and Welch’s F-ratio is 
therefore reported. The pattern of results was similar across all three follow-ups and is 
consistent with previous findings in the literature. The first ANOVA examining PEP one day 
after the speech showed significant group differences, F(2, 41.42) = 22.81, p < .001, partial η2 
= .42. Post hoc comparisons using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean score for the 
SAD group (M = 4.85, SD = 2.27) was significantly higher than the anxious (M = 2.25, SD = 
1.91) and healthy (M = 1.16, SD = 1.28) control groups at p < .001 level of significance. The 
anxious and healthy controls did not differ significantly in their level of PEP, p = .07. These 
analyses were repeated at the 4-day [F(2, 41.33) = 18.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .37] and 7-day 
[F(2, 38.20) = 14.21, p < .001, partial η2 = .35] follow-ups. Post hoc tests for the remaining 
two follow-ups were comparable to Day 1, with the SAD group engaging in significantly more 
PEP relative to both control groups (all p’s < .002). The anxious and healthy control groups did 
not differ from one another at either of these time points (all p’s > .15). 
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Mediation Analyses
7 
(Hypothesis 6) 
The relationship between group status and PEP in the days following the speech was 
explored using a multiple mediator model with perception of overall speech performance, 
overall certainty of performance ratings, metacognitive beliefs, memory uncertainty, and 
mental checking (measured at post-speech) entered as potential mediating variables.
8
 It was 
expected that the proposed mediators would be more strongly related to PEP in the SAD group 
relative to both control groups. Given that the independent variable was multicategorical, 
dummy coding was used to represent the groups for these analyses. The SAD group was 
chosen as the reference group as we were most interested in exploring the unique effect of 
having a SAD diagnosis relative to other anxiety disorders or no mental health concerns. Using 
this method, two dummy-coded variables were created as the independent variables: a) SAD 
group vs. anxious controls; and b) SAD group vs. healthy controls. 
 To test the indirect effect of the independent variables on PEP via the proposed 
mediators, bias-corrected bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) were 
implemented using a macro program for SPSS developed by Hayes and Preacher (in press). 
Boostrapping procedures are recommended as the preferred method of analyzing mediation 
(Jose, 2013) and do not require symmetry or normality in the sampling distribution. For these 
data, a 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval was used to generate 5,000 
                                                          
7
 In addition to mediation analyses, we reasoned that the association between PEP and metacognitive beliefs, 
PSPC certainty, memory uncertainty, and mental checking might be moderated by participants’ perceptions of 
speech performance. For instance, it is possible that the hypothesized relationships would only occur among 
individuals who perceived their performance to be poor. This hypothesis was evaluated using linear regression 
moderation analyses with each of the constructs of interest entered separately as a predictor variable 
(metacognitive beliefs, PSPC certainty, memory uncertainty and mental checking), PEP at each of the time points 
entered as the outcome variable, and perception of performance immediately after the speech entered as the 
moderating variable. No significant moderating relationships were found, all p’s >.11. 
8
 The mediation model was re-run with depression scores included as a mediator. The pattern of results did not 
change, although depression scores were also identified as a mediating variable at the Day 1 and Day 7 follow-
ups. 
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bootstrap samples. Figure 8 depicts the results of this mediation model and results. Path a 
represents the direct paths from the independent variables to each of the mediators; path b 
represents the direct paths from each of the mediators to the outcome variable while the 
independent variable is held constant; path c represents the total effect of the independent 
variables on the outcome variable; and path cʹ represents the effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable after accounting for the mediators. The indirect effect (ab) is 
considered significant if the confidence interval does not straddle zero.  
In the total effects mediation model, group status and the 5 mediators accounted for a 
significant amount of the variance in predicting PEP at the Day 1 follow-up, R
2
 = .42, F (2, 65) 
= 23.94, p < .001. Consistent with results presented previously, examination of the direct 
effects suggest that the SAD group reported significantly more engagement in PEP relative to 
the anxious (path c1; B = -2.67, SE = .56, t = -4.79, p <.001) and healthy controls (path c2; B = 
-3.76, SE = .56, t = -6.74, p <.001). Examination of the a paths indicates that relative to both 
control groups, participants in the SAD group also reported significantly worse speech 
performance ratings (SAD vs. anxious: B = .58, SE = .16, t = 3.70, p <.001; SAD vs. healthy: 
B = .90, SE = .16, t = 5.68, p <.001), greater uncertainty (SAD vs. anxious: B = .37, SE = .19, t 
= 2.00, p =.05; SAD vs. healthy: B = .51, SE = .19, t = 2.72, p =.008), more metacogitive 
beliefs (SAD vs. anxious: B = -.81, SE = .26, t = -3.15, p =.002; SAD vs. healthy: B = -1.09, 
SE = .26, t = -4.26, p <.001), and greater memory uncertainty (SAD vs. anxious: B = -.87, SE = 
.30, t = -2.91, p =.005; SAD vs. healthy: B = -1.07, SE = .30, t = -3.58, p <.001). For mental 
checking, the SAD group reported significantly greater checking relative to the healthy (B = -
.68, SE = .33, t = -2.04, p =.05), but not the anxious (B = -.56, SE = .33, t = -1.69, p =.10) 
controls. The associations between two mediators and the outcome variable were also  
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Figure 8. Study 1 mediation model of group (dummy coded with SAD group as reference) on 
PEP at the Day 1 follow-up through multiple mediators (perception of speech performance, 
certainty, metacognitive beliefs, memory uncertainty, and mental checking). Unstandardized 
regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are provided. Direct effects of 
group status on PEP are represented with dotted-lines. * p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p <.001. 
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significant (b paths). More specifically, the effects of worse performance ratings (B = -1.58, SE 
= .38, t = -4.20, p <.001) and greater endorsement of positive metacognitive beliefs (B = 1.27, 
SE = .33, t = 3.79, p <.001) were associated with greater PEP one day after the speech. The 
other mediators were not significantly associated with PEP while holding the independent 
variable constant (all absolute B’s < .31, all p’s > .23) Furthermore, when looking at the 
indirect effects, the only mediators whose 95% confidence intervals did not overlap with zero 
were performance ratings and metacognitive beliefs indicating that these variables are 
significant mediators (see Table 8).  
Table 8 
 
Indirect Effects (ab) of Group Status on PEP Day 1 Through Proposed Mediators for Study 1 
 
 
Criterion          Indirect Effect  SE      95% CI 
          
 
PSPC Performance 
  SAD vs Anxious   -0.93   0.35  [-1.68, -0.34] 
  SAD vs Healthy   -1.42   0.43  [-2.31, -0.67]  
PSPC Certainty 
  SAD vs Anxious   0.03   0.13  [-0.22, 0.31]  
  SAD vs Healthy   0.04   0.17  [-0.29, 0.40] 
MACS-PS-Metacognition 
  SAD vs Anxious   -1.02   0.42  [-1.93, -0.30]  
  SAD vs Healthy   -1.38   0.49  [-2.45, -0.53] 
MACS-PS-Memory Uncertainty  
  SAD vs Anxious   -0.03   0.18  [-0.41, 0.34]  
  SAD vs Healthy   -0.03   0.22  [-0.48, 0.40] 
MACS-PS-Mental Checking 
  SAD vs Anxious   0.18   0.20  [-0.14, 0.66]  
  SAD vs Healthy   0.21   0.22  [-0.15, 0.75] 
 
 
Note. SE = Standard Error; CI = Confidence Interval; SAD = Social Anxiety Disorder; PSPC = 
Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty 
Scale - Post Speech. 
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The mediation analyses were repeated with PEP at Days 4 and 7 entered as the outcome 
variables. The model parameters and pattern of results were similar for both time points and 
are therefore not reported here. Importantly, the indirect mediation effects were confirmed at 
both time points, suggesting that perception of performance and metacognitive beliefs 
continued to mediate the relationship between group status and PEP for at least one week 
following a social stressor task.  
The second mediation hypothesis that was proposed was that feelings of uncertainty 
and metacognitive beliefs would lead participants to engage in PEP, which in turn would result 
in increased certainty and worsening perceptions of performance. To test this hypothesis two 
multiple mediator models were explored.
9
 First, post-speech metacognitive beliefs, 
performance uncertainty, and memory uncertainty were entered as predictors with changes in 
performance certainty from post-speech to Day 1 (difference score: PSPC Certainty post 
speech – PSPC Certainty Day 1 follow-up10) entered as the dependent variable and PEP at Day 
1 entered as the mediator (See Figure 9). The total effects model was significant, suggesting 
that PEP, memory uncertainty, and metacognitive beliefs accounted for a significant amount of 
the variance in predicting changes in certainty one day after the speech, R
2
 = .36, F (3, 65) = 
12.08, p < .001. The direct effects (path c) indicated that changes in certainty at Day 1 were 
significantly related to reported PSPC certainty scores assessed immediately after the speech, B 
= .48, SE = .08, t = 5.94, p < .001, and marginally significantly related to general memory 
uncertainty, B = .10, SE = .05, t = 1.94, p =.06. The direct effect of metacognition was not  
                                                          
9
 The second and third mediation models were re-run including depression as a predictor variable. Although 
depression was significantly related to PEP at each of the follow-ups and was associated with worsening 
performance appraisals at Day 1 and Day 4 follow-ups, it did not emerge as a significant mediator of these 
relationships. 
10
 A difference score was used as the dependent variable (rather than certainty ratings at Day 1) because it was 
theorized that PEP would result in increased PSPC certainty ratings over time, and this model examines whether 
the predictor and mediating variables are associated with changes in certainty. 
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Figure 9. Study 1 mediation model of metacognitive beliefs, performance uncertainty (PSPC 
certainty scale), and memory uncertainty on changes in certainty ratings at the Day 1 follow-up 
via post-event processing (Day 1). Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors 
(in parentheses) are provided. Direct effects of the predictor variables on certainty change 
scores are indicated with dotted-lines. * p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p <.001.  
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c1ʹ, .13 (.05)* 
c2ʹ, .48 (.08)*** 
c2, .48 (.08)*** 
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a3, 1.34 (.25)*** 
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significant, B = -.02, SE = .06, t = -.26, p =.79. Examination of the a paths indicated significant 
relationships between metacognitive beliefs, B = 1.34, SE = .25, t = 5.41, p <.001, and memory 
uncertainty, B = .56, SE = .22, t = 2.54, p =.01, with PEP at Day 1. The PSPC certainty scores 
were not significantly related to PEP, B = -.02, SE = .36, t = -.07, p =.95. The association 
between PEP and changes in certainty was also significant, B = -.05, SE = .03, t = -1.97, p 
=.05. The indirect effects, identified by examining the mediators whose 95% confidence 
intervals do not straddle zero, were all non-significant, suggesting that PEP is not a significant 
mediator between the proposed variables. These mediation analyses were repeated with PEP at 
Day 4 and Day 7 as well and the pattern of results was very similar. The only notable 
difference was that path b was no longer significant, indicating that the relationship between 
PEP and changes in certainty at the remaining follow-ups were no longer substantial (both p’s 
> .30).  
 The final proposed mediation model tested was based on the premise that PEP would 
mediate the relationship between post-speech metacognitive beliefs and uncertainty and 
changing perceptions of performance over time (See Figure 10). Based on the previous 
analyses suggesting that only perceptions for negative aspects of performance changed over 
time, the negative subscale of the PSPC was used to test the mediation model. Similar to the 
previous mediation analysis, metacognitive beliefs, performance uncertainty (PSPC certainty 
scores), and memory uncertainty (MACS-PS) were entered as predictors and PEP at Day 1 was 
entered as the mediator. The dependent variable in this model was change in performance
11
, 
which was calculated as the difference between performance appraisals post speech minus 
performance appraisals at the one day follow-up (for negative items only). The total effects  
                                                          
11
 As with the previous mediation analysis, a difference score was used as the dependent variable (rather than 
PSPC performance ratings at Day 1) because it was theorized that PEP would result in changes in performance 
ratings over time. 
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Figure 10. Study 1 mediation model of metacognitive beliefs, performance uncertainty (PSPC 
certainty scale) and memory uncertainty on changes in worsening performance ratings (for 
negative items only) at the Day 1 follow-up through post-event processing (Day 1). 
Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are provided. 
Direct effects of the predictor variables on certainty change scores are indicated with dotted-
lines. * p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p <.001.  
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c1ʹ, .05 (.05) 
c2ʹ, -.10 (.07) 
c2, -.10 (.07) 
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model was significant, suggesting that PEP, PSPC certainty, memory uncertainty, and 
metacognitive beliefs accounted for a significant amount of the variance in predicting 
worsening changes in perception of performance one day after the speech, R
2
 = .15, F (3, 62) = 
3.50, p =.02. The direct effects (path c) indicated that metacognitive beliefs were significantly 
related to changes in perceptions of performance at Day 1, B = .10, SE = .05, t = 2.06, p =.04.  
Neither feelings of certainty as measured by the PSPC certainty scale, B = -.10, SE = .07, t = -
1.39, p =.17, nor general memory uncertainty, B = .04, SE = .04, t = .87, p =.39, were 
significantly related to changes in performance appraisals. Examination of the a paths indicated 
significant relationships between metacognitive beliefs, B = 1.34, SE = .25, t = 5.30, p <.001, 
and memory uncertainty, B = .60, SE = .23, t = 2.63, p =.01, with PEP at Day 1. The PSPC 
certainty scores were not significantly related to PEP, B = .04, SE = .37, t = .12, p =.91. The 
association between PEP at Day 1 and changes in performance appraisals was not significant, 
B = -.01, SE = .02, t = -.58, p =.56. Similarly, the 95% confidence intervals crossed zero for all 
variables, indicating that PEP was not a significant mediator. These analyses were repeated 
with PEP at Day 4 and Day 7 and the pattern of results was consistent. 
Discussion 
The primary aims of the current study were to explore how memory uncertainty and 
positive metacognitive beliefs were related to perceptions of performance and PEP following a 
standardized speech task in the lab among individuals with a diagnosis of SAD in comparison 
to clinical and healthy controls. A number of interesting results emerged from this study, some 
of which support the proposed theoretical model. This was the first study to evaluate the 
presence of PEP among individuals with SAD relative to an anxious control sample. Consistent 
with prior studies which have found that individuals with a diagnosis of SAD and socially 
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anxious analogue samples engage in more PEP relative to healthy controls and low social 
anxiety participants, the current study found that individuals with SAD engage in greater PEP 
relative to both anxious and healthy controls. Despite recent suggestions that repetitive 
negative thought may best be conceptualized as a transdiagnostic factor (McEvoy, Mahoney, & 
Moulds, 2010; McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011) results of the current study suggest that 
engagement in PEP following a social stressor is unique to SAD. 
This study also found that, as expected and consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Brozovich & Heimberg, 2011; Hackman, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Zou & Abbott, 2012), 
participants in the SAD group rated their overall performance more poorly and in a more 
biased manner (compared to objective observers) relative to anxious and healthy controls, both 
immediately after the speech as well as during the week that followed. Unexpectedly, all 
participants rated their performance more positively one day after the speech compared to 
immediately after, and this increased positivity was maintained at the 4-day follow-up. 
However, when performance ratings were assessed one week later, they were once again 
becoming more negative, and this was true across all participants. Although this finding was 
unexpected, it is consistent with findings from Cody & Teachman (2010) who likewise found 
that overall perceptions of performance became more positive over time (although high 
socially anxious participants had more negative perceptions relative to low anxious 
participants). In their study, perceptions of speech performance were assessed immediately 
after a speech task as well 3 days later, and findings suggested that individuals both high and 
low in social anxiety reported more positive self-perceptions at the 3-day assessment. The 
results from the present study corroborate this finding, however, the additional assessment one 
week later indicates that perceptions of performance may continue to change and that the 
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improved perceptions of performance may not persist. To date, studies have not explored how 
perceptions change over longer time intervals, and this will be an important area for future 
studies to explore. Although no group differences were observed in the current study, it is 
possible that the perceptions of individuals with SAD would become more negative given more 
time.  
Positive and negative aspects of performance were also explored separately, as previous 
studies suggest that socially anxious individuals may perceive and recall information 
differently based on valence (Cody & Teachman, 2011). The results of these findings suggest 
that as expected, participants in the SAD group rated their performance less positively 
immediately after the speech task relative to both anxious and healthy controls. However, by 
the one day follow-up, they were comparable to both control groups in their perceptions of 
positive aspects of performance. In other words, while individuals without social anxiety are 
consistent in their positive self-evaluations of performance, individuals with SAD initially 
view their performance less positively but eventually “catch up” to anxious and healthy 
controls. Given that individuals with SAD experienced greater state anxiety both before and 
after the speech task, one possible explanation for these findings is that during a period of 
heightened arousal, individuals with SAD may be prone to diminishing positive aspects of their 
performance. However, once their anxiety has subsided their perception may become more 
positive. If this is the case, and given that individuals with SAD frequently experience feelings 
of state anxiety in social situations, they may be in a chronic state of de-valuing their positive 
performance abilities, continuously leaving social situations with a sense that they did not do 
well. Even if these perceptions eventually improve, the cumulative effect of this pattern is 
likely to be detrimental to participants’ views that they can perform well socially.  
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With regards to perceptions of negative aspects of performance, while the SAD group rated 
their performance more negatively at every time point, all participants exhibited less negative 
perceptions of performance over time. However, although not statistically significant, the 
group × time interaction was trending towards significance (p=.09). The pattern of results was 
such that perceptions of performance for negative items remained stable over time for the SAD 
group. In contrast, in both control groups, negative items became more positive from post-
speech to the Day 1 follow-up, and this was maintained over the course of the week. Although 
there has been some inconsistency with regards to this in the research literature, these findings 
are consistent with findings from several other studies. For example, Cody and Teachman 
(2011) found that negative items became more positive over time but only for individuals with 
low social anxiety, and that high socially anxious participants’ negative ratings remained 
stable. In contrast, in a different study by these same authors, results suggested that ratings for 
negative items did not change significantly over time regardless of social anxiety status (Cody 
& Teachman, 2010). Other studies, which have found that perceptions of performance for 
socially anxious individuals become more negative, did not examine positively versus 
negatively valenced items separately (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Dannahy & Stopa, 2007). 
Furthermore, other studies examining changes in perception of performance over time 
provided standardized feedback to participants and evaluated how recollections for feedback 
changed (Cody & Teachman, 2010, 2011), which was different from the methodology used in 
the current study.   
Participants’ performance was evaluated by objective observers, and as expected, 
participants in the SAD group were significantly less accurate in their performance ratings 
relative to both control groups. The proposed theoretical model predicted that with time, 
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individuals with SAD would become increasingly more biased in their recollections. However, 
this finding was not supported, as perceptions did not become more biased in the week 
following the speech. 
A novel aspect of the current study was its investigation of feelings of certainty about 
speech performance. It was hypothesized that individuals with SAD would report greater 
feelings of uncertainty immediately after the speech task, which may then be associated with 
increased motivation to engage in PEP. Results from this study suggest that, as expected, 
individuals with SAD reported feeling less certain about their performance immediately after 
the speech task compared to the control participants, and these ratings remained relatively 
unchanged over the course of the week. In contrast, both control groups started out more 
certain about their performance, and showed a decline in certainty ratings by the next day, so 
that participants across all groups were equally certain about their performance during all 3 
follow-up assessments. These results are interesting, as the SAD group clearly exhibits a 
different pattern of results than both control groups. The findings suggest that among 
individuals without social anxiety, a normative process is for certainty about aspects of 
performance to decline with time, perhaps as the memory for the event is put aside or 
forgotten. It is possible that since individuals with SAD are engaging in greater PEP relative to 
both control groups, memory of the speech task is being continuously activated in their minds 
and they do not therefore show the typical declines in certainty observed in the control 
participants. Once again, it would be informative to examine how these certainty ratings might 
continue to change over a longer period of time to explore whether degree of certainty is 
maintained or whether the SAD group would eventually show a decline in certainty as more 
time passes. 
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There were also some interesting findings comparing certainty for negative relative to 
positive items across groups. Immediately after the speech, all participants felt more certain 
about negative aspects of their performance relative to positive aspects. However, while this 
pattern was maintained by the anxious and healthy control groups at each of the follow-up 
assessments, the SAD group was equally uncertain about both positive and negative items at 
these time points. Although examinations of certainty in SAD have been relatively sparse in 
the literature, a study by Moscovitch et al. (2009) is of particular relevance, as these authors 
found that while control participants attributed greater certainty to positive self-attributes 
relative to negative self-attributes, individuals with SAD did not demonstrate this bias. The 
results from the current study show the opposite pattern. Anxious and healthy controls reported 
feeling more certain about negative aspects of performance relative to positive aspects, while 
the SAD group demonstrated no difference in certainty across valences. Of course, several 
methodological differences may account for these discrepant findings.  Of primary importance, 
the Moscovitch et al. (2009) study explored more general perceptions of attributes and 
associated certainty, rather than the certainty experienced following a lab-based social stressor. 
In the context of the current study, given that control participants rated their performance less 
negatively (and more accurately) relative to the SAD group, feeling confident that they did not 
do poorly on this task is likely to be adaptive. With this frame of mind, non-socially anxious 
participants can leave social situations thinking “I’m not sure if I did a great job, but I’m 
certain I did not mess up”. In contrast, individuals with SAD appear to lack confidence for both 
positive and negative aspects of performance which is likely to be particularly detrimental 
given their negative self-perceptions and schemas. 
91 
 
Another aim of the current study was to evaluate whether, in response to feelings of 
uncertainty, individuals with SAD would report a greater desire to mentally “check” or review 
their memories in an effort to gain certainty about their performance. It was hypothesized that 
this motivation may in turn lead individuals to engage in PEP in an effort to increase feelings 
of certainty. Contrary to predictions, participants with SAD were not more motivated than 
control participants to mentally review their memories for the speech task in order to increase 
certainty. Although individuals with SAD report greater uncertainty immediately after the 
speech, this does not appear to be related to engagement in PEP. These findings imply that 
factors other than mental checking are responsible for maintaining PEP.  
A second factor that was hypothesized to motivate engagement in PEP was positive 
metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of reviewing the speech task. Metacognitive beliefs 
have been implicated in maintaining worry and depressive rumination in GAD and Major 
Depressive Disorder, respectively, and have only recently become a topic of investigation in 
SAD. Previous studies (Fisak & Hammond, 2013; Wong & Moulds, 2010), as well as results 
from the Pilot Study described earlier, provide support for the presence of metacognitive 
beliefs in SAD. However, to our knowledge, this was the first study to evaluate such beliefs 
among individuals with a diagnosis SAD in relation to PEP. The results from the current study 
were consistent with hypotheses, with individuals with SAD endorsing significantly more 
positive metacognitive beliefs about the value of reviewing or processing the speech task 
relative to anxious and healthy controls. Consistent with the S-REF model reviewed in the 
introduction, these findings provide support that as in other emotional disorders, positive 
metacognitive beliefs may contribute to the initiation and persistence of PEP in SAD, despite 
its negative consequences.    
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 The final aim of this study was to test the mediation models that follow from the 
proposed theoretical framework. First, we were interested in examining whether group status 
would predict greater metacognitive beliefs, uncertainty, motivation to mentally check, and 
poor perceptions of performance which, in turn, would lead to greater engagement in PEP. The 
proposed mediation model was partially supported. Metacognitive beliefs and perceptions of 
performance emerged as the only significant mediating variables. These results suggest that a 
diagnosis of SAD, relative to another anxiety disorder or a healthy control, is more strongly 
related to PEP because individuals hold stronger metacognitive beliefs and have more negative 
perceptions of their own performance following the speech task. Contrary to predictions, 
certainty, as assessed with both the general memory uncertainty scale on the MACS-PS and the 
PSPC certainty subscale, was not a significant mediator, nor was motivation to mentally check 
or review the speech task. These findings suggest that within the context of social anxiety, PEP 
may be driven by individuals’ perceptions of their own performance, which is consistent with 
results of previous studies (Chen, Rapee, & Abbott, 2013; Perini, Abbott, & Rapee, 2006; 
Rapee & Abbott, 2007). The current results build on these findings with the inclusion of the 
anxious control group, as they establish that this relationship between performance ratings and 
PEP is indeed unique to social anxiety. Another novel contribution of this study is the finding 
that metacognitive beliefs are also at least partially responsible for the relationship between 
SAD and PEP. Implications of these findings will be discussed in further detail within the 
General Discussion section.  
 Based on the premise that participants would engage in PEP due to feelings of 
uncertainty and metacognitive beliefs, it was expected that PEP would, in turn, lead to greater 
certainty and worsening perceptions of performance; two mediation models were tested to 
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evaluate these predictions. Since our earlier findings suggested that only negative aspects of 
performance changed over time, these were the only items included in the mediation analysis. 
The results suggested that although PEP was significantly related to metacognitive beliefs and 
general memory uncertainty, the proposed mediation models were not supported. 
 In Study 1, the proposed theoretical framework was evaluated in the context of 
naturally occurring PEP. Although this study found that individuals in the SAD group engaged 
in greater PEP following the social task, the study design did not permit us to isolate the effects 
of repeated recall on memory for performance and certainty ratings. Study 2 was therefore 
designed to experimentally manipulate the recollection of a social versus non-social task in 
order examine the direct impact on performance, certainty, and accuracy ratings.  
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Study 2 – Examining the Causal Effects of PEP: The Impact of Socially-Relevant vs. 
Socially-Irrelevant Mental Review on Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty 
Study 2 was designed to experimentally manipulate repetitive thought in the laboratory 
in order to enable a more direct investigation of the theoretical premise that PEP might 
function as a mental checking strategy. According to our model of PEP (see Figure 1), in the 
aftermath of a social task or encounter, socially anxious individuals experience strong feelings 
of uncertainty about their performance, and such feelings might motivate them to engage in 
repeated mental review or “check” of that event, in order to attain greater certainty. As was 
outlined in the introduction, the repeated reactivation of the social memory would then be 
expected to make the memory susceptible to the influence of cognitive biases, which, for high 
trait socially anxious individuals, would likely involve negatively distorted self-appraisals.  
Cognitive models of compulsive checking in the OCD literature have demonstrated that 
the act of repeatedly checking an object degrades one’s confidence or certainty in their 
memory for that event. For example, Radomsky, Gilchrist, and Dussault (2006) instructed an 
unselected sample of undergraduate students to engage in repeated, standardized checking 
trials of either a stove (relevant checking) or a kitchen sink (irrelevant checking). All 
participants completed one check of the stove before and after the repeated trials, and their 
memory confidence, vividness, and detail was assessed at these time points.  Results indicated 
that participants reported significantly less confidence in their memories, rated their memories 
as less vivid and less detailed following the checking trials, but only in the relevant checking 
condition. Research with clinical populations has demonstrated similar results. For example, 
Boschen and Vuksanovic (2007) had participants with and without OCD complete a similar 
checking task, and found that repeated relevant checking resulted in reductions in memory 
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confidence, vividness and detail for all participants, regardless of OCD status. A number of 
other studies have demonstrated similar findings, all of which highlight the detrimental effects 
of repeated checking on memory certainty (Coles, Radomsky & Horng, 2006; Tolin et al., 
2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003, 2004). These findings have also been extended to repeated 
mental checking of threatening stimuli. For example, Radomsky and Alcolado (2010) had 
participants engage in repeated checking of a physical stove or imagine checking a stove in 
their minds. They found that both physical and mental checking had similar results, leading to 
decreased memory confidence, as well as decreased vividness and detail. 
Taken together, the findings from the OCD literature suggest that the act of repeatedly 
checking or reviewing a task can be detrimental to memory confidence and certainty, and this 
is true even in the absence of physical checking (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). Given the 
definition of PEP as a mental review of a past social event, it is possible that it might function, 
at least in part, as a mental “check” to determine whether certain feared outcomes occurred. If 
PEP does in fact serve a mental checking function, it is possible that the cognitive processes 
and associated effects on memory confidence observed with repeated checking in OCD would 
likewise be observed for memories of past social events in socially anxious participants. That 
is, we might expect that as socially anxious individuals repeatedly call to mind their memories 
for a past social event, this not only impacts their certainty for the event but also potentially 
exposes that memory to distortion and bias. As was reviewed in the introduction, the 
reactivation of a memory makes it susceptible to manipulation and may lead to increasingly 
negative perceptions.  
The results from Study 1 indicated that individuals with SAD do experience greater 
uncertainty immediately after a speech task, although this study did not support the 
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conceptualization that “mental checking” was one of the primary functions of PEP. However, 
we were interested in exploring this hypothesis further in an experimental study within a 
controlled environment, as has been done in the studies on OCD, reviewed above. To this end, 
in the current study socially anxious undergraduate students completed an impromptu speech 
task as well as a word definition task in counterbalanced order. Following these tasks, they 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in which they engaged in a repeated mental 
review or “mental check” that was either socially-relevant (speech) or socially-irrelevant (word 
definition). Both mental review conditions were designed to elicit equivalent levels of anxiety 
and perceptions of failure to meet expected standards, although only the socially-relevant 
condition involved a social context in which task performance was public (i.e., observable by 
an “audience” rather than private) and carried with it the prospect of negative evaluation by 
others. Speech performance appraisals and certainty ratings were completed both before and 
after the mental review period. The main hypothesis was that compared to participants in the 
socially-irrelevant review condition, participants assigned to the socially-relevant review 
condition would experience more negatively biased appraisals of their speech performance and 
greater certainly associated with these appraisals. To formulate this hypothesis, we reasoned 
that if PEP in social anxiety leads to outcomes such as biased performance appraisals and 
increased certainty ratings because PEP functions as a type of socially-relevant mental 
checking strategy, then such outcomes should only be observed when participants are 
instructed to conduct a repeated mental review of the speech itself but should not be observed 
when they are instructed to conduct a repeated review of an irrelevant non-socially threatening 
task, even if the latter task is associated with heightened anxiety and negative affect. On the 
other hand, if the two conditions yield comparable outcomes or a pattern of results other than 
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that which is hypothesized, it may be unlikely that PEP functions as a type of socially-relevant 
mental checking strategy, and alternative functions of PEP must be considered.  
In addition to mental checking, socially anxious individuals may engage in PEP for 
numerous alternate reasons. The results of Study 1 provide some initial evidence that 
individuals with SAD endorse a greater number of positive metacognitive beliefs on a 
standardized questionnaire about the value of reviewing past social events. However, the use of 
a questionnaire to assess motivations to engage in PEP does not permit the exploration of 
individual’s idiosyncratic reasons for engaging in this form of thought, and may therefore 
exclude potentially important motivating factors. Therefore, an additional purpose of Study 2 
was to investigate the phenomenology of individuals’ metacognitive beliefs about PEP using 
qualitative methods. Thus, in addition to completing the MACS-PS described in Study 1, all 
participants were asked to report, in an open-ended manner, the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of reviewing the speech task. We hoped that these reports would provide 
additional information about the perceived benefits and risks of engaging in review of past 
social events, without limiting the scope of potential responses.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the University of Waterloo’s undergraduate research 
pool and received course credit for participation. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Moscovitch et al., 2011), participants were invited to take part in the current study if they 
scored high on a measure of social anxiety (SPIN scores > 30) and were able to speak, read and 
write English fluently, which was administered as part of a larger online questionnaire battery 
to undergraduates at the start of the semester. Based on these criteria, 85 participants were 
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recruited for the study from the research pool, but since the SPIN was administered days or 
even weeks earlier along with a series of other questionnaires that were included in the 
prescreening measures, none of them knew the specific eligibility criteria by which they had 
been selected. The SPIN was re-administered on the day of the study (as part of a questionnaire 
battery administered at the end), and 22 participants no longer met the pre-determined cut-off 
score for study inclusion. Given that a SPIN score of 30 is considered a conservative cut-off, 
and in order to avoid discarding such a large proportion of participants (26%), the cut-off score 
for inclusion was subsequently modified to 19, a somewhat less stringent score but one that has 
been recommended by others and has been shown to distinguish reliably between individuals 
with and without SAD (Connor et al., 2000). Of the participants who completed the study, 16 
individuals were removed from analyses for the following reasons: a) did not meet the 
modified cut-off criteria on the SPIN (n  = 3); b) did not comply with the study protocol (e.g., 
disclosed in the questionnaire data that they did not engage in the recall tasks; n = 9); c) 
experimenter concerns that language comprehension interfered with ability to understand study 
tasks (n = 2); d) left majority of the questionnaire data blank (n = 1); and e) malfunctions with 
the lab equipment which were believed to confound the data (n = 1). The final sample 
consisted of 69 socially anxious participants. 
Procedure  
An overview of Study 2 procedures is presented in Figure 11. Upon arriving at the lab, 
participants were informed that the current study was designed to examine the types of 
thoughts individuals have in response to different situations and events, and that they would be 
asked to complete a number of different tasks over the course of the study. All participants 
completed both an impromptu speech task and a word definition task in counterbalanced order. 
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These tasks were designed to provide participants with experimental material to review during 
the recall trials (see below). Importantly, we wanted to ensure that both tasks induced 
comparable levels of anxiety and negative affect, but differed only in terms of their social 
relevance and perceived evaluative consequences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Overview of Procedure for Study 2. The speech and word definition tasks were 
presented in counterbalanced order.  
 
Presentation of speech topics and 3-minute preparation period 
3-minute impromptu speech. Video recorded and observed by research assistant 
Speech task baseline review 
Questionnaire battery: PSPC, SUDS, PANAS, motivation to engage in PEP about speech task 
3-minute word definition task completed privately 
Word definition task baseline review 
Questionnaire battery: SUDS, PANAS, motivation to engage in PEP about word task 
Random assignment to  
Socially-Relevant condition 
Random assignment to  
Socially-Irrelevant condition 
 
Recall Trials: 10 recalls of speech task Recall Trials: recalls of word definition task 
Questionnaire battery: PSPC, SUDS, PANAS, motivation to engage in 
PEP about speech task and word definition task, DASS, MACS-PS, 
SPIN 
Debriefing 
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Participants were also provided with false information about average performance for 
each of the tasks in an effort to induce feelings of anxiety. The standards provided were 
intentionally designed so that most or all participants would not be able to reach the supposed 
“average”. In the speech task, participants were provided with three controversial topics 
(animal research, euthanasia, and cloning) and were asked to provide their opinion and 
supporting arguments for one or more of these topics during a 3 minute speech. Participants 
were encouraged to speak for the full 3 minutes if possible, but were permitted to terminate the 
task early by ringing a bell. The speech task was observed and evaluated (using the PSPC 
performance subscale) by the experimenter, who was trained to remain neutral during the 
duration of the speech, as in Study 1. The speech task was also video recorded to increase 
social evaluative threat and to allow for coding of performance by additional researchers (to 
establish greater reliability in coded performance ratings). The script for the speech task 
contained the following information:   
For the first part of the study, I’m going to give you a list of topics that I would like you 
to give a speech about. The topics provided are ones that people have different opinions 
on, and there are no right or wrong answers. The goal for this task is to give your 
opinion on the issues and provide arguments, ideas, or stories you can think of to 
support your opinion. Most university students are able to generate 4-5 arguments in 
support of their opinion for each of topics in the time provided so that will probably be 
the case for you as well, but just do your best.  The list that I will give you contains 3 
topics to choose from, and you are welcome to talk about one, two or all three of these. 
You will have 3 minutes to do this part of the study, and we would really like you to 
take the full 3 minutes if possible. However, if you finish before the 3 minutes are up, 
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just ring the bell , and I will give you further instructions at that time. Don’t worry 
about keeping track of the time, I will do that for you. As I mentioned at the beginning, I 
will be sitting in the room observing the speech so you can treat me like an audience 
member, and this portion of the study will also be videotaped. The reason for this is to 
allow us to gather objective information for the purposes of this study.  
In the word definition task, participants were provided with a list of English words 
varying in difficulty from relatively easy (e.g., communicate) to relatively difficult (e.g., 
meretricious) and asked to write down definitions for as many words as possible during a 3-
minute period (see Appendix 9). The task was designed in a way that enhanced the likelihood 
of perceived failure, thereby inducing negative affect and making the affective consequences of 
the task similar to the speech task. To mirror the high standards that socially anxious 
participants perceive audience members to hold for social performance (see Moscovitch & 
Hofmann, 2007), participants were provided with instructions that conveyed unreasonably high 
standards for the number of words that could be defined by the average undergraduate student. 
Based on pilot testing conducted prior to data collection, it was decided that most students 
would not be able to define 11-12 words during the 3-minute period, and this was therefore the 
standard that was provided. In addition, because the purpose of this task was to provide an 
anxiety-provoking control condition that was not socially relevant, it was stressed to 
participants that their performance on this task would remain completely private and would not 
be made available to the experimenters. The following specific instructions were provided to 
participants prior to the word definition task: 
For the next part of the study, I’m going to give you a list of randomly selected English 
words that I would like you to provide definitions for. The goal for this task is to write 
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down thorough, comprehensive and accurate definitions for as many words as possible 
in the 3-minute period. Most university students are able to correctly define 11-12 
words in that time, so that will probably be the case for you as well, but just do your 
best. The list that I will give you contains 24 words, and you are welcome to provide 
definitions for whichever words you choose. You will have 3 minutes to do this part of 
the study, and we would really like you to take the full 3 minutes if possible. However, if 
you finish before the 3 minutes are up, just ring the bell , and I will come into the room 
to give you further instructions. Don’t worry about keeping track of the time, I will do 
that for you. I also want you to know that your performance on this task will be 
completely private, and you won’t be asked any questions about how you did on this 
task and you will not be asked to provide the researcher with the definitions that you 
generate. It is however important for this study that you try your best to define as many 
words as possible.    
All participants mentally reviewed the speech task and the word definition task once, 
immediately after each task was completed. Participants were permitted to review the tasks for 
as much time as they wanted, in an effort to limit experimenter interference in this thought 
process. The experimenter was not in the room during the recall period, but participants were 
instructed to contact the experimenter by ringing a bell once they had completed their review. 
The following instructions were provided to participants prior to the mental review periods: 
Now I would like you to spend some time thinking about the [speech/word definition] 
task you just completed. You do not need to write anything for this task, it will all be 
done in your head. During the review, please think about the [speech/word definition]  
in your mind in as much detail as possible. Focus on how you did, as well as any 
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sensations, thoughts, judgements, observations, or feelings that you had during the 
task. Please spend as much time as you need to think about the [speech/word 
definition] task, really going over everything you remember in your mind. It is very 
important for the purposes of this study that you engage in this recollection task to the 
best of your abilities, and we would appreciate if you would try to do so. You will be 
asked to rate your ability to stay focused on this task at the end of the study. You can 
begin now and please ring the bell when you have completed a thorough review of the 
[speech/word definition] task. 
After each of these review periods, participants completed a short questionnaire battery 
assessing their state anxiety, positive and negative affect, and motivation to review the given 
task. In addition, after reviewing the speech task, participants provided performance and 
certainty ratings for that task using the PSPC.   
At this point, participants were randomly assigned to the socially-relevant or socially-
irrelevant review conditions. Participants in the socially-relevant review condition were 
instructed to recall and review the speech 10 more times in succession, in the same manner as 
outlined above. Participants in the socially-irrelevant review condition recalled and reviewed 
the word definition task 10 more times in the same manner. The following instructions were 
provided prior to the first recollection trial:  
Now I would like you to spend some time thinking about the [speech/word definition] 
task you completed earlier. I’d like you to once again review the [speech/word 
definition] task in your mind in as much detail as possible. Focus on how you did, as 
well as any sensations, thoughts, judgements, observations, or feelings that you had 
during the task. It is really important for this study that you complete a thorough review 
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of the [speech/word definition] task as instructed each time. Even though you have 
done this already, please bring the thoughts to mind again each time I ask you to and 
we really appreciate you doing so. You can begin now and please ring the bell when 
you have completed a thorough review of the [speech/word definition] task.  
The participant sat alone in the room during the recall trials, although the beginning of 
each trial was guided by the experimenter via an intercom system. The length of each recall 
trial was determined by the participant, as they were instructed to ring a bell once they were 
finished recalling the event. Participants completed 10 trials, and abbreviated instructions about 
the task were provided by the experiment each time. After the final recall trial, participants 
once again rated their state anxiety, positive and negative affect, and motivation to review each 
task, and provided ratings of speech performance and certainty. Finally, all participants 
completed a questionnaire battery consisting of symptom measures and demographic variables, 
prior to being debriefed about the purposes of the study and the use of deception. 
Measures 
Social Phobia Inventory (Connor et al., 2000; SPIN). The SPIN was used to pre-
select individuals who experience significant levels of social anxiety and to confirm ongoing 
symptoms at the time of the study. A detailed description of the SPIN can be found in the Pilot 
Study, and a copy can be found in Appendix 1. The SPIN in this study showed good internal 
consistency, α = .86 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale – Short Version (DASS 21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS provideed a measure of depression, anxiety, and stress 
symptoms. See Study 1 for a detailed description of this measure and Appendix 4 for a copy. In 
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the current study, all three subscales had good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas of 
.84 for the stress, .85 for the anxiety, and .89 for the depression subscales.  
Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty (PSPC; Cody & Teachman, 
2011; Rapee & Lim, 1992). The same version of the PSPC as in Study 1 was used to assess 
perception of performance and certainty ratings for the speech task. The PSPC was 
administered immediately after the first recall of the speech task, as well as following the 
repeated recall trials.  The performance subscale of the PSPC was used by the researchers 
coding participants’ performance to obtain an objective assessment of speech performance. In 
the current study, both subscales demonstrated adequate internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha 
for the performance subscale was .86 for the post-speech administration and .87 for the post-
recall administration. Similarly, for the certainty subscale, Cronbach’s alpha was .88 for the 
post-speech administration and .92 for the post-recall administration. A copy of the PSPC can 
be found in Appendix 5 and a detailed overview of the scale is provided in Study 1.  
Motivation Questionnaire. Participants’ motivation to engage in PEP about the 
speech (MQ-S) and word definition (MQ-WD) tasks was assessed immediately after the task as 
well as following the recollection periods using two items developed by the authors to assess 
this construct. Immediately after the speech and word definition tasks, participants were asked 
to rate the extent to which they wanted to review that task using a 0 (not at all) to 100 
(extremely) scale. See Appendix 10 for a copy of this measure.  
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
The PANAS is a 20-item measure consisting of adjectives that describe different affective 
states. The measure consists of two subscales measuring positive affect (PANAS-PA; e.g., 
“excited,” “determined”) and negative affect (PANAS-NA; e.g., “distressed,” “guilty). 
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Participants were asked to rate each item on a scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 
(extremely) based on how they were feeling at that moment. The PANAS is widely used in 
experimental studies and demonstrates good reliability and validity (e.g., Chiupka, Moscovitch 
& Bielak, 2012; Mackinnon et al., 1999; Sloan & Kring, 2007). The PANAS was administered 
immediately after the speech task, word definition task, and after the recall period. In the 
current study, Cronbach’s alpha values ranged across administrations from .87 to .91 for the 
PANAS-PA subscale and from .88 to .91 for the PANAS-NA subscale. See Appendix 11 for a 
copy of this scale. 
Metacognition and Certainty Scale – Post-Speech Version (MACS-PS). The 
MACS-PS was administered at the end of the study to assess positive beliefs about engaging in 
PEP. For this study, Cronbach’s alpha was excellent for the Metacognitive Beliefs scale, α= 
.90 and adequate for the Mental Checking subscale, α = .69. However, in contrast to Study 1, 
the internal reliability was low for the Memory Uncertainty Scale, α = .47 and results 
pertaining to this subscale should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. See Study 1 for a 
detailed description of the MACS-PS and Appendix 7 for a copy of the measure.  
Objective Ratings of Speech Performance 
Objective ratings of performance were obtained from two research assistants who were 
blind to the purposes of the study or the condition to which participants were assigned. 
Observers viewed video recordings of each participants’ speech and coded their performance 
using the PSPC performance subscale. As in Study 1, observers were trained by the principal 
investigator and were provided with rating guidelines. Sample videos were used as part of the 
training process to help coders calibrate their ratings. Inter-rater reliability across the two 
coders was excellent (Cicchetti, 1994), ICC = .76 (one-way, mixed effects model, consistency 
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in ratings, and based on average of ratings). As in Study 1, standardized residual scores were 
calculated based on participants’ ratings of their own performance and the average of the coder 
ratings in order to obtain a measure of self-observer discrepancy.  
Results 
Data Screening 
The assumption of normality for all variables was explored by examining absolute 
values of skewness and kurtosis and with the K-S test of normality. The results of these 
analyses can be found in Table 9. Examination of the skew and kurtosis values indicate that 
there were no serious concerns with the distribution of any Study 2 variables. The K-S test was 
significant for several variables. However, as was noted in Study 1, the K-S test is likely to be 
significant in larger sample sizes and significant results do not necessarily indicate a 
distribution problem. The data were therefore further explored with Q-Q plots, and a visual 
examination of these plots suggested minimal deviation. This information, combined with the 
acceptable skew and kurtosis values suggested that the assumption of normality was met. The 
homogeneity of variance assumption was explored using Levene’s test. In a few cases, this 
assumption was violated, and these analyses are provided in the relevant results section.  
Preliminary Results 
Sample Characteristics 
Summary demographic and sample characteristics for each of the conditions can be 
found in Table 10. Across conditions, participants did not differ in age [t(67) = .56, p = .58, r = 
.07], gender [χ²(1) = .003, p = .96, Phi = .01], marital status [χ²(1) = 2.12, p = .15, Phi = .18], 
ethnicity [χ²(6) = 7.20, p = .30, Cramer’s V = .32], or medication status [χ²(1) = .00, p = 1.00, 
Phi = .00].  
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The means and standard deviations for all scales are presented in Table 11 and the 
correlations between the variables are presented in Table 12. A series of independent samples 
t-tests was conducted to identify if there were any significant differences between conditions 
on trait variables. Levene’s test for equality of variances was not significant for any variables 
(all p’s > .14). The groups were comparable on SPIN scores [t(67) = -.58, p =.56, r = .07], 
DASS – Depression [t(67) = -.40, p =.69, r = .05], DASS – Anxiety [t(67) = .45, p =.66, r = 
.05], and DASS – Stress [t(67) = .70, p =.48, r = .09]. 
Recall Length  
Immediately after the speech and word definition tasks, each participant  recalled that 
task a single time so that everyone recalled each task at least once. The average length of this 
baseline recall trial after the speech task was 110.04 (SD = 79.47) seconds and the average 
length of the baseline recall trial following the word definition task was 102.10 (SD = 63.57). 
The results of a paired samples t-test indicated that the conditions did not differ in length for 
the baseline recall, t(67) = .83, p = .41, r = .10. Next, the average length of recall across the 10 
repeated trials was explored, and the results of an independent samples t-test indicated that 
there were no significant differences between length of recall across the two conditions, t(67) = 
1.51, p = .14, r = .18. Across all participants, the average recall time was 78.14 (SD = 49.22) 
seconds, with the range of scores falling between 15.90 and 258.80 seconds.  
 Changes in length of recall across the 10 trials in the two conditions was assessed using 
a 2 (condition) × 10 (time) mixed-design ANOVA. Levene’s test indicated that variances were 
homogeneous for all but trials 5, 6, and 7 where this assumption was not met. Levene’s test for 
these variables was followed up with Hartley’s FMAX to determine whether the unequal 
variances were significant enough to be of concern. The calculated FMAX values were smaller 
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Table 9 
 
Normality Indexes for Study 2 Descriptive and Dependent Measures 
 
Variable    N  Skew  SEskew  Kurtosis    SEkurtosis K-S      p 
 
Post-speech 
  SUDS    64  0.30  0.30  -0.18  0.59  0.21  <.001 
  MQ-S      64  0.43  0.30  -1.03  0.59  0.17  <.001 
  PANAS-PA   64  0.11  0.30  -1.09  0.59  0.10  .200
 a
   
  PANAS-NA   64  0.98  0.30  0.04  0.59  0.15  .001 
  PSPC-Performance  64  0.34  0.30  -0.39  0.59  0.09  .200
 a
 
  PSPC-Certainty   64  -0.25  0.30  -0.26  0.59  0.07  .200
 a
 
Post-word definition 
  SUDS    64  0.13  0.30  -0.31  0.59  0.20  <.001 
  MQ-WD   64  0.07  0.30  -0.90  0.59  0.13  .01 
  PANAS-PA   64  0.99  0.30  1.18  0.59  0.13  .01  
  PANAS-NA   64  0.81  0.30  -0.05  0.59  0.12  .02 
Post-recall 
  SUDS    64  0.50  0.30  -0.63  0.59  0.19  <.001 
  MQ-S    64  1.14  0.30  0.42  0.59  0.24  <.001 
  MQ-WD   64  0.95  0.30  -0.46  0.59  0.23  <.001 
  PANAS-PA   64  0.88  0.30  -0.09  0.59  0.14  .002 
  PANAS-NA   64  0.94  0.30  -0.24  0.59  0.24  <.001 
  PSPC-Performance  64  -0.41  0.30  -0.43  .59  0.08  .200
 a
 
  PSPC-Certainty   64  -0.36  0.30  0.40  0.59  0.08  .200
 a
 
  SPIN    64  0.42  0.30  -0.25  0.59  0.08  .200
 a
 
  DASS-Depression  64  0.48  0.30  -0.50  0.59  0.13  .01 
  DASS-Anxiety   64  0.22  0.30  -0.96  0.59  0.11  .07 
  DASS-Stress   64  -0.09  0.30  -0.73  0.59  0.07  .200
 a
 
  MACS-PS-Metacognition 64  -0.08  0.30  0.14  0.59  0.07  .200
 a
 
  MACS-PS-Uncertainty  64  -0.18  0.30  0.72  0.59  0.10  .200
 a
 
  MACS-PS-Mental Checking 64  -0.03  0.30  -0.28  0.59  0.11  .07 
   
a 
This is a lower bound of the true significance.  
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; MQ-S = Motivation Questionnaire - Speech; MQ-WD = Motivation Questionnaire - Word Definition; PANAS-PA = 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale, positive affect; PANAS-NA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, negative affect; PSPC = Perception of Speech Performance and 
Certainty; SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty Scale - Post Speech.
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Table 10 
Study 2 Demographic Characteristics by Condition 
 
 
Variable        Socially-Relevant          Socially-Irrelevant 
        (n = 34)                           (n = 35) 
 
 
Age       20.12 (2.01)   19.86 (1.87) 
Gender (% female)    82.4%    82.9%   
Marital status 
 Married/cohabiting   5.9%    0.0% 
 Never married    94.1%    100.0% 
Ethnicity 
 Asian     20.6%    25.7%  
 South Asian    11.8%    25.7%  
 Southeast Asian   5.9%    0.0%  
 West Indian    2.9%    0.0%  
 Black     2.9%    2.9%  
 White     38.2%    40.0%  
 Other      17.6%    5.7%  
Psychotropic medications   5.9%    5.7% 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 11 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Study 2 Variables by Condition 
 
 
Measure           Socially-Relevant      Socially-Irrelevant         Scale Range 
 
 
Post-speech 
  SUDS     40.73 (24.50) 49.17 (25.37)      0 - 100 
  PANAS-PA     21.32 (6.53)  19.00 (6.30)         10 - 50 
  PANAS-NA     18.29 (7.21)  21.06 (9.78)      10 - 50 
  PSPC-Performance    40.23 (10.48) 41.83 (13.44)      0 - 92 
  PSPC-Certainty    61.91 (10.95) 65.66 (11.48)      0 - 92 
Post-word definition 
  SUDS     37.94 (23.62) 41.11 (23.39)      0 - 100 
  PANAS-PA     21.70 (7.71)  17.69 (6.27)      10 - 50 
  PANAS-NA     18.58 (7.20)  21.14 (8.66)      10- 50 
Post-recall 
  SUDS     28.09 (27.0)  35.14 (28.53)      0 - 100 
  PANAS-PA     16.82 (7.24)  15.46 (5.24)      10 - 50 
  PANAS-NA     16.82 (7.24)  18.11 (7.79)      10 - 50 
  PSPC-Performance    42.23 (11.29) 42.29 (13.34)      0 - 92 
  PSPC-Certainty    66.32 (14.27) 67.14 (13.06)      0 - 92 
  MACS-PS-Metacognition   34.39 (13.77) 34.03 (12.91)           0 - 60 
  MACS-PS-Uncertainty   13.26 (4.33)  14.66 (3.32)           0 –-25 
  MACS-PS-Mental Checking  7.26 (3.26)  6.71 (3.58)             0 – 15 
  SPIN      35.88 (9.81)  37.46 (12.51)          0 - 68 
  DASS-Depression    8.41 (5.60)  8.97 (5.92)          0 - 21 
  DASS-Anxiety    8.21 (5.00)  7.62 (5.65)         0 - 21 
  DASS-Stress     10.47 (5.08)  9.63 (4.86)      0 - 21 
 
 
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; PANAS-PA = Positive and Negative Affect 
Scale, positive affect; PANAS- NA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, negative affect; 
PSPC = Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty; SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; 
DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty Scale-
Post Speech. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
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Table 12 
 
Correlations amongst Study 2 Variables 
 
 
Measure  
 
 
1 
 
    2 
 
   3 
 
  4 
 
 5 
 
  6 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
  9 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
 19 
 
20 
                     
Post-Speech                     
  1.SUDS – -.02 .74** -.47** .15 .50** .02 .57** .27* .01 .34** -.48** -.30* .35** .36** .21 .47** .43** .48** .22 
  2. PANAS-PA   – -.02 .30 -.12 .05 .69** .04 .19 .68** .24 .19 .29* .37** .08 .40** .03 -.15 .16 .07 
  3. PANAS-NS   – -.50** .17 .51** .09 .76** .21 .16 .60 -.48** -.25* .32** .31* .31* .54** .46** .55** .34** 
  4. PSPC-Performance      – -.40** -.28* .18 -.33** -.01 .12 -.07 .90** .73** -.14 -.17 -.06 -.40** -.27* -.34** -.11 
  5. PSPC-Certainty     – .15 -.20 .19 .12 -.14 .13 -.45** -.48** .19 .17 .11 .29* .02 .01 -.17 
Post-word definition                     
  6. SUDS      – .00 .80** .56** .20 .48** -.26* -.13 .22 .23 .32** .42** .44** .51** .51** 
  7. PANAS-PA       – -.09 .06 .66** .13 .12 .23 .32** -.01 .43** .01 -.15 .05 -.03 
  8.  PANAS-NA        – .48** .13 .71** -.31** -.16 .16 .30* .20 .55** .54** .58** .51** 
Post-recall                     
  9. SUDS          – .18 .57** -.01 .04 .05 .07 .07 .21 .22 .25* .23 
  10. PANAS-PA          – .14 .16 .28* .37** .02 .46** -.03 -.08 .16 .08 
  11. PANAS-NA           – -.16 -.07 .16 .29* .21 .43** .41** .56** .40** 
  12. PSPC-Performance            – .85** -.24 -.57* -.13 -.86** -.34** -.34** -.10 
  13. PSPC-Certainty              – -.20 -.17 -.07 -.38** -.32** -.12 .05 
  14. MACS-Metacogn.              – .22 .85** .11 .16 .14 .06 
  15. MACS-Uncertainty                – .14 .21 .40** .30* .33** 
  16. MACS-Checking                – .05 .15 .18 .18 
  17. SPIN                 – .49** .43** .41** 
  18. DASS-Depression                  – .58** .66** 
  19. DASS-Anxiety                   – .67** 
  20. DASS-Stress                    – 
 
 
                    
 
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; PANAS-PA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, positive affect; PANAS-NA = 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale, negative affect; PSPC = Perception of Speech Performance and Certainty; SPIN = Social Phobia 
Inventory; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; MACS-PS = Metacognition and Certainty Scale - Post Speech. Standard 
deviations appear in parentheses.
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than the critical FMAX value of 2.63 and we therefore proceeded with the analyses. Mauchly’s 
Test of Sphericity was significant suggesting that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
χ2(44) = 327.33, p  <.001, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was therefore  
employed. The main effect of time was not significant, F(3.81, 255.38) = 1.68, p =.16, partial η2 
= .02. The condition × time interaction was approaching significance, although the effect size 
was small, F (3.81, 255.38) = 2.03, p =.09, partial η2 = .03. Although not quite reaching 
significance, the pattern of results suggests that over time, participants in the speech recall 
condition increased the length of time they spent reviewing the task whereas the opposite was 
true of participants in the word definition recall condition (see Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12. Study 2 length of repeated recall across trials for all participants.  
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Subjective Emotional Responses 
Anxiety. Participants’ level of anxiety as assessed by the SUDS was examined to evaluate 
the impact of each task and changes over time using two t-tests. To control for multiple 
comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was applied (p = .05/2) and the level of significance was 
set to p = .025. First, we examined differences in level of self-reported anxiety immediately after 
the speech and word definition tasks using a paired-samples t-test. Results indicated no 
significant differences in state anxiety between the two tasks, t(68) = 1.87, p =.07, r = .22, 
suggesting that the word task was successful at eliciting a level of anxiety comparable to the 
speech. 
Next, participants’ level of anxiety following the repeated recall trials was examined to 
evaluate whether repeatedly reviewing the speech versus the word definition task differentially 
impacted state anxiety. Results from an independent samples t-test indicated no significant 
differences between the conditions, t(67) = -1.05, p =.30, r = .13, indicating, as hoped, that 
reviewing both tasks resulted in comparable feelings of anxiety. Means and standard deviations 
for all Study 2 state and trait variables can be found in Table 11.  
Negative Affect. Participants’ experience of negative affect in response to each task as 
well as changes over time were assessed using two t-tests. A Bonferroni correction (.05/2) was 
applied to control for multiple comparisons, and the alpha level was set to p = .025. First, to 
determine whether the speech and word definition tasks were comparable in eliciting negative 
affect, a paired samples t-test was conducted with the PANAS-NA ratings provided immediately 
after each task. Results suggested, as hoped, that the word definition task was successful at 
eliciting negative affect at a level that was comparable to the speech task, t(65) = .13, p =.90, r = 
.02.  
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Next, differences across conditions in negative affect after the recall trials were assessed 
to see if recollection of the tasks was comparable in eliciting negative affect. Results from an 
independent samples t-test indicated no significant differences in experience of negative affect, 
t(67) = -1.51, p =.14, r = .18. 
Positive Affect. Participants’ self-reported positive affect was assessed using the 
PANAS-PA and differences across tasks and time were analyzed using two t-tests (Bonferroni 
correction with alpha set to p = .025). As with state anxiety and negative affect, participants rated 
their positive affect consistently across the speech and word definition tasks, t(65) = .61, p =.55, 
r = .08. Similarly, the results from an independent samples t-test indicated that repeatedly 
reviewing the speech versus the word definition task had similar impacts on positive affect, t(67) 
= .90, p =.37, r = .11. 
In sum, preliminary analyses suggested that the tasks (speech, word definition) as well as 
the conditions (socially-relevant, socially-irrelevant review) were equivalent in terms of 
participants’ reported state anxiety, positive and negative affect. These findings suggest, as 
anticipated, that the word definition task was successful at eliciting negative affect comparable to 
that observed in response to the speech task. 
Primary Analyses 
Perception of Performance 
Perception of Speech Performance. Changes in overall perception of speech 
performance from post-speech to post-recall were examined with the PSPC performance 
subscale in each of the conditions to determine whether repeated recall in the socially-relevant 
review condition was associated with degradation in performance ratings relative to the socially-
irrelevant review condition. The homogeneity of variance assumption was met (Levene’s test, all 
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p’s > .11). Results of a 2 (condition: socially-relevant, socially-irrelevant) × 2 mixed-design 
(time: post-speech, post-recall) ANOVA indicated that there was no main effect of condition, F 
(1, 67) = .08, p =.78, partial η2 = .001. The main effect of time was approaching significance, F 
(1, 67) = 3.56, p = .06, partial η2 = .05, while the condition × time interaction was not significant, 
F (1, 67) = 1.40, p = .24, partial η2 = .02. Contrary to predictions, participants rated their overall 
speech performance somewhat more positively following the repeated recall period relative to 
baseline across both conditions (See Figure 13 a). 
Next, changes in perception of positive and negative aspects of performance were 
examined separately from post-speech to post-recall (See Figure 13, b and c). With the positive 
subscale, there was a significant main effect of time such that all participants rated their speech 
performance less positively following the repeated recall task, F (1, 67) = 7.31, p =.009, partial 
η2 = .10. There was no main effect of condition, F (1, 67) = 0.44, p = .51, partial η2 = 0.007, and 
no significant interaction, F (1, 67) = 1.08, p = .30, partial η2 = 0.02. With the negative subscale, 
once again, there was a main effect of time with perception of performance becoming less 
negative following the repeated recall task, F (1, 67) = 16.29, p <.001, partial η2 = .20. The main 
effect of condition was not significant, F (1, 67) = 0.002, p = .97, partial η2 = 0.00, nor was the 
interaction, F (1, 67) = 0.64, p = .43, partial η2 = .009. The homogeneity of variance assumption 
was met for all variables (all p’s>.13).  
Self-Observer Discrepancy Ratings of Speech Performance. To examine how accurate 
participants were in their performance ratings, two paired-samples t-tests were conducted where 
self-ratings at post-speech and post-recall were compared to objective observer ratings on the 
performance subscale of the PSPC. The results suggested that across both conditions, 
participants rated their performance more negatively than observers immediately after the speech  
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Figure 13. Study 2 PSPC performance ratings in socially-relevant and socially-irrelevant 
conditions for pre- and post-recall for a) overall perception of performance, b) perception of 
performance for positive items, and c) perception of performance for negative items. Higher 
scores indicate better performance ratings.  
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task, t(48) = -14.98, p <.001, r = .92, as well as after the recall task t(43) = -13.52, p <.001, r = 
.90.  
Next, as in Study 1, standardized residual scores were computed as a means of assessing 
whether participants’ accuracy changed from post-speech to post-recall and whether  
there were any differences by condition. The post-speech and post-recall discrepancy scores 
were then entered into a mixed-design ANOVA as the within subjects factors and condition 
entered as the between subjects factor. The results of this analysis suggested that there were no 
significant main effects of time [F(1, 42) = 0.01, p = .91, partial η2 = 0.00], or condition [F(1, 
42) = 0.05, p = .83, partial η2 = 0.001], and no significant interaction [F(1, 42) = 0.43, p = .52, 
partial η2 = 0.01]. These results indicate that participants in neither condition became more 
biased in their perceptions of speech performance following the recall period (See Figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14. Study 2 PSPC performance discrepancy ratings (standardized residual scores) for the 
socially-relevant and socially-irrelevant conditions for pre- and post-recall. 
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Motivation to Engage in Recall 
Motivation to engage in PEP about the speech was assessed following the repeated recall 
manipulation. It was expected that if PEP functions as a mental checking strategy, then after the 
recall trials, participants in the socially-irrelevant review condition (reviewed the word task) 
would be particularly motivated to engage in PEP about the speech, whereas those who reviewed 
the speech (i.e., those in the socially-relevant review condition) would be somewhat less 
motivated to think about it further. We expected that all participants, regardless of condition 
would not be motivated to engage in PEP about the word definition task following the repeated 
recall trials. A one-way ANOVA was conducted with condition as the between subjects factor 
and motivation to review the speech task as the dependent variable. Levene’s test indicated that 
the homogeneity of variance assumption was met (p =.85). The results of this analysis suggested 
that contrary to hypotheses, there were no differences between conditions in motivation to 
engage in PEP about the speech task, F (1, 67) = .03, p =.87, partial η2 = 0.00.  
Certainty 
PSPC Certainty Ratings for the Speech Task. A mixed-measures ANOVA was 
conducted to examine the effect of condition on changes in speech performance certainty ratings 
(PSPC, certainty subscale) from post-speech to post recall. Levene’s test was not significant for 
the certainty ratings at either time point, p’s > .55. Results suggested a significant main effect of 
time, with all participants becoming more certain about their speech performance following the 
repeated recall trials, F(1, 67) = 6.04, p =.02, partial η2 = 0.08. Contrary to hypotheses, the main 
effect of condition was not significant, F(1, 67) = 0.68, p = .41, partial η2 = 0.01, nor was the 
time × condition interaction, F(1, 67) = 1.49, p = .23, partial η2 = 0.02. These results are 
presented in Figure 15 and suggest that repeatedly recalling the speech task relative to the word 
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definition task does not differentially impact certainty ratings, although all participants reported 
feeling more certain about their performance after the recall period.   
Memory Uncertainty. The extent to which people reported general uncertainty in their 
memory for the speech task was assessed post-recall with the MACS-PS (memory uncertainty 
subscale). The results of an independent t-test suggest that there were no significant differences 
across the two conditions , t(67) = -1.50, p =.14, r = .18. 
Mental Checking. Differences in tendency to mentally check or review the speech task 
were evaluated with an independent samples t-test. Results revealed that there were no 
significant differences between conditions, t(67) = .67, p =.50, r = .08. 
 
 
Figure 15. Study 2 PSPC certainty ratings in the socially-relevant and socially-irrelevant 
conditions at the post-speech and post-recall assessments. 
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Metacognitive Beliefs 
MACS-PS. Metacognitive beliefs about engaging in PEP about the speech task were 
assessed with the metacognitive beliefs subscale of the MACS-PS following the recall period. 
An independent samples t-test indicated that there were no significant condition differences in 
endorsement of these beliefs, t(66) = .11, p =.91, r = .01.  
Advantages and Disadvantages. To assess metacognitive beliefs about PEP for social 
events more directly, participants were asked open-ended questions post-recall about the 
advantages and disadvantages of reviewing the speech task. Across all participants,
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approximately 75% reported some benefit to engaging in PEP about the speech task. More 
specifically, 47.8% of participants reported one advantage to reviewing the speech, 23.2% 
reported two advantages, and 4.3% reported three advantages. Sample advantages reported by 
participants included “self-awareness”, “identifying areas to be improved”, and “practice for 
future public speaking”. Inspection of the advantages reported by participants’ revealed common 
themes. The most frequently endorsed advantages were to improve next time, to gain greater 
self-understanding and insight, to prevent future mistakes, to organize one’s thoughts, and to 
view performance more objectively. The frequency with which these categories were endorsed 
can be found in Table 13. 
Most participants also endorsed disadvantages to reviewing the speech task, with almost 
70% endorsing at least one disadvantage. More specifically, 47.8% reported one disadvantage, 
17.4% reported two disadvantages, and 2.9% reported three disadvantages. Sample 
disadvantages reported included “lingering on negative thoughts”, “if you get too hung up, it will 
distract you from other tasks”, and “makes me feel bad about myself”. The most commonly 
                                                          
12
 To ensure that the conditions did not differ in number of self-reported advantages and disadvantages, two 
independent samples t-tests were performed which confirmed that the groups were equivalent (both p’s >.67). 
 
122 
 
reported disadvantages could be categorized into the following themes: increasing negative 
emotions (e.g, anxiety, guilt, sadness), increasing negative beliefs about oneself or one’s 
performance, the content of thoughts is focused on the negative, thoughts become more negative 
over time, and it increases self-doubt (see Table 13 for frequency of endorsement for each 
category). 
The majority of participants, 57.7%, reported both advantages and disadvantages to 
reviewing the speech task. Sixteen point nine percent reported only advantages, 9.9% reported 
only disadvantages, and 15.5 % did not report any advantages or disadvantages. 
 
Table 13 
 
Study 2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Reviewing Speech Task Categorized into Common 
Themes  
 
  
Categories               Frequency 
              ____________________ 
         n  %  
 
 
Advantages 
Improve next time      30   43.5 
   Understanding/insight into self    12   17.4 
   Prevent future mistakes     6   8.7 
  Organize thoughts       5  7.2 
   View performance more objectively    3   4.3 
Disadvantages 
   Increase negative emotions      20   29.0   
   Increase negative beliefs about self/performance   12   17.4 
   Thoughts focused on negative    8  11.6   
   Thoughts become more negative     5  7.2 
   Increase doubt (i.e., self and situation)    2   2.9 
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Discussion 
 The primary aims of Study 2 were to experimentally evaluate the effects of repeatedly 
recalling a socially-relevant versus irrelevant task on participants’ performance, certainty and 
accuracy ratings and to examine idiosyncratic motivations for engaging in PEP. The results of 
the current investigation suggest that repeatedly reviewing a socially-relevant task, relative to a 
socially-irrelevant task, did not result in the hypothesized effects. That is, participants who were 
asked to repeatedly review the speech task showed similar ratings on performance, certainty, and 
accuracy ratings compared to participants who reviewed the word definition task. These results 
are in contrast to study hypotheses, and are inconsistent with cognitive behavioural theories and 
prior research which has demonstrated that engagement in PEP results in more negative self-
perceptions. It is unclear what may be contributing to this pattern of results. One possibility is 
that regardless of condition and the instructions provided, all participants may have engaged in 
recall of both the speech and the word definition task throughout the recall periods. All of the 
recall trials were conducted in participant’s minds, and they were instructed to notify the 
experimenter once they had finished a recall trial. This methodology was used in order to 
simulate a more ecologically-valid process (rather than, for example, having participants write 
down their thoughts after each trial). However, this design provided less experimental control 
over measuring the precise content of the recollection process and, thus, it was impossible to 
know what participants were actually doing during this time. Indeed, several participants made 
comments in the post-recall questionnaire that they did not engage in the exercise as instructed. 
Although these individuals were excluded from the analyses, it is possible that other participants 
likewise did not engage in the recall task but did not communicate this to the experimenters.  
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The results from the current study suggest that all participants showed overall improved 
performance ratings after the recall periods. These findings were unexpected, and suggest that 
engagement in experimenter guided recall trials may not adequately replicate naturalistically-
occurring PEP. During the recall trials, participants in the current study were instructed to focus 
on how they performed, as well as any sensations, thoughts, judgements, observations, or 
feelings they experienced during the task. These instructions were generated based on cognitive 
behavioural models of PEP but were presented in a neutral manner (i.e., not focused on negative 
or positive aspects of performance) in order to minimize undue experimenter influence on 
participants’ thought processes. However, it is possible that these instructions may have altered 
the way in which PEP occurred and the recall trials may not have mimicked real world PEP, thus 
failing to facilitate the expected decline in perceived performance. Difficulties inducing 
naturalistic PEP in individuals with SAD have been previously identified in the literature. A 
study by Rowa et al. (2013) had participants with SAD complete a lab based speech task and 
then engage in a PEP induction (focus on speech performance) or a distraction condition (listen 
to a neutral audiotaped recording and note when certain words are presented). Contrary to 
expectations, they found that the PEP induction did not result in greater engagement in PEP 
relative to the distraction condition, although individuals in the distraction condition did 
experience some benefit in terms of anxiety reduction. These findings suggest that PEP may be 
difficult to induce experimentally and that intentional engagement in this cognitive process 
functions differently, and is less harmful, than PEP that unfolds naturally in an unprovoked 
manner. A study by Makkar and Grisham (2012) lends support to this hypothesis. In their study, 
participants engaged in a speech task and were immediately assigned to either a PEP or 
distraction condition. The PEP condition was based on the Clark and Wells (1995) model as well 
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as previous research and was designed to elicit negative thoughts and perceptions of the speech 
task. Participants in this condition were instructed to focus on portions of their speech that went 
poorly, anxious feelings and sensations that were experienced, things they wished they had done 
differently, negative cognitions, imagining their appearance during the most uncomfortable 
moments, recalling past speeches that went poorly, and considering what being negatively 
evaluated on the speech would mean about the themselves and their future. In contrast, 
participants in the distraction condition were asked to think about and visualize a series of non-
self-relevant and neutral topics. Surprisingly, the authors found that relative to the distraction 
condition, engaging in PEP actually resulted in positive outcomes for socially anxious 
participants, including an improved perception of speech quality, reduced perceived visibility of 
negative behaviours, and an increased willingness to complete a subsequent speech. The authors 
postulated that the PEP condition in their study may have actually elicited a more constructive 
form of repetitive thought by encouraging the speech task to be processed in a concrete and 
experiential manner rather than in a more abstract way (Watkins, 2008). There are of course 
some important methodological differences between the current study and the Rowa et al., 
(2013) and Makkar and Grisham (2012) studies, including the repeated recall trials, the socially-
relevant and socially-irrelevant review conditions, the absence of a control condition, as well as 
the fact that the PEP instructions in the current study were presented in a more neutral manner. 
However, the results of all three of these studies suggest that there may be some substantive 
differences between experimenter guided PEP compared to the negative processing that occurs 
more intrinsically among socially anxious individuals.  
The results of the present study did not support the hypothesized effects of repeatedly 
reviewing a socially-relevant vs. irrelevant task on feelings of certainty. The effects of repeated 
126 
 
physical and mental checking on memory confidence, vividness and detail are well established in 
the OCD literature. The current study sought to extend these findings to social anxiety, in order 
to evaluate whether similar effects would be observed with repeated recall or checking of a 
socially threatening event. The results from the current investigation indicate that, contrary to 
hypotheses, all participants became more certain of their speech performance after the recall 
period regardless of whether they repeatedly reviewed the speech or the word definition task. It 
is possible that repeated socially-relevant mental checking in the aftermath of a social task does 
not impact socially anxious individuals’ performance certainty in the same manner that repeated 
mental checking of threat stimuli erodes participants’ memory certainty in the context of OCD. 
Alternatively, as reviewed above, it is also possible that, unbeknownst to the experimenters, the 
participants did not engage in the repeated recollection of the tasks as instructed. Future studies 
may wish to more directly assess participant compliance with the experimental procedures.   
 A final aim of the current study was to explore the types of metacognitive beliefs 
reported by socially anxious individuals about engaging in PEP about the speech task. When 
asked about advantages to reviewing the speech task, 75% of participants generated at least one 
advantage. Most of the reported advantages could be summarized by one of the following 
categories: to improve next time, to gain understanding/insight into oneself, to prevent future 
mistakes, to organize one’s thinking, and to view performance more objectively. Importantly, all 
but the last theme (to view performance more objectively) were assessed by the MACS-PS, 
suggesting that this measure provides a reasonably thorough assessment of the beliefs 
participants hold about the value of PEP. Alongside the advantages, most participants (70%) also 
reported at least one disadvantage of engaging in PEP about the speech, suggesting at least some 
level of ambivalence about the process. Indeed, a majority of participants endorsed both 
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advantages and disadvantages (57.7%). Beliefs about the disadvantages of mentally reviewing 
are considered negative metacognitive beliefs as they pertain to the negative consequences of 
this thought process. Most of the endorsed disadvantages of PEP could be categorized as 
follows: increases negative affect, increases negative self-perceptions about performance, 
thoughts are predominantly negative, thoughts become more negative with time, and increases 
doubt about oneself and the situation. Interestingly, participants did not spontaneously report that 
reviewing the speech task would result in a loss of control over their thought process as might be 
predicted by the S-REF model of negative metacognitive beliefs. However, the current 
methodology, which simply asked participants to report on the disadvantages of mentally 
reviewing the speech task, may not have been designed to elicit such responses, even if they are 
present.  
Importantly, a remarkably similar pattern of results regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of repetitive thought has emerged in the depression literature. Watkins and 
Baracaia (2001) asked individuals who self-identified as ruminators to report on the advantages 
and disadvantages of rumination. These authors found that 80% of participants endorsed at least 
one perceived advantage and 70% endorsed at least one perceived disadvantage. Furthermore, 
several of the themes were similar to the ones found in the current study, including 
understanding/insight, preventing future mistakes, and maintaining/worsening negative affect. 
The findings from the current study suggest that similar beliefs may exist in social anxiety, and 
may contribute to the persistence of negative PEP following social situations. 
In the present study, a word definition task served as the control task, and was designed 
to elicit negative affect and induce feelings of perceived failure. The preliminary analyses 
presented above suggest that it was effective at doing so, and that feelings of state anxiety, 
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positive and negative affect were similar across both tasks. This task was chosen in order to 
reduce the likelihood that any obtained results were due simply to differences in negative affect 
between the conditions. It is possible however, that with a university sample, the word definition 
task may have been particularly relevant and upsetting given the implications of doing poorly on 
such a task in terms of school success. A review of the thoughts generated post-recall revealed 
that a number of participants commented on their university student status and indicated that the 
word definition task led them to compare themselves to other students (e.g., “I felt not as smart 
compared to other university students”, “it felt like an exam where I didn’t know the answers”, “I 
thought I didn’t do well since I only got 3 definitions out of the 11 to 12 definitions expected as a 
university student”). The current study did not evaluate perceptions of performance for the word 
definition task or changes in such perceptions over time, although it might be interesting to 
compare whether similar results are found for social and non-social tasks. Furthermore, future 
studies may wish to address some of the limitations of the current study design and sample. For 
example, the word definition task used in the current study elicited a high degree of anxiety for 
participants. Although this was done intentionally so that the unique effects of social threat could 
be explored, it is possible that the induction of negative affect in both conditions masked the 
effects of repeated recall. Future studies may wish to evaluate these hypotheses using a 
threatening relative to a non-threatening task. Similarly, it is possible that the word definition 
task was particularly threatening to a student sample, given its implications for educational 
attainment and success, and future studies may wish to explore these relationships in community 
samples. Finally, this study only explored the hypothesized relationships among individuals with 
elevated social anxiety and lacked a low social anxiety comparison group. It is possible that 
meaningful differences would emerge on the constructs of interest if high versus low socially 
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anxious participants were compared. Future studies in this area should include a low anxiety 
control group.   
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General Discussion 
 The primary aim of the current studies was to investigate mechanisms that may 
contribute to the maintenance of PEP in social anxiety. Although ample research has identified 
the nature and consequences of this phenomenon, few studies have investigated the specific 
factors that may serve to perpetuate PEP. The current line of research was developed to evaluate 
a novel theoretical framework which proposed that feelings of uncertainty, positive 
metacognitive beliefs, motivation to mentally review, and poor perceptions of performance 
would motivate individuals with SAD to engage in PEP following a threatening social event. It 
was further hypothesized that engagement in such processing would be viewed as a productive 
and beneficial thought process and would be reinforcing as it may serve to resolve feelings of 
uncertainty about one’s social performance. However, despite these perceived advantages, it was 
expected that engagement in such repetitive thinking would leave individuals’ memories 
susceptible to interpretation biases and ultimately more negative and biased interpretations. 
Findings across three studies provide partial support for the proposed theoretical framework. 
Specifically, results demonstrated that holding positive metacognitive beliefs and negatively 
biased perceptions of performance immediately after a social task fueled engagement in PEP in 
the days that followed. In contrast, although individuals with social anxiety reported feeling 
greater uncertainty about their social performance, these feelings did not appear related to PEP. 
Similarly, contrary to expectations and previous research (e.g., Brozovich & Heimberg, 2011; 
Wong & Moulds, 2012), degree of PEP was not associated with more negative perceptions of 
performance or changes in certainty over time.  
 One of the novel aspects of this line of research was the evaluation of PEP as it occurs in 
SAD relative to both healthy and anxious controls. Negative repetitive thinking is common in a 
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number of psychological disorders. Traditionally, each of these negative thinking styles has been 
studied exclusively within the context of the associated disorder (e.g., worry has been studied in 
the context of GAD). However, in recent years, a number of authors have recognized the 
similarities in perseverative negative thinking patterns across psychopathologies and have argued 
that repetitive thought may be best conceptualized as a transdiagnostic factor (McEvoy et al., 
2010; McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). To test this conceptualization, McEvoy, 
Mahoney and Moulds (2010) developed and administered the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire 
(RTQ) to a large sample of undergraduate students. The RTQ was derived exclusively from 
items on existing measures of PEP (PEPQ-R), worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), and rumination (Response Style Questionnaire; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RTQ was designed to be non-disorder specific and 
participants were instructed to respond to the items in reference to a recent distressing event of 
their choosing. Results from a common factor analysis indicated a two-factor solution, with 
positively worded items loading on one factor and negatively worded items loading on a separate 
factor.  The authors interpreted these findings as suggesting that rumination, worry, and PEP 
share a number of similarities. They further examined the relationships between the RTQ and 
both depression (Beck Depression Inventory II; Beck, Steer, & Broen, 1996) and anxiety (Beck 
Anxiety Inventory; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988); the findings indicated that the RTQ 
was moderately correlated with both measures. Furthermore, multiple regression analyses 
demonstrated that depression and anxiety were both uniquely predictive of RTQ scores, which 
the authors argued provides support for repetitive thought as a ‘trans-emotional’ process.  
 In contrast to the findings and conclusions of McEvoy et al., (2010) and as was reviewed 
in the introduction, a number of studies have found that individuals with SAD are more likely to 
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engage in PEP relative to healthy controls, even when depression is accounted for (e.g., Abbott 
& Rapee, 2004; Mellings & Alden, 2000). Furthermore, social situations have been found to 
uniquely elicit engagement in PEP relative to other distressing events (Fehm et al., 2007). The 
results of Study 1 are consistent with these studies, as individuals with SAD engaged in greater 
PEP relative to both anxious and healthy controls, signifying that PEP about a specific socially 
threatening task may be a SAD-specific phenomenon. Taken together, the available empirical 
evidence suggests that individuals with emotional disorders may have a propensity to engage in 
negative repetitive thinking in response to distressing events; however, in social situations this 
cognitive process is uniquely triggered amongst individuals with social fears. To provide 
evidence for this hypothesis, future research could include a general measure of negative 
thinking (e.g., RTQ) as well as a disorder specific measure (e.g., PEPQ-R) within the same 
study.  
 The role that certainty plays in fueling PEP was explored in all three of the current 
studies. The pilot study found preliminary correlational evidence for a moderate but significant 
association between social anxiety symptoms and uncertainty for past social events in two large 
samples of unselected undergraduate students. Expanding on these findings, Study 1 
demonstrated that compared to both anxious and healthy controls, individuals with a diagnosis of 
SAD experienced significantly greater uncertainty immediately after a standardized speech task. 
When certainty ratings were examined across time, the data suggested an interesting pattern of 
results. While socially anxious individuals were initially less certain than controls, their ratings 
remained unchanged over time. In contrast, individuals in the two control groups reported greater 
certainty about their performance (for both positive and negative items) than those with SAD in 
the immediate aftermath of the speech task, but their certainty ratings declined by the following 
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day and these lower ratings remained constant throughout the week. These data appear to suggest 
that initial certainty about performance after a social task, followed by a reduction in certainty 
that remains stable in the days following the task, represents the “normative” pattern, to which 
both healthy and anxious control participants conformed, but participants with SAD did not. One 
possible explanation for these findings is that individuals in the SAD group, who also exhibited 
heightened levels of PEP in the days following the speech task, were continuing to think about 
the task throughout the week, thus keeping the memory for the event active in their minds and 
preventing decreases in certainty that might otherwise be expected. It would be interesting to 
examine how certainty might continue to change over the course of time. Do participants with 
social anxiety simply start out less certain and maintain this level of certainty indefinitely, or 
would they eventually show the decline in certainty that was observed in the control groups? 
These are empirical questions that require further research. 
Although research on feelings of certainty in the context of social anxiety has been 
relatively sparse, a few recent studies have examined certainty in the context of positive and 
negative self-attributes. First, Wilson and Rapee (2006) found that relative to non-anxious 
controls, individuals with SAD held less favourable beliefs about their self-attributes, even when 
depression was partialled out. With regards to certainty, individuals with SAD were less 
confident in their ratings for both positive and negative qualities of the self. Furthermore, relative 
to healthy controls, they were slower to respond on a reaction time task requiring them to 
indicate whether specific characteristics were representative of them. Importantly, the authors 
found evidence that decreased certainty among socially anxious individuals was specific to self-
relevant personality attributes, rather than a more general tendency to feel uncertain. A later 
study by Moscovitch et al. (2009) found that non-anxious control participants attributed greater 
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certainty for positive relative to negative self-attributes while individuals with SAD did not show 
this bias. In other words, non-anxious individuals had greater confidence in their positive, 
relative to their negative, traits whereas individuals with SAD reported feeling equally uncertain 
across all personality characteristics. These authors argued that a positive bias for viewing self-
attributes likely serves a self-protective function, by increasing self-esteem and psychological 
well-being. Finally, Stopa et al. (2010) found that, relative to non-anxious controls, socially 
anxious individuals were less consistent in their endorsement of self-attributes, suggesting a 
greater sense of uncertainty about the self. However, when consistency for positive and negative 
self-attributes was examined separately, socially anxious individuals were significantly more 
certain for negative self-attributes while reporting less certainty for positive self-attributes 
compared to non-anxious controls. Taken together, these studies suggest that socially anxious 
individuals report less certainty for both positive and negative self-attributes, although this may 
be particularly salient for positive aspects of the self.  
The results from Study 1 suggest that participants from all diagnostic groups felt more 
certain about negative relative to positive aspects of their performance immediately after the 
speech. Anxious and healthy control participants continued to show this bias throughout the 
week, whereas by the 1-day follow-up, participants in the SAD group felt equally uncertain 
about both positive and negative aspects of performance. These findings appear inconsistent with 
previous studies on self-certainty (Moscovitch et al., 2009; Stopa et al., 2010), which have 
generally found that socially anxious individuals lack certainty for positive aspects of the self but 
tend to feel more certain for negative self-attributes. However, the current study specifically 
assessed certainty for speech performance, whereas prior studies have examined certainty in the 
context of more general self-attributes. In general, it is likely adaptive for individuals to feel 
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certain and confident in their positive attributes and abilities and to know that they possess these 
qualities in their day-to-day social interactions. In contrast, in the current study, feelings of 
certainty were assessed for performance ratings with regards to a structured, lab-based, speech 
task. Given that anxious and healthy controls rated their performance less negatively and more 
accurately, it may be that the most adaptive response in this context is to leave the situation 
feeling confident that you performed “well enough”. In other words, individuals without social 
anxiety may leave the speech task feeling less certain about whether they did a great job, but 
feeling confident that they did not perform poorly. In contrast, individuals with SAD appear to 
feel uncertain about both positive and negative aspects of their speech performance. 
It was hypothesized that certainty may be one mechanism which maintains the 
persistence of PEP in SAD; however, the results of these studies do not support this conclusion. 
In Study 1, contrary to expectations, certainty was not significantly related to PEP at any of the 
follow-up assessments and did not mediate the relation between diagnostic status and 
engagement in PEP. Similarly, we did not find support for the idea that wanting to mentally 
check or review one’s memory was associated with increased engagement in PEP, and once 
again, this variable was not found to be a significant mediator. Study 2 further explored how 
engaging in PEP about a socially threatening task impacted feelings of certainty. It was 
hypothesised that PEP might serve a mental checking function, and that participants who were 
instructed to repeatedly recall and mentally review a socially-relevant relative to a socially-
irrelevant event would report increases in certainty while at the same time showing decreases in 
performance appraisals. However, the findings from this study did not support this hypothesis. 
Regardless of which task was recalled, participants in Study 2 showed a general increase in 
certainty following the recall period. Study 2 consisted only of participants with high levels of 
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trait social anxiety; thus, it is possible that including a comparison group of low socially anxious 
individuals may have revealed significant group differences that were not observable within the 
context of our design.   
In the proposed framework outlined in the introduction, positive metacognitive beliefs 
about the value and benefit of reviewing past social events were identified as an additional 
mechanism which may serve to motivate engagement in PEP.  The presence and function of 
metacognitive beliefs in emotional disorders, such as GAD and Major Depression, has received 
support in the research literature, although these ideas have only recently been investigated in the 
context of PEP and social anxiety. Prior studies in this area have found some evidence for the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs, PEP, and social anxiety (Fisak & Hammond, 2013; 
Wong & Moulds, 2010). The current research provides additional support for these relationships 
and expands on previous work by including a clinical sample and evaluating the role of 
metacognitive beliefs in the context of a standardized experimental design. The Pilot Study 
provided evidence that social anxiety symptoms and metacognitive beliefs are moderately but 
significantly correlated – a finding that is consistent with results reported elsewhere (e.g., Fisak 
& Hammond, 2013; Wong & Moulds, 2010). The goal of Study 1 was to further evaluate 
whether positive metacognitive beliefs would be related to PEP following a social stress task. 
Results from this study suggested that individuals with SAD more strongly endorsed 
metacognitive beliefs relative to both anxious and healthy controls. Furthermore, we found 
support for the hypothesized relationship between positive metacognitive beliefs and PEP. 
Results from the mediation analyses suggest that metacognitive beliefs mediated the relationship 
between diagnostic group status and engagement in PEP. In other words, relative to both control 
groups, individuals with SAD engaged in PEP because they held metacognitive beliefs about the 
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value of doing so. The second set of mediational analyses indicated that although metacognitive 
beliefs predicted PEP, PEP in turn did not mediate the relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and worsening perceptions of performance or increases in certainty. Contrary to 
expectations, this suggests that while metacognitive beliefs may lead individuals to engage in 
PEP, this engagement is not associated with greater feelings of certainty or more negative 
perceptions of performance over time.  
The results of Study 2 expanded on these findings by exploring the phenomenology of 
beliefs held by socially anxious individuals. The main finding from this study suggested that 
most socially anxious individuals believed that there were both advantages (75%) and 
disadvantages (70%) to reviewing the speech task. Participants’ self-generated advantages and 
disadvantages were reviewed, and a number of common themes emerged. Interestingly, the 
frequency with which participants endorsed both advantages and disadvantages was similar to a 
study by Watkins & Baracaia (2001) who examined these constructs in a sample of self-
identified ruminators. In their study, they found that 80% of their participants reported at least 
one advantage and 70% reported at least one disadvantage to engaging in rumination. 
Furthermore, the themes that were identified in this study were likewise similar to those obtained 
in Study 2 (e.g., greater understanding/insight, preventing future mistakes, 
maintaining/worsening negative affect, not understanding self/problems).  
The results presented here, in combination with data emerging from the literature on 
metacognitive beliefs, suggests that there may be an underlying tendency to engage in “thinking 
about thinking” across diagnostic categories, but that the specific situations in which these 
thoughts manifest are specific to the disorder.  Consistent with this, the presence of 
metacognitive beliefs across anxiety and mood disorders has been well documented (e.g., Janeck, 
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Calamari, Riemann, & Heffelfinger, 2003; Bailey & Wells, 2013; Wells, 2005; Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005). In the current studies, we were particularly interested in understanding the 
impact of positive metacognitive beliefs in reference to a standardized social stressor task given 
that these beliefs have been proposed to initiate repetitive thinking styles (Matthews & Wells, 
2004; Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996). Given that socially anxious individuals in Study 1 more 
strongly endorsed items on a measure of positive metacognitive beliefs regarding a speech task 
relative to anxious and healthy controls, it appears that although such beliefs may be prevalent 
across emotional disorders, beliefs about the benefit of reviewing social events is unique to SAD. 
One possible explanation for these findings is that individuals across anxiety and mood disorders 
may see value in reviewing emotionally distressing events. The notion that repetitive thinking 
occurs in response to distressing events has been previously proposed. In the context of response 
style theory, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) argued that rumination is a means of responding to distress 
that involves repeatedly dwelling on symptoms, causes, and consequences of that distress. 
Similarly, the concept of cognitive processing has emerged which refers to the tendency for 
people to think about distressing events, including their emotional impacts and future 
implications (see Watkins, 2008 for a review). The cognitive processing account proposes that 
individuals think about distressing events in an effort to resolve them so that these events can be 
successfully incorporated into their understanding of the world. Cognitive processing has been 
largely studied in the context of traumatic events (e.g., Greenberg, 1995; Lindstrom, Cann, 
Calhoun, & Tedeschi, 2013), although some studies have also evaluated this process in response 
to non-traumatic, yet distressing situations (e.g., Lepore & Greenberg, 2002). These theories may 
help to provide a framework for understanding the current findings. In Study 1, individuals in the 
SAD group experienced significantly higher levels of state anxiety in response to the speech task 
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and it may be that this increased level of distress signalled to participants that this was a 
significant event. This interpretation may in turn have activated positive metacognitive beliefs 
about the value of reviewing the event in order to reach a resolution. According to these theories, 
metacognitive beliefs about reviewing distressing events may therefore be best be conceptualized 
as a transdiagnostic factor which is activated in response to the individuals’ idiosyncratic fears. 
In other words, individuals across a range of anxiety and mood disorders may hold beliefs that it 
is valuable and important to review distressing events when they occur. However, the specific 
events that trigger distress are expected to vary across disorders and endorsement of 
metacognitive beliefs would therefore only be expected in situations that the individual considers 
particularly distressing. Of course, at this stage this suggestion is largely conjectural and future 
studies may wish to test this assumption by examining metacognitive beliefs across a range of 
distressing situations.   
The final set of findings from the current studies involved participants’ perceptions of 
performance on a standardized speech task. Consistent with prior research, the results of Study 1 
suggested that relative to both anxious and healthy control participants, individuals with SAD 
tended to rate their performance more poorly and less accurately (compared to objective 
observers). As has been found in previous studies (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Brozovich & 
Heimberg, 2011), it was expected that as a result of PEP, participants with SAD would rate their 
performance more negatively over time while the control participants would not show this 
pattern. Contrary to predictions, results from Study 1 indicated that overall performance ratings 
improved over time for all participants, regardless of diagnostic status. Although improvements 
observed at the 1-day follow-up were maintained at the 4-day follow-up, perceptions of 
performance began to decline again by the 7-day assessment.  
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When positive and negative aspects of performance were evaluated separately, the 
findings suggested that individuals with SAD initially rated their performance less positively 
relative to both control groups, but that these appraisals improved  by the day-1 follow-up 
assessment. For negative items, participants across all groups reported less negative perceptions 
of performance over time. However, in addition to the main effect of time, an interesting trend 
emerged in the data. These results indicated that perceptions of negative aspects of performance 
tended to remain fairly stable over time for the SAD group, whereas both control groups showed 
improvements by the 1-day follow-up (these data should be interpreted with caution as they did 
not reach statistical significance). Although prior studies have generally found that perceptions 
of performance tend to become worse over time, and that this is unique to social anxiety, there 
have been some findings to suggest this is not always the case (Cody & Teachman, 2010). These 
discrepant findings may be due to methodological differences across studies. For example, Cody 
and Teachman (2011) provided false feedback to participants and assessed how their 
recollections for this feedback changed over time, which was not done in the current studies. 
Furthermore, few studies have examined positively and negatively valenced items separately, 
and the results from Study 1 suggest that there are clear differences in how positive versus 
negative items are recalled by individuals with SAD and that this may be an important 
distinction when assessing perceptions of performance. Our results suggest that negative aspects 
of performance tended to be particularly stable and remained negatively biased over time for 
socially anxious individuals. In contrast, positive aspects of performance seemed to improve over 
time for individuals with SAD, and were indistinguishable from control participants by the 1-day 
follow-up. These findings are consistent with the predictions of cognitive behavioural models of 
social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007, Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) which argue 
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that individuals with SAD have well engrained negative self-schemas. In contrast, positive 
aspects of performance may be less well developed and therefore more susceptible to influence 
and change. Future studies should consider both types of performance appraisals in order to 
develop a better understanding of how these are expressed and experienced by socially anxious 
individuals.  
The results from Study 1 also highlight the importance of assessing PEP and perceptions 
of performance over longer intervals of time. In this study, we found that individuals with SAD 
continued to engage in significant PEP in the week following the speech; in fact, no significant 
declines in PEP were observed over the course of the study. This implies that individuals with 
SAD were continuing to actively recall and reactivate their memories for the speech task even at 
the final follow-up whereas control participants seemed to have put the event “behind them”. As 
was reviewed in the introduction, memory is a reconstructive process, and each time a memory is 
recalled it is stored as a separate memory trace in the brain and is therefore susceptible to 
manipulation (Moscovitch, 1992; Schacter, 2012). In terms of perceptions of performance, we 
found that although overall ratings initially improved, they started to decline again by the 7-day 
follow-up. Given that socially anxious individuals were continuing to engage in PEP, thereby 
reactivating their memories for this event, it seems plausible that additional changes in 
perceptions could have occurred given more time. To our knowledge, no studies have evaluated 
PEP or performance for more than a one-week period, and future studies are needed to assess 
these variables over longer periods of time to determine if any group differences emerge at 
longer intervals.  
Perceptions of performance immediately after the speech task were found to be a 
significant mediator of the relationship between diagnostic group status and PEP in the days 
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following the task, indicating that socially anxious individuals’ negative evaluations of their 
performance in the immediate aftermath of a social task subsequently cause them to ruminate 
about their performance. Although similar findings have been reported previously (e.g., Chen, 
Rapee, & Abbott, 2013), the present study was the first to demonstrate that such mediation 
occurs exclusively for individuals with a diagnosis of SAD and not for either healthy or anxious 
controls. Interestingly, Study 1 showed that participants’ performance was rated equally well 
across all diagnostic groups by objective observers. Therefore, consistent with cognitive models 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), it is socially anxious 
individuals’ inaccurate perceptions, rather than actual performance, which leads them to engage 
in maladaptive thinking about social events.  
In Study 2, we hypothesized that socially anxious participants who were instructed to 
review their speech repeatedly in their minds would report increasingly worse perceptions of 
their performance relative to those who repeatedly reviewed the socially-irrelevant task (and only 
reviewed the speech once). Contrary to expectations, all participants – irrespective of the 
condition to which they were assigned – demonstrated improved ratings of their speech 
performance following the recall period. A possible reason for these unexpected findings may be 
that all participants engaged in PEP about the speech and word definition tasks regardless of 
which condition they were in. Indeed, in designing the study, we intended to simulate naturalistic 
PEP by having participants simply review the tasks in their mind rather than disrupting this 
process by having them write down their thoughts. However, this design provided less than 
optimal structure and experimental control, while providing participants the opportunity to 
violate experimental instructions by simply thinking about anything they wished. If this is the 
case and we assume that all participants engaged at least in some repeated recollection of the 
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speech task during the recall period, it is of interest to consider why performance ratings might 
have improved.  
One possibility for the improved performance ratings observed in Study 2 comes from 
recent theories on the nature of constructive versus unconstructive styles of thinking (Watkins, 
2008). Constructive styles are characterized by concrete, specific and process-focused thinking 
whereas unconstructive styles are characterized by abstract, general and evaluative thinking. 
Research in the depression literature has shown that depressed clients are more likely to engage 
in abstract-evaluative rumination compared to recovered-depressed and never-depressed 
individuals (Watkins & Moulds, 2005).  Furthermore, when depressed individuals are instructed 
to engage in abstract-evaluative thinking, they report higher ratings of depressed mood, over-
general autobiographical memory, increasingly negative views of the self, and impaired problem 
solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). 
In contrast, these studies have found that depressed individuals who are instructed to engage in 
concrete-experiential thought do not exhibit the same negative effects. Similar findings have also 
emerged in relation to negative thought in the context of social anxiety. Vassilopoulos (2008) 
had high and low socially anxious individuals engage in an imaginal exercise where they either 
adopted an abstract-analytical or a concrete-experiential thinking style. The results indicated that 
socially anxious individuals in the concrete-experiential condition reported a decrease in anxious 
mood and an increase in positive thoughts relative to the abstract-analytical condition. More 
recently, Makkar and Grisham (2012) found that their structured, lab-based induction of PEP 
resulted in positive changes in cognition and behaviour amongst participants high on social 
anxiety. It is therefore possible that the structured design of the PEP induction in Study 2, 
unintentionally elicited a form of constructive repetitive thought by encouraging engagement in 
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concrete, rather than abstract, recall of the task, thereby improving participants’ perceptions of 
performance.  
A second possibility for the improved performance ratings observed in Study 2 comes 
from recent studies which have shown that socially anxious individuals may benefit from using 
distraction to disrupt the negative outcomes associated with post-event processing. For example, 
Kocovski and colleagues (2011) found that, in comparison to a guided rumination condition, 
socially anxious undergraduate students in a distraction condition experienced more positive 
thoughts following a speech task. Similar findings have been reported by Wong and Moulds 
(2009) in a student sample and by Rowa et al., (2013) in a clinical sample, suggesting some 
benefit to engaging in distraction. Although we did not use distraction as our control condition in 
Study 2 per se, we were surprised that repeatedly reviewing the word definition task did not 
differentially benefit socially anxious participants relative to those assigned to review their 
speech performance, at least by virtue of preventing them from engaging in socially-relevant 
PEP. Unlike distraction however, our control condition was specifically designed to induce 
concerns about failing to achieve expected standards and elicit heightened negative affect even in 
the absence of public social evaluation. Given that all participants had improved perceptions of 
performance following the recall trials, it is also possible that the PEP instructions used in the 
current study did not adequately mimic PEP as it unfolds following real-world social events.  
Although participants in this study were permitted to determine the length of each recall trial, the 
experimenter provided instructions guiding the start of the next trial. It is possible that these 
instructions and experimenter involvement disrupted the natural process of PEP. Rowa et al. 
(2013) have argued that naturalistic PEP may be difficult to induce experimentally in a lab-based 
task such as the one used in Study 2. If we assume – as Studies 1 and 2 suggest – that socially 
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anxious individuals hold metacognitive beliefs about the value of engaging in PEP, then perhaps 
this thought process must be motivated by the activation of such beliefs rather than imposed 
externally by an experimenter. It is also possible that one particularly distressing element of such 
a thought process is the individuals’ perception that these thoughts are intrusive and 
uncontrollable. Such negative metacognitive beliefs are identified by the S-REF model outlined 
in the introduction although were not the focus of the current work. Future studies are needed to 
explore the differences between intrinsically versus naturally-occurring PEP and to understand 
the conditions under which PEP is particularly harmful.  
In summary, the results of the current study appear to support some, but not all, aspects 
of the proposed theoretical framework. In terms of certainty, it does appear that individuals with 
SAD experience greater uncertainty about their performance immediately after the event; 
however, this in turn does not appear to motivate them to engage in PEP in order to resolve these 
feelings. On the other hand, socially anxious individuals were found to hold more positive 
metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of engaging in PEP and these beliefs were found to 
uniquely predict engagement in perseverative thinking following a socially distressing event. 
Similarly, individuals with SAD were more critical of their own performance, and these negative 
perceptions led them to engage in perseverative thinking about the social task.  Contrary to 
predictions, engaging in PEP about a socially distressing event did not seem to worsen 
perceptions of performance or impact feelings of certainty. A summary of the significant and 
non-significant findings are graphically represented in Figure 16. 
The results of these studies have important implications for the treatment of SAD. 
Current cognitive-behavioural treatments for social anxiety focus on identifying and challenging  
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negative self-perceptions using techniques such as disputing negative automatic thoughts, 
behavioural experiments and in vivo exposure exercises. Recent evidence suggests that such 
protocols can be enhanced by incorporating additional cognitive and behavioural strategies. For 
example, Rapee, Gaston and Abbott (2009) found that enhancing standard CBT with additional 
treatment techniques (e.g., elimination of safety behaviours, provision of performance feedback, 
attention retraining) resulted in more favourable outcomes, including less anxiety during a 
speech task, less negative self-perceptions, and reductions in how costly negative evaluation was 
perceived to be. There is growing support for the use of metacognitive based treatments for a 
wide range of psychological disorders, including depression, GAD, OCD and PTSD (e.g., Fisher 
& Wells, 2007; Hans, 2009; Wells, 2013; Wells & King, 2006; Wells, Welford, et al., 2008)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. The proposed theoretical framework revisited based on results from the current 
studies. Solid lines indicate the relationships that were supported, while dotted lines indicate the 
relationships that were not supported by the current investigation.  
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and some preliminary evidence that such interventions may also be effective for SAD (Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 2001). Our findings suggest that positive metacognitive beliefs are held by 
individuals with SAD and motivate engagement in maladaptive thought patterns. The inclusion 
of intervention techniques aimed at helping socially anxious clients to identify and challenge 
such beliefs may therefore further enhance treatment protocols and improve outcomes. For 
example, individuals may learn to identify their perceived advantages to engaging in PEP; 
cognitive restructuring techniques can then be used to help evaluate and challenge such beliefs. 
Relatedly, given that a majority of participants in Study 2 endorsed disadvantages to engaging in 
PEP, these should be highlighted in treatment to help clients recognize the harmful effects of 
negative rumination. Furthermore, standard CBT protocols instruct participants to discontinue 
engagement in PEP by challenging the negative content of such thoughts. However, these 
findings suggest that helping clients identify the factors which maintain such thinking patterns 
may be a useful intervention. Further research is needed to examine whether such interventions 
are successful at reducing PEP and improving treatment outcomes in cognitive behavioural 
treatments.  
The results from these studies also provided evidence that individuals with SAD perceive 
their performance more negatively than objective observers and this leads them to engage in 
negative perseverative thinking. This supports cognitive behavioural models (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) that individuals with social anxiety have 
biased perceptions of performance rather than objective performance deficits and lends support 
to interventions which seek to modify negative self-perceptions (e.g., thought records, 
behavioural experiments). Additionally, these findings provide evidence for the use of video 
feedback interventions since socially anxious individuals did not perform objectively worse than 
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control participants but rather – inaccurately – perceived their performance to be more negative 
than it was (Orr & Moscovitch, 2010; Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005).  
A number of limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings from these 
studies. First, Studies 1 and 2 were intentionally designed to evaluate the constructs proposed by 
the theoretical framework following a standardized speech task in the lab. However, the use of 
such a controlled, lab-based task may make the findings more difficult to generalize to real world 
situations. More specifically, a speech task completed as part of a research study is likely to be 
less personally relevant and therefore less threatening than speech tasks encountered in 
participants’ daily lives (e.g., in a work or classroom setting) since the consequences of negative 
evaluation are less significant (e.g., there is no threat of job loss). Similarly, during the informed 
consent procedure participants were made aware that all of the data gathered over the course of 
the study would be kept confidential and that their names would not be associated with any of 
the information provided or their performance on the tasks. Although a necessary and vital part 
of ethically responsible research, such anonymity may have provided participants with a sense of 
security that poor performance would have few real-world consequences and the task may 
therefore have been perceived as less threatening. Although socially anxious participants in both 
studies reported moderate levels of anxiety in response to the speech task that are comparable to 
previous studies utilizing similar designs (Cody & Teachman, 2010; Laposa & Rector, 2011; 
Rowa et al., 2013), it is possible that a more novel research methodology may have produced a 
different pattern of results. For example, future studies may consider using deception to mislead 
participants into believing that their performance would be made public to induce a more 
personally-relevant social threat and observe the impact of such a manipulation on variables of 
interest.  
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The content of the speech task used in Studies 1 and 2 may have similarly impacted 
research findings. Controversial topics were selected in order to increase the threat and 
ambiguity of the task as participants were not made aware of the researchers’ personal opinions 
on the topics and had no way of knowing whether they were offending the observers (especially 
given that the audience member maintained a neutral demeanor throughout the speech). Research 
has demonstrated that socially anxious individuals have a tendency to limit the amount and depth 
of self-disclosures they provide (Orr, 2013) which would have been difficult to do given the 
nature of this task. Nevertheless, future studies might consider a methodology in which 
participants are led to believe that the observer holds the opposite point of view which may 
increase the sense that participants have committed a social blunder and may therefore 
differentially impact PEP, metacognitive beliefs, certainty, and performance appraisals.  
Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 used a speech task, which was chosen given that 
public speaking is a common fear in SAD and studies have more consistently demonstrated the 
presence of PEP following speech relative to interaction tasks (e.g., Kocovski & Rector, 2007; 
Makkar & Grisham, 2011a).  However, a number of important differences exist between 
performance and interaction situations that should be considered when interpreting the results. 
First, performance tasks such as the one used in the current studies are inherently more 
evaluative, and participants were explicitly informed that their performance would be evaluated 
by objective observers. Furthermore, it has been argued that performance tasks are more 
ambiguous and therefore contain a greater degree of uncertainty, as participants receive minimal 
feedback and therefore have less available information to gage how they are doing (Makkar & 
Grisham, 2011a). This fact was further emphasized in the current study by having experimenters 
maintain a neutral demeanor throughout the duration of the speech task. As was reviewed in the 
150 
 
introduction, individuals with social anxiety tend to interpret neutral information in a negatively 
biased manner (e.g., Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Hertel, Brozovich, Joorman, & Gotlib, 2008). 
Each of these factors should have increased negative evaluative concerns among socially anxious 
individuals, thereby increasing the propensity to PEP.  In contrast, others have argued that 
interpersonal interactions may be particularly challenging for socially anxious individuals as they 
necessitate continued bi-directional interaction (Fehm et al., 2007), are inherently less structured 
(Voncken & Bögels, 2008), and require more complex interpersonal social behaviour (Voncken 
& Bögels, 2008). Furthermore, some studies have found that socially anxious individuals are less 
skillful in their social interactions and may therefore be perceived more negatively by interaction 
partners (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Creed & Funder, 1998; Meleshko & Alden, 1993; Thompson 
& Rapee, 2002). One of the contents of PEP includes others’ reactions, and socially anxious 
individuals may dwell on what is said or done by evaluative others. The audience observer was 
included in Studies 1 and 2 specifically for this reason – i.e., so that participants would have 
information of this type to process. However, in the current design, the audience member simply 
listened and did not speak or provide any verbal or nonverbal feedback. Participants therefore 
had less material of this type to engage with during PEP. An interaction situation would naturally 
include this type of social information. Given these important differences between performance 
and interaction situations, further research is needed to determine whether the observed findings 
could be replicated and applied to interaction scenarios, less structured tasks, or more naturalistic 
performance situations.  
Further, although the hypothesized role of certainty in predicting PEP was not supported, 
the findings from Study 1 do suggest that relative to healthy and anxious controls, individuals 
with SAD do experience greater feelings of uncertainty immediately after a social performance 
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which are maintained over time. Taken together with their more negative overall self-
perceptions, this may indicate that although socially anxious individuals have a hunch that they 
performed poorly, they may not be fully committed to this perspective and these perceptions may 
therefore be particularly amenable to modification. In the current study, individuals with SAD 
reported consistent certainty ratings for up to one week post-speech; although it is not clear if 
such ratings would be maintained over longer periods. It would be interesting for future studies 
to examine whether there is an optimal “window” of time following a social exposure during 
which participants are at least somewhat uncertain about their performance and therefore more 
open to alternative, and less biased, perspectives.   
Another limitation of Study 1 is that participants in the anxious control group reported 
fewer symptoms of depression, stress and anxiety as measured by the DASS. The primary 
analyses in this study were replicated while statistically controlling for depression, which was 
considered particularly important given the similarities between PEP and depressive rumination. 
Although depression was significantly related to some of the constructs of interest, accounting 
for depression did not result in any meaningful differences in the interpretation of results. 
However, it has been argued that attempting to artificially “remove” the effects of a conceptually 
related phenomenon such as depression is inappropriate and removes meaningful variance from 
the constructs being evaluated (Miller & Chapman, 2001). As a result, these analyses were not 
emphasized in the current work, and although they do provide some evidence that the obtained 
findings are likely not attributable solely to depression, this possibility cannot be entirely ruled 
out.  Future studies wishing to explore the unique impacts of social anxiety versus depression 
would need to recruit “pure” samples of participants who only meet diagnostic criteria for one of 
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these disorders. Including a depression, rather than an anxiety control group might be of 
particular interest.  
The anxious control group was included in Study 1 in order to ensure that obtained 
results could be attributed specifically to social, rather than more general anxiety 
psychopathology. Unexpectedly, individuals in the anxious control group were more likely to 
report taking psychotropic medications. In combination with the findings that they endorsed 
fewer symptoms of depression, stress and anxiety on the DASS, it is plausible that the symptoms 
in this group of individuals were less clinically severe due to the effects of medication. The 
current studies did not assess for overall distress or symptom severity, although future studies 
comparing clinical groups of participants may wish to include such a measure.  
Another limitation in Study 1 was the composition of the anxious control group itself, 
which consisted of individuals with heterogeneous anxiety disorder diagnoses. The inclusion of a 
range of anxiety disorders in this group may have masked potentially important group 
differences. For example, the presence of metacognitive beliefs have been well established in 
some disorders (e.g., GAD, OCD; Gwilliam et al., 2004; Myers & Wells, 2005; Wells & Carter, 
2001) but are not as well understood in others (e.g., panic disorder, specific phobia). It is 
therefore possible that combining these diverse symptom presentations into a single anxiety 
group obscured potentially meaningful differences amongst participants. Relatedly, the inability 
to tolerate feelings of uncertainty has been identified as particularly characteristic of individuals 
with GAD (e.g., Koerner & Dugas, 2008; van der Heiden et al., 2010). Although in the current 
studies, we were interested in evaluating feelings of certainty, rather than an intolerance for 
uncertainty, these are arguably related constructs. It is possible therefore that some individuals in 
the anxious control group experienced more difficulty tolerating uncertainty and this could have 
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impacted the results. However, recent research has found that despite the fact that the construct 
of intolerance of uncertainty originated in the GAD literature, it appears to be pervasive across 
anxiety disorders, including social anxiety (Carleton et al., 2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011; 
Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012). Given these findings, it is reasonable to assume that individuals in 
both the SAD and anxious controls groups experienced some difficulty tolerating feelings of 
uncertainty in the context of the current studies. Given that intolerance of uncertainty is 
emerging as an important construct across anxiety disorders, future studies should explicitly 
focus on understanding how this variable might impact feelings of certainty following social 
events, metacognitive beliefs, perceptions of performance and PEP.
13
 
The MACS and the MACS-PS were developed for the purposes of the current research. 
The measures were designed to enable a brief assessment of the constructs of interest, and were 
not intended to be comprehensive measures of metacognitive beliefs, memory uncertainty, or 
mental checking. Although the Pilot Study was designed to provide initial psychometric 
validation of the scale, this was a preliminary investigation, and additional validation is required. 
Furthermore, the MACS-PS administered in Studies 1 and 2 was a slightly modified version of 
the questionnaire which had been validated in the Pilot Study. The factor structure of the MACS-
PS has not yet been validated, as the sample sizes in these studies were not large enough to 
support a factor analytic data analysis strategy. Further research is needed to increase confidence 
in the validity of this measure. 
Relatedly, the PEPQ-R was selected to assess PEP in Study 1 because its psychometric 
properties have been well documented in both clinical and analogue samples (Makkar & 
Grisham, 2011a; McEvoy & Kinsep, 2006; Rachman et al., 2000) and it provides a general 
                                                          
13
 It should be noted that Study 2 did include the Intolerance of Uncertainty scale (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). However, 
the socially-relevant and socially-irrelevant review conditions did not differ on this measure and it was therefore not 
included in the analyses. 
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evaluation of the frequency, intrusiveness, and persistence of perseverative thought following a 
social event. However, one of the limitations of the PEPQ-R is that it does not assess the content 
or valence of thoughts as has been done in other studies (Dannahy & Stopa, 2007; Kocovski, 
MacKenzie, & Rector, 2011) and it is therefore impossible to know what exactly participants 
were thinking about or processing and how that may have differed across diagnostic groups or 
changed over time. In order to continue enhancing our understanding of the factors that maintain 
PEP, further research in understanding its content is warranted.   
Finally, the current studies focused primarily on the impact of positive metacognitive 
beliefs on PEP. However, the S-REF model of affective disorders implicates both positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs on engagement in the persistence of negative thinking (Matthews 
& Wells, 2004; Wells, 2009; Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996). Proponents of these models argue 
that individuals with emotional disorders hold positive metacognitive beliefs, such as the ones 
assessed in the current studies, in which they view engagement in repetitive negative thinking as 
beneficial. In addition to positive beliefs however, they also hold negative metacognitive beliefs 
which lead them to believe that engaging in negative thinking is uncontrollable, intrusive, 
dangerous, and harmful. As a result, they make unsuccessful attempts to control or suppress their 
thinking, which only serves to maintain maladaptive cognitive patterns. Indeed, qualitative data 
from Study 2 suggested that most individuals with elevated social anxiety symptoms 
spontaneously reported disadvantages to thinking about the speech task. Consistent with this 
finding, results from a recent study found evidence that negative metacognitive beliefs mediated 
the relationship between neuroticism and engagement in repetitive negative thought in a sample 
of participants with an anxiety disorder diagnosis (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2013). These results 
nicely compliment the current set of findings, and suggest that both positive and negative 
155 
 
metacognitive beliefs may contribute to the persistence of PEP.  Existing measures of PEP, 
including the PEPQ-R used in the current studies, include items assessing the intrusiveness of 
thoughts about past social events as well as the attempts made to resist thinking about these 
events. Given that individuals with SAD consistently endorse these items more strongly than 
anxious and healthy controls, it is reasonable to assume that they find thoughts about past social 
events difficult to control and make attempts to push them out of their minds. It is therefore 
likely that in the aftermath of a socially distressing event, individuals may initially engage in 
PEP because of positive beliefs about its utility, but the persistence of PEP may continue as a 
result of beliefs that this form of thought is out of their control.  The results of the current studies 
and existing literature support this idea, although it remains an empirical question in need of 
further investigation. 
In sum, despite their limitations, these studies are informative in helping to understand 
the cognitive processes which may function to maintain negative thinking patterns in SAD. 
These findings provide evidence that socially anxious individuals’ biased evaluations of 
performance, in combination with beliefs about the value of reviewing past social events, leads 
them to engage in PEP. This provides evidence that it may be helpful to challenge negative 
beliefs about thinking, rather than simply focusing on the negative content of thoughts. In 
contrast, although individuals with social anxiety seemed to feel less certain about their 
performance on a social task, these feelings of uncertainty did not appear to motivate a desire to 
mentally “check” their memories or engage in PEP. Additional research is needed to more fully 
understand the role that metacognitive beliefs and feelings of uncertainty play in the 
development and maintenance of PEP as well as the intervention strategies that may help to 
reduce this negative thinking pattern.  
156 
 
References 
Abbott, M. J., & Rapee, R. M. (2004). Post-event rumination and negative self-appraisal in 
social phobia before and after treatment. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113, 
136−144. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.113.1.136 
Acarturk, C., Smit, F., de Graaf, R., van Straten, A., ten Have, M., Cuijpers, P. (2009). Economic 
costs of social phobia: a population-based study. Journal of Affective Disorders, 115, 
421–429. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2008.10.008   
Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin, 93, 203-231. 
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.93.2.203 
Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). Emotion-regulation strategies across 
psychopathology: A meta-analytic review. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 217-237. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2009.11.004 
Alden, L. E., & Wallace, S. T. (1995). Social phobia and social appraisal in successful and 
unsuccessful social interactions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 497-505. doi: 
10.1016/0005-7967(94)00088-2  
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (Fourth Edition, Text Revision). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Amir, N., Beard, C., & Bower, E. (2005). Interpretation bias and social anxiety. Cognitive  
Therapy and Research, 29, 433-443. doi: 10.1007/s10608-005-2834-5 
Amir, N., Foa, E. B., & Coles, M. E. (1998). Negative interpretation bias in social phobia. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 945-957. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00060-6 
157 
 
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). Psychometric  
properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales in 
clinical group and a community sample. Psychological Assessment, 10, 176–181. doi: 
10.1037/1040-3590.10.2.176 
Antony, M. M., Roth, D., Swinson, R. P., Huta, V., Devins, G. M. (1998). Illness intrusiveness 
in individuals with panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, or social phobia. 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186, 311-315. doi: 10.1097/00005053-
199805000-00008 
Antony, M. M., Coons, M. J., McCabe, R. E., Ashbaugh, A. & Swinson, R. P. (2006).  
Psychometric properties of the social phobia inventory: Further evaluation. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 44(8), 1177-1185. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2005.08.013 
Bailey, R. & Wells, A. (2013). Does metacognition make a unique contribution to health anxiety 
when controlling for neuroticism, illness cognition, and somatosensory amplification? 
Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 27, 327-337. doi: 10.1891/0889-8391.27.4.327  
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., Greenberg, R. L. (1985). Anxiety disorders and phobias: a cognitive 
perspective. New York: Basic Books Inc.   
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., & Steer, R. A. (1988). An inventory for measuring clinical 
anxiety: Psychometric properties. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 
893-897. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.56.6.893 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Beck Depression Inventory manual (2nd ed.). 
San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
158 
 
Borkovec, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stöber, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive phenomenon intimately 
linked to affective, physiological, and interpersonal behavioral processes. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 22, 561-576. doi: 10.1023/A:1018790003416  
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary exploration of 
worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 9-16. 
doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(83)90121-3  
Boschen, M. J., & Vuksanovic, D. (2007). Deteriorating memory confidence, responsibility  
perceptions and repeated checking: comparisons in OCD and control samples. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 45, 2098-2109. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2007.03.009 
Brown, J. R. (2011). Exploring Perfectionism, Rumination and Social Anxiety: Theoretical and 
Causal Implications (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from http://scholars.wlu.ca/etd 
Brozovich, F., & Heimberg, R. G. (2008). An analysis of post-event processing in social anxiety 
disorder. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 891-903. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2008.01.002 
Brozovich, F. & Heimberg, R. G. (2011). The relationship of post-event processing to self-
evaluation of performance in social anxiety. Behavior Therapy, 42, 224-235. doi: 
10.1016/j.beth.2010.08.005 
Brozovich, F. A. & Heimberg, R. G. (2013). Mental imagery and post-event processing in 
anticipation of a speech performance among socially anxious individuals. Behavior 
Therapy, 44, 701-716. doi: 10.1016/j.beth.2013.07.001 
Bruch, M. A., Fallon, M., & Heimberg, R. G. (2003). Social Phobia and difficulties in 
occupational adjustment. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 50, 109-117. doi: 
10.1037/0022-0167.50.1.109 
159 
 
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2002). The intolerance of uncertainty scale: Psychometric properties 
of the English version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 931-345. 
doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00092-4 
Carleton, R. N., Mulvogue, M. K., Thibodeau, M. A., McCabe, R. E., Antony, M. M., 
Asmundson, G. J. G. (2012). Increasingly certain about uncertainty: Intolerance of 
uncertainty across anxiety and depression. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 26, 468-479.doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2012.01.011  
Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about worry and intrusions: the  
metacognitions questionnaire and its correlates. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11, 279–
296. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(97)00011-X 
Chen, J., Rapee, R. M., & Abbott, M. J. (2013). Mediators of the relationship between social 
anxiety and post-event rumination. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 27, 1-8. doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2012.10.008  
Chiupka, C. A., Moscovitch, D. A., & Bielak, T. (2012). In vivo activation of anticipatory vs. 
post-event autobiographical images and memories in social anxiety. Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 31, 783-809. doi: 10.1521/jscp.2012.31.8.783 
Cicchetti, D. V. (1994). Guidelines, criteria, and rules of thumb for evaluating normed and 
standardized assessment instruments in psychology. Psychological Assessment, 6, 284-
290. doi: 10.1037/1040-3590.6.4.284 
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, M. R.  
Liebowitz, D. A. Hope & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, 
and treatment. (pp. 69-93). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Cody, M. W., & Teachman, B. A. (2010). Post-event processing and memory bias for 
160 
 
performance feedback in social anxiety. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 24, 468-479. doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.03.003 
Cody, M. W. & Teachman, B. A. (2011). Global and local evaluations of public speaking  
performance in social anxiety. Behavior Therapy, 42, 601-611. doi: 
10.1016/j.beth.2011.01.004 
Coles, M. E., & Heimberg, R. G. (2002). Memory biases in the anxiety disorders: Current status.  
Clinical Psychology Review, 22, 587-627. doi: 10.1016/S0272-7358(01)00113-1 
Coles, M. E., Radomsky, A. S., & Horng, B. (2006). Exploring the boundaries of memory  
distrust from repeated checking: increasing external validity and examining thresholds. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 995-1006. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2005.08.001 
Constans, J. I., Penn, D. L., Ihen, G. H., & Hope, D. A. (1999). Interpretive biases for ambiguous  
stimuli in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 643-651. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00180-6 
Connor, K. M., Davidson, J. R. T., Churchill, L. E., Sherwood, A., Foa, E., & Weisler, R. H. 
(2000). Psychometric properties of the social phobia inventory (SPIN): New self rating 
scale. British Journal of Psychiatry, 176, 379-386. doi: 10.1192/bjp.176.4.379 
Creed, A. T., & Funder, D. C. (1998). Social anxiety: From the inside and outside. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 25, 19-33. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00037-3 
Dannahy, L., & Stopa, L. (2007). Post-event processing in social anxiety. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 45, 1207-1219. doi: 10.1007/BF02228037 
Davey, G. C. L., Jubb, M., & Cameron, C. (1996). Catastrophic worrying as a function of 
changes in problem-solving confidence. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 333-344. 
doi: 10.1007/BF02228037  
161 
 
Direnfeld, D. M. & Roberts, J. E. (2006). Mood congruent memory in Dysphoria: The roles of 
state affect and cognitive style. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1275-1285. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2005.03.014  
Donaldson, C., & Lam, D. (2004). Rumination, mood and social problem-solving in major 
depression. Psychological Medicine, 34, 1309-1318. doi: 10.1017/S0033291704001904  
Efron, B., & Tibshirani,R. (1985). The bootstrap method for assessing statistical accuracy. 
Behaviormetrika, 17, 1-35. doi: 10.2333/bhmk.12.17_1  
Ehring, T., & Watkins, E. R. (2008). Repetitive negative thinking as a transdiagnostic process. 
International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 1, 192-205. doi: 10.1680/ijct.2008.1.3.192  
Fehm, L., Schneider, G., & Hoyer, J. (2007). Is post-event processing specific for social 
anxiety? Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 38, 11-22. doi: 
10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.02.004  
Field, A. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS (third edition). London: Sage. 
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., Williams, J. B. M. (1996). Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders – Patient Edition (SCID-I/P, Version 2.0). New 
York, NY: Biometrics Research Department, New York State Psychiatric Institute.  
Fisak, B., & Hammond, A, N. (2013). Are positive beliefs about post-event processing related 
to social anxiety? Behaviour Change, 30, 36-47. doi: 10.1017/bec.2013.4  
Fisher, P. L., & Wells, A. (2007). Metacognitive therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder: A 
case series. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 39, 117-132. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.12.001 
Foa, E. B., Franklin, M. E., Perry, K. J., & Herbert, J. D. (1996). Cognitive biases in generalized  
162 
 
social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 433-439. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.105.3.433 
García-Pérez, M. A. (2012). Statistical conclusion validity: Some common threats and simple 
remedies. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1-11. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00325  
Gaydukevych, D., & Kocovski, N. L. (2012). Effect of self-focused attention on post-event 
processing in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 50, 47-55. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2011.10.010  
George, D., & Mallery, P. (2003). SPSS for Windows step by step: A simple guide and 
reference. 11.0 update (4
th
 ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Glass, G. V, Peckham, P. D., & Sanders, J. R. (1972). Consequences of failure to meet 
assumptions underlying the fixed effects analyses of variance and covariance. Review of 
Educational Research, 42, 237-288. doi: 10.3102/00346543042003237 
Greenberg, M. A. (1995). Cognitive processing of traumas: The role of intrusive thoughts and 
reappraisals. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25, 1262-1296. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.134.2.163 
Gwilliam, P., Wells, A., & Cartwright-Hatton, S. (2004). Does meta-cognition or responsibility 
predict obsessive-compulsive symptoms: A test of the metacognitive model. Clinical 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 11, 137-144. doi: 10.1002/cpp.402 
Hackmann, A., Clark, D. M., & McManus, F. (2000). Recurrent images and early memories in 
social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 601-610. doi.org/10.1016/S0005-
7967(99)00161-8 
163 
 
Hackmann, A., Surawy, C., & Clark, D. M. (1998). Seeing yourself through others’ eyes: A 
study of spontaneously occurring images in social phobia. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 26, 3-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S1352465898000022 
Hallgren, K. A. (2012). Computing inter-rater reliability for observational data: An overview and 
tutorial. Tutor Quant Methods Psychol, 8, 23-34.  
Hans, M. N. (2009). Effectiveness of brief metacognitive therapy versus cognitive-behavioral 
therapy in a general outpatient setting. International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 2, 
152-159. doi: 10.1521/ijct.2009.2.2.152 
Hartley, H. O. (1950). The maximum F-ratio as a short cut test for heterogeneity of variances. 
Biometrika, 37, 308-312. 
Harwell, M. R. (1992). Summarizing Monte Carlo results in methodological research. Journal of 
Educational Statistics, 17, 297-313. doi: 10.2307/1165126 
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (in press). Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical 
independent variable. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. doi: 
10.1111/bmsp.12028  
Heery, E. A. & Kring, A. M. (2007). Interpersonal consequences of social anxiety. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 116, 125-134. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.116.1.125 
Hermans, D., Martens, K., De Cort, K., Pieters, G., & Eelen, P. (2003). Reality monitoring and  
metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder.  
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 383-401. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00015-3 
Hertel, P. T., Brozovich, F., Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2008). Biases in interpretation and  
memory in generalized social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 278-288. 
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.117.2.278 
164 
 
Hofmann, S. G. (2007). Cognitive factors that maintain social anxiety disorder: A  
comprehensive model and its treatment implications. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 36, 
193-209. doi: 10.1080/16506070701421313 
Iacobucci, D., & Duhachek, A. (2003). Advancing alpha: Measuring reliability with confidence. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13, 479-487. doi: 10.1207/S15327663JCP1304_14 
Janeck, A. S., Calamari, J. E., Riemann, B. C., & Heffelfinger, S. K. (2003). Too much thinking 
about thinking?: metacognitive differences in obsessive–compulsive disorder. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 17, 181-195. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00198-6 
Jose, P. E. (2013). Doing statistical mediation and moderation. New York: NY: The Guilford 
Press. 
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters, E. E. (2005). 
Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 593-609. doi: 
10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.5 
Kiko, S., Stevens, S., Mall, A. K., Steil, R., Bohus, M., & Hermann, C. (2012). Predicting post-
event processing in social anxiety disorder following two prototypical social situations: 
State variables and dispositional determinants. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 50, 
617-626. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2012.06.001  
Kocovski, N. L., Endler, N. S., Rector, N. A., & Flett, G. L. (2005). Ruminative coping and post-
event processing in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 971-984. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2004.06.015  
165 
 
Kocovski, N. L., MacKenzie, M. B., & Rector, N. A. (2011). Rumination and distraction periods 
immediately following a speech task: Effect on postevent processing in social anxiety. 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 40, 45-56. doi: 10.1080/16506073.2010.526631  
Kocovski, N. L., & Rector, N. A. (2007). Predictors of post-event rumination related to social 
anxiety. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 36, 112-122. doi: 10.1080/16506070701232090  
Kocovski, N. L., & Rector, N. A. (2008). Post-event processing in social anxiety disorder: 
idiosyncratic priming in the course of CBT. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
32, 23-36. doi: 10.1007/s10608-007-9152-z 
Koerner, N., & Dugas, M. J. (2008). An investigation of appraisals in individuals vulnerable to 
excessive worry: The role of intolerance of uncertainty. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
32, 619-638. doi: 10.1007/s10608-007-9125-2 
Kuehner, C., & Weber, I. (1999). Responses to depression in unipolar depressed patients: An 
investigation of Nolen-Hoeksema's response styles theory. Psychological Medicine, 29, 
1323-1333. doi: 10.1017/S0033291799001282  
Laposa, J. M., & Rector, N. A. (2011). A prospective examination of predictors of post-event 
processing following videotaped exposures in group cognitive behavioural therapy for 
individuals with social phobia. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 25, 568-573. doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.01.004  
Leary, M. R. (1983). A brief version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 9, 371-375. doi: 10.1177/0146167283093007 
Lei, M., & Lomax, R. G. (2005). The Effect of Varying Degrees of Nonnormality in Structural 
Equation Modeling. Structural Equation Modeling, 12, 1-27. doi: 
10.1207/s15328007sem1201_1 
166 
 
Lepore, S. J., & Greenberg, M. A. (2002). Mending broken hearts: Effects of expressive writing 
on mood, cognitive processing, social adjustment and health following a relationship 
breakup. Psychology & Health, 17, 547-560. doi: 10.1080/08870440290025768 
Lindstrom, C. M., Cann, A., Calhoun, L. G., & Tedeschi, R. G. (2013). The relationship of core 
belief challenge, rumination, disclosure, and sociocultural elements to posttraumatic 
growth. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 5, 50-55. doi: 
10.1037/a0022030 
Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the 
malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12, 361-366. doi: 10.1101/lm.94705 
Lovibond, P. F, & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states: 
Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck Depression 
and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 335-342. doi: 
10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U 
Lundh, L. G., & Sperling, M. (2002). Social anxiety and the post-event processing of socially 
distressing events. (2002). Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 31, 129-134. doi: 
10.1080/165060702320338004 
Lyubomirsky, S., Caldwell, N. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Effects of ruminative and 
distracting responses to depressed mood on retrieval of autobiographical memories. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 166-177. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.75.1.166  
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1993). Self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric 
rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 339-349. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.339  
167 
 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1995). Effects of self-focused rumination on negative 
thinking and interpersonal problem solving. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 69, 176-190. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.1.176  
MacDonald, P. A., Antony, M. M., Macleod, C. M., & Richter, M. A. (1997). Memory and  
confidence in memory judgements among individuals with obsessive compulsive 
disorder and non-clinical controls. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 497-505. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00013-2 
Mackinnon, A., Jorm, A., Christensen, H., Korten, A., Jacomb, P., & Rodgers, B. (1999). A short 
form of the positive and negative affect schedule: Evaluation of factorial validity and 
invariance across demographic variables in a community sample. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 27, 405-416. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00251-7 
MacLeod, A. K., Williams, J. M., & Bekerian, D. A. (1991). Worry is reasonable: The role of 
explanations in pessimism about future personal events. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 100, 478-486. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.100.4.478  
Mahoney, A. J., & McEvoy, P. M. (2012). A transdiagnostic examination of intolerance of 
uncertainty across anxiety and depressive disorders. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 41, 
212-222. doi: 10.1080/16506073.2011.622130  
Makkar, S. R. & Grisham, J. R. (2011a). The predictors and contents of post-event processing in 
social anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 35, 118-133. doi: 10.1007/s10608-011-
9357-z 
Makkar, S. R. & Grisham, J. R. (2011b). Social anxiety and the effects of negative self-imagery 
on emotion, cognition, and post-event processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 
654-664. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2011.07.004 
168 
 
Makkar, S. R., & Grisham, J. R. (2012). Constructive effects of engaging in post-event 
processing in high and low socially anxious individuals. Behaviour Change, 29, 127-147. 
doi: 10.1017/bec.2012.13 
Matt, G. E., Vázquez, C., & Campbell , W. K. (1992). Mood-congruent recall of affectively 
toned stimuli: A meta-analytic review. Clinical Psychology Review, 12, 227-255. doi: 
10.1016/0272-7358(92)90116-P 
Matthews, G., & Wells, A. (2004). Rumination, depression, and metacognition: The S-REF 
model. In C. Papageorgiou & A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive rumination: Nature, theory 
and Treatment (pp. 125–149). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Mattick, R.P. & Clarke, J.C. (1998). Development and validation of measures of social phobia 
scrutiny and social interaction anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 455-470. 
doi:10.1016/s0005-7967(97)10031-6 
McEvoy, P. M., & Kingsep, P. (2006). The post-event processing questionnaire in a clinical  
sample with social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1689-1697. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2005.12.005 
McEvoy, P. M., Mahoney, A. E. J., & Moulds, M. L. (2010). Are worry, rumination, and post-
event processing one and the same?: Development of the Repetitive Thinking 
Questionnaire. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 24, 509-519. doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.03.008 
McEvoy, P. M., & Mahoney, A. J. (2011). Achieving certainty about the structure of intolerance 
of uncertainty in a treatment-seeking sample with anxiety and depression. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 25, 112-122. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.08.010 
169 
 
McEvoy, P. M., & Mahoney, A. J. (2013). Intolerance of uncertainty and negative metacognitive 
beliefs as transdiagnostic mediators of repetitive negative thinking in a clinical sample 
with anxiety disorders. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 27, 216-224.doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2013.01.006  
McLaughlin, K. A.,  & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2011). Rumination as a transdiagnostic factor in 
depression and anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 186-193. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2010.12.006  
McNally, R. J., & Kohlbeck, P. A. (1993). Reality monitoring in obsessive-compulsive disorder.  
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 249-253. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(93)90023-N 
Meleshko, K. G., & Alden, L. E. (1993). Anxiety and self-disclosure: Toward a motivational 
model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 1000-1009. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.64.6.1000 
Mellings, T. M. B., & Alden, L. E. (2000). Cognitive processes in social anxiety: The effects of 
self-focus, rumination and anticipatory processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 
243-257. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00040-6 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and validation 
of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 487-495. 
doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(90)90135-6 
Miller, G. A. & Chapman, J. P. (2001). Misunderstanding analysis of covariance. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 110, 40-48. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.110.1.40  
Moitra E., Beard, C., Weisberg, R. B., & Keller, M. B. (2011). Occupational impairment and  
social anxiety disorder in a sample of primary care patients. Journal of Affective 
Disorders, 130, 209-212. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2010.09.024 
170 
 
Morgan, J, & Banerjee, R. (2008). Post-event processing and autobiographical memory in social 
anxiety: The influence of negative feedback and rumination. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 22, 1190-1204. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.01.001 
Moscovitch, D. A., Gavric, D. L., Merrifield, C., Bielak, T., & Moscovitch, M. (2011). Retrieval 
properties of negative vs. positive mental images and autobiographical memories in 
social anxiety: Outcomes with a new measure. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 
505-517. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2011.05.009 
Moscovitch, D. A., & Hofmann, S. G. (2007). When ambiguity hurts: Social standards moderate 
self-appraisals in generalized social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1039-
1052. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2006.07.008  
Moscovitch, D. A., Rowa, K., Paulitzki, J. R., Ierullo, M. D., Chiang, B., Antony, M. M., & 
McCabe, R. E. (2013). Self-portrayal concerns and their relation to safety behaviors and 
negative affect in social anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 51, 476-486. 
doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2013.05.002 
Moscovitch, D. A., Orr, E., Rowa, K., Gehring Reimer, S.,& Antony, M. M. (2009). In the 
absence of rose-coloured glasses: Ratings of self-attributes and their differential 
certainty and importance across multiple dimensions in social phobia. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 47, 66-70. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2008.10.007 
Moscovitch, M. (1992). Memory and working memory: A component process model based on  
modules and central systems. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 4, 257-267. doi: 
10.1162/jocn.1992.4.3.257 
171 
 
Myers, S., & Wells, A. (2005). Obsessive-compulsive symptoms: The contribution of 
metacognitions and responsibility. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 19, 806-817. doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2004.09.004 
Nepon, T., Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., & Molnar, D. S. (2011). Perfectionism, negative social 
feedback, and interpersonal rumination in depression and social anxiety. Canadian 
Journal of Behavioural Science, 43, 297-308. doi: 10.1037/a0025032  
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed 
anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 504-511. doi: 
10.1037/0021-843X.109.3.504  
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and posttraumatic 
stress symptoms after a natural disaster: The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 115-121. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.61.1.115 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1993).Effects of rumination and distraction on naturally 
occurring depressed mood. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 561-570. doi: 
10.1080/02699939308409206  
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. Wisco, B. E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking rumination. 
Psychological Science, 3, 400-424. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00088.x  
Orr, E. M. J. (2013). Blending in at the cost of losing oneself: The cyclical relationship between 
social anxiety, self-disclosure, and self-certainty (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON.  
Orr, E., & Moscovitch, D.A. (2010). Learning to re-appraise the self during video feedback for 
social anxiety: Does depth of processing matter? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 
728-737. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2010.04.004 
172 
 
Patel, A., Knapp, M., Henderson, J., & Baldwin, D. (2002). The economic consequences of 
social phobia. Journal of Affective Disorders, 68, 221-233. doi: 10.1016/S0165-
0327(00)00323-2 
Perini, S.J., Abbott, M.J., & Rapee, R.M. (2006). Perception of performance as a mediator in the 
relationship between social anxiety and negative post-event rumination. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 30, 645-659. doi: 10.1007/s10608-006-9023-z 
Plaisier, I., Beekman, A. T. F. de Graaf, R., Smit, J. H., van Dyck, R., & Penninx, B. W. J. H.  
(2010). Work functioning in persons with depressive and anxiety disorders: The role of 
specific psychopathological characteristics, Journal of Affective Disorders, 125, 198-206. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2010.01.072 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects 
in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 
717-731. doi: 10.3758/BF03206553 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 
879-891. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.3.879 
Rachman, S. (2002). A cognitive theory of compulsive checking. Behaviour Research and  
Therapy, 40, 625-639. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00028-6 
Rachman, S., Grüter-Andrew, J., & Shafran, R. (2000). Post-event processing in social anxiety. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 611-617. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00089-3 
Radomsky, A. S., & Alcolado, G. M. (2010). Don’t even think about checking: Mental 
checking causes memory distrust. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 41, 345-351. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.03.005 
173 
 
Radomsky, A. S., Gilchrist, P. T., & Dussault, D. (2006). Repeated checking really does cause 
memory distrust. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 305-316. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2005.02.005 
Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., & Hammond, D. (2001). Memory bias confidence and  
responsibility in compulsive checking. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 813-822. 
doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00079-6 
Rapee, R. M., Abbott, M. J. (2007). Modelling relationships between cognitive variables during 
and following public speaking in participants with social phobia. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 45, 2977-2989. doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2007.08.008 
Rapee, R. M., Gaston, J. E., & Abbott, M. J. (2009). Testing the efficacy of theoretically 
derived improvements in the treatment of social phobia. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 77, 317-327. doi: 10.1037/a0014800 
Rapee, R. M., & Hayman, K. (1996). The effects of video feedback on the self-evaluation of 
performance in socially anxious subjects. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 315-
322. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(96)00003-4  
Rapee, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety in social  
phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 741-756. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(97)00022-3 
Rapee, R. M., & Lim, L. (1992). Discrepancy between self- and observer ratings of performance  
in social phobics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101, 728-731. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.101.4.728 
174 
 
Rimes, K. A., & Watkins, E. (2005). The effects of self-focused rumination on global negative 
self-judgements in depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 1673-1681. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2004.12.002 
Rodebaugh, T. L., & Rapee, R, M. (2005). Those Who Think They Look Worst Respond Best: 
Self-observer Discrepancy Predicts Response to Video Feedback Following a Speech 
Task. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 29, 705-715. doi: 10.1007/s10608-005-9634-9  
Rowa, K., Antony, M. M., Swinson, R. P., & McCabe, R. E. (2014). A preliminary attempt to 
experimentally induce post event processing in social anxiety disorder. Behavioural and 
Cognitive Psychotherapy, 42, 238-242. doi:10.1017/S1352465813000143 
Ruscio, A. M. (2002). Delimiting the boundaries of generalized anxiety disorder: Differentiating 
high worriers with and without GAD. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16, 377-400. doi: 
10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00130-5  
Schacter, D. L. (1999). The seven sins of memory: Insights from psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. American Psychologist, 54, 182-203. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182 
Schacter, D. L. (2012). Adaptive constructive processes and the future of memory. American 
Psychologist, 67, 603-613. doi: 10.1037/a0029869  
Schneier, F. R., Heckelman, L. R., Garfinkel, R., Campeas, R., Fallo, B. A. & Gitow, A. (1994). 
Functional impairment in social phobia. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 55, 322-331.  
Segerstrom, S. C., Tsao, J. C. I., Alden, L. E., & Craske, M. G. (2000). Worry and 
rumination: Repetitive thought as a concomitant and predictor of negative 
mood. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24, 671-688. doi: 10.1023/A:1005587311498 
Sheehan, D., Lecrubier, Y., Sheehan, K. H., Amorim, P., Janavs, J., Weiller, E., Hergueta, T., ... 
Dunbar, G. C. (1998). The Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.): 
175 
 
The development and validation of a structured diagnostic psychiatric interview for 
DSM-IV and ICD-10. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 59, 22-33. 
Shields, M. (2004). Social anxiety disorder – beyond shyness. Health Reports, 15, 45-61. 
Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New 
procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7, 422-445. doi: 
10.1037//1082-989X.7.4.422 
Sloan, D. M. & Kring, A, M. (2007). Measuring Changes in Emotion During Psychotherapy:  
Conceptual and Methodological Issues. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 14, 
307-322. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2850.2007.00092.x 
Stein, M. B., & Kean, Y. M. (2000). Disability and quality of life in social phobia: 
Epidemiologic findings. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 1606-1613. doi: 
10.1176/appi.ajp.157.10.1606 
Stopa, L., Brown, M. A., Luke, M. A., & Hirsch, C. R. (2010). Constructing a self: The role of 
self-structure and self-certainty in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 
955-965. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2010.05.028 
Stopa, L., & Clark, D. M. (2000). Social phobia and interpretation of social events. Behaviour  
Research and Therapy, 38, 273-283. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00043-1 
Tallis, F. (1995). Obsessive compulsive disorder. A cognitive and neuropsychological  
perspective. Chichester: Wiley. 
Tallis, F. (1997). The neuropsychology of obsessive-compulsive disorder: A review and  
consideration of clinical implications. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36, 3-20. doi: 
10.1111/j.2044-8260.1997.tb01226.x 
176 
 
Taylor, C. T., & Alden, L. E. (2011). To see ourselves as others see us: An experimental 
integration of the intra and interpersonal consequences of self-protection in social anxiety 
disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 120, 129-141. doi: 10.1037/a0022127  
Thompson, S., & Rapee, R. M. (2002). The effect of situational structure on the social 
performance of socially anxious and non-anxious participants. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 33, 91-102. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7916(02)00021-6 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., Amir, N., Street, G. P., & Foa, E. B. (2001). 
Memory and memory confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 39, 913-927. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00064-4 
Tolman, R. M., Himle, J., Bybee, D., Abelson, J. L., Hoffman, J., & Van Etten-Lee, M. (2009).  
Impact of social anxiety disorder on employment among women receiving welfare 
benefits. Psychiatric Services, 60, 61-66. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.60.1.61 
Turner, S. M., Beidel, D. C., Dancu, C. V., & Stanley, M. A. (1989). An empirically derived  
inventory to measure social fears and anxiety: the social phobia and anxiety inventory. 
Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1, 35-40. 
doi: 10.1037/1040-3590.1.1.35 
van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003). Repeated checking causes memory distrust. Behaviour  
Research and Therapy, 41, 301-316. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00012-8 
van den Hout, M., & Kindt, M. (2004). Obsessive-compulsive disorder and the paradoxical  
effects of perseverative behaviour on experienced uncertainty. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 35, 165-181. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2004.04.007 
Vassilopoulos, S. P. (2008). Social anxiety and ruminative self-focus. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 22, 860-867. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.08.012  
177 
 
Vasey, M. W., & Borkovec, T. D. (1992). A catastrophizing assessment of worrisome thoughts. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16, 505-520. doi: 10.1007/BF01175138  
Voncken, M. J., &  Bögels, S. M. (2008). Social performance deficits in social anxiety disorder: 
Reality during conversation and biased perception during speech. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 22, 1384-1392. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.02.001 
Watkins, E. R. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought. Psychological 
Bulletin, 134, 163-206. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.163 
Watkins, E. & Baracaia, S. (2001). Why do people ruminate in dysphoric moods? Personality  
and Individual Differences, 30, 723-734. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00053-2 
Watkins, E., & Moulds, M. (2005). Positive beliefs about rumination in depression – A  
replication and extension. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 73-82. doi: 
10.1016/j.paid.2004.12.006 
Watkins, E., Teasdale, J. D. (2001). Rumination and overgeneral memory in depression: Effects 
of self-focus and analytic thinking. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 353-357. doi: 
10.1037/0021-843X.110.2.333 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 82, 1-8. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2003.10.006  
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 6, 1063-1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Wells, A. (2005). The Metacognitive Model of GAD: Assessment of Meta-Worry and 
Relationship with DSM-IV Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 29, 107-121. doi: 10.1007/s10608-005-1652-0 
178 
 
Wells, A. (2009). Metacognitive therapy for anxiety and depression. New York, NY, US: 
Guilford Press.  
Wells, A. (2013). Advances in metacognitive therapy. International Journal of Cognitive 
Therapy, 6, 186-201. doi: 10.1521/ijct.2013.6.2.186 
Wells, A., & Carter, K. (2001). Further tests of a cognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder: Metacognitions and worry in GAD, panic disorder, social phobia, depression, 
and nonpatients. Behavior Therapy, 32, 85-102. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7894(01)8  
Wells, A., & King, P. (2006). Metacognitive therapy for generalized anxiety disorder: An open 
trial. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 37, 206-212. doi: 
10.1016/j.jbtep.2005.07.002  
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical perspective. Hove, 
England: Erlbaum. 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1996). Modelling cognition in emotional disorder: the S-REF model. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 867–870. 
Wells, A., Papageorgiou, C. (2001). Brief Cognitive Therapy for Social Phobia: A case series. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 713-720. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00036-X 
Wells, A., Welford, M., Fraser, J., King, P., Mendel, E., Wisely, J., … Rees, D. (2008). Chronic 
PTSD treated with metacognitive therapy: An open trial. Cognitive and Behavioral 
Practice, 15, 85-92. doi: 10.1016/j.cbpra.2006.11.005  
Wilson, J. K., & Rapee, R. M. (2006). Self-concept certainty in social phobia. Behaviour  
Research and Therapy, 44, 113-136. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2005.01.006 
Wisco, B. E., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2008). Ruminative response style. In K. Dobson & D. 
Dozois (Eds.), Risk Factors for depression (pp.221-232). San Diego: Elsevier.  
179 
 
Wolpe, J. (1958). Psychotherapy by reciprocal inhibition. Stanford, CA: Stanford University  
Press. 
Wong, Q. J. J., & Moulds, M. L. (2009). Impact of rumination versus distraction on anxiety and 
maladaptive self-beliefs in socially anxious individuals. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 47, 861-867. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.06.014 
Wong, Q. J. J., & Moulds, M. L. (2010). Do socially anxious individuals hold positive 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination? Behaviour Change, 27, 69-83. doi: 
10.1375/bech.27.2.69  
Wong, Q. J. J., & Moulds, M. L. (2012). Does rumination predict the strength of maladaptive 
self-beliefs characteristic of social anxiety over time? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
36, 94-102. doi: 10.1007/s10608-010-9316-0 
Zou, J. B., & Abbott, M. J. (2012). Self-perception and rumination in social anxiety. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 50, 250-257. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2012.01.007  
180 
 
Appendix 1 
 
SOCIAL PHOBIA INVENTORY (SPIN) 
 
Please check how much the following problems have bothered you during the past week.  Mark only one box for 
each problem, and be sure to answer all items.  
 
  Not at all A little bit Somewhat Very much Extremely 
       
1. I am afraid of people in authority.      
       
2. I am bothered by blushing in front of people.      
       
3. Parties and social events scare me.      
       
4. I avoid talking to people I don’t know.      
       
5. Being criticized scares me a lot.      
       
6. Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid 
doing things or speaking to people. 
     
       
7. Sweating in front of people causes me 
distress. 
     
       
8. I avoid going to parties.      
       
9. I avoid activities in which I am the centre of 
attention. 
     
       
10 Talking to strangers scares me.      
       
11 I avoid having to give speeches.      
       
12 I would do anything to avoid being criticized.      
       
13 Heart palpitations bother me when I am 
around people. 
     
       
14 I am afraid of doing things when people 
might be watching. 
     
       
15 Being embarrassed or looking stupid are 
among my worst fears. 
     
       
16 I avoid speaking to anyone in authority.      
       
17 Trembling or shaking in front of others is 
distressing to me. 
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Appendix 2 
 
PILOT STUDY METACOGNITION AND CERTAINTY SCALE (MACS) 
 
The following questions ask you to describe the thoughts you have following social situations. A social 
situation is any situation in which there is at least one other person present who has the potential evaluate 
you in some way. Some examples of social situations include, but are not limited to, giving a speech in 
front of an audience, having a conversation, going to a job interview, eating in public, going to a party, 
going to the gym etc. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly Disagree Slightly Agree Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
 Item 
1.  Repeatedly thinking about social interactions  helps me figure out how well I did 
2.  Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps me figure out how poorly I did  
3.  Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps me figure out whether I made certain mistakes  
4.  Repeatedly thinking about  prior social situations helps me remember the details of what happened  
5.  I’m usually certain I remember everything important about prior social situations after they happen  
6.  The more I think about prior social events, the more I forget important details of what happened  
7.  I am often unsure about my performance in social situations  
8.  I usually have little confidence in my memory for social situations  
9.  I have trouble remembering important aspects of social situations I have been in  
10.  I often check my memory following social situations to evaluate how well I did  
11.  Repeatedly thinking about a prior social event helps me think about it more clearly  
12.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me avoid problems in future social encounters  
13.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me gain new insights  
14.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me cope with my emotions 
15.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me prepare for future social events 
16.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me organize my thoughts about the events  
17.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me come to terms with how I performed  
18.  Repeatedly thinking about previous social situations helps me get things sorted out in my mind  
19.  There are advantages to going back and thinking about prior social events  
20.  There are disadvantages to going back and thinking about prior social events  
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Appendix 3 
 
STUDY 1 SPEECH TOPICS 
 
Below is a list of 8 topics that people have different opinions on. There are no right or wrong 
answers for these issues, but we would like you to provide your opinion. You are welcome to 
choose as many or as few topics as you would like to talk about. Please try to talk for the full 10 
minutes, but if you finish before the 10 minutes are up, just ring the bell provided.  
 
1. Do you agree or disagree with the practice of Euthanasia? (terminating the life of a person or an 
animal because they are perceived as living an intolerable life). Why or why not?  
 
2. Do you agree or disagree with Canada‘s decision to abolish (eliminate) the death penalty? Why 
or why not?  
 
3. Do you agree or disagree with censoring material in books, magazines, videos and the internet 
that certain persons—individuals, groups or government officials—find objectionable or 
dangerous? Why or why not?  
 
4. Do you agree or disagree with Canada‘s legalization of same-sex marriage? Why or why not?  
 
5. Do you agree or disagree with gun control? (efforts to regulate or control sales of guns). Why or 
why not?  
 
6. Do you agree or disagree with the practice of cloning and other reproductive technologies (e.g. in 
vitro fertilization, genetic manipulation of embryos). Why or why not?  
 
7. Do you agree or disagree with using of animals for research purposes. Why or why not? 
 
8. Do you agree or disagree that Marijuana should be legalized in Canada. Why or why not?  
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Appendix 4 
 
DEPRESSION ANXIETY STRESS SCALE – SHORT VERSION (DASS 21) 
 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 that indicates how much the statement applied to you 
over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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Appendix 5 
PERCEPTION OF SPEECH PERFORMANCE AND CERTAINTY (PSPC) 
Please read each question carefully. This measure asks you to provide information about two 
areas.  
Using the Performance scale, assess how you think you did in all of the areas listed below. 
Using the Certainty scale, please rate how certain you are of you performance ratings (e.g., 
how sure are you that the “content was understandable”). 
PERFORMANCE RATINGS  CERTAINTY RATINGS 
0 = Not at all      0 = Not at all certain 
1 = Slightly      1 = Slightly certain 
2 = Moderately     2 = Moderately certain 
3 = Very     3 = Very certain 
4 = Extremely     4 = Extremely certain 
 
 
  PERFORMANCE  CERTAINTY  
1.  Content was understandable    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
2.  Kept eye contact with audience    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
3.  Stuttered    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
4.  Used sophisticated vocabulary     0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
5.  Fidgeted    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
6.  Kept audience interested    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
7.  Seemed to tremble or shake    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
8.  Appeared nervous    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
9.  Face twitched    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
10.  Made a good impression    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
11.  “Um‘ed”  and “Ah‘ed.”    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
12.  Had long pauses (more than 5 seconds)    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
13.  Was a good public speaker     0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
14.  Sweated    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
15.  Smiled appropriately     0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
16.  Appeared confident    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
17.  Made a bad impression     0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
18.  Had a clear voice    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
19.  Bored the audience     0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
20.  Generally spoke well    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
21.  Blushed    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
22.  Voice quivered    0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
23.  Was not convincing     0         1         2         3         4    0         1         2         3         4 
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Appendix 6 
 
SUBJECTIVE UNITS OF DISTRESS SCALE (SUDS) 
 
This scale is a 0-100 rating scale that allows you to label the amount of distress or anxiety you 
are experiencing currently. A score of “0” is the least distress possible and a score of “100” is the 
most distress you can imagine. A score of “50” is a moderate amount of distress/anxiety, and 
although this level of distress is challenging, it is something you believe you can manage. 
  
1. Using the scale below, please circle how nervous/anxious you are right now.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0           25   50   75   100 
No                Mild          Moderate             Severe            Extreme 
Anxiety            Anxiety            Anxiety            Anxiety             Anxiety
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Appendix 7 
 
METACOGNITION AND CERTAINTY SCALE – POST-SPEECH VERSION (MACS - PS) 
Please use the scale provided to answer the following questions about the speech task you 
just completed. 
0 -------------------- 1 -------------------- 2 -------------------- 3 -------------------- 4 --------------------5 
Strongly         Moderately          Slightly      Slightly        Moderately      Strongly 
Disagree          Disagree         Disagree              Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
 
1. I have trouble remembering important aspects of the speech. [Memory Uncertainty] 
2. Thinking about this speech will help me figure out how well I did. [Metaocgnitive Beliefs] 
3. Thinking about this speech will help me get new insights into myself. [Metaocgnitive 
Beliefs] 
4. Thinking about this speech will help me remember the details of what happened. 
[Metaocgnitive Beliefs] 
5. Thinking about this speech will help me figure out whether I made certain mistakes. 
[Metaocgnitive Beliefs] 
6. I want to think about the speech so that I can figure out whether certain things happened. 
(Mental Checking] 
7. Thinking about the speech will help me get things sorted out in my mind. [Metaocgnitive 
Beliefs] 
8. I have doubts about my performance on the speech task. [Memory Uncertainty] 
9. I’m not sure whether I did well on the speech task. [Memory Uncertainty] 
10. Repeatedly thinking about this speech will help me cope. [Metacognitive Beliefs] 
11. I need to think about this speech in order to do well next time. [Metaocgnitive Beliefs] 
12. I need to think about this speech in order to keep my thoughts organized. [Metaocgnitive 
Beliefs] 
13. I need to think about this speech to avoid problems in the future. [Metaocgnitive Beliefs] 
14. I have little confidence in my memory for the speech. [Memory Uncertainty] 
15. I’m certain I remember everything important about the speech. [Memory Uncertainty - 
Reverse scored] 
16. Thinking about this speech will allow me to check my memory for how well I did on the 
task. [Mental Checking] 
17. Thinking about the speech will help me come to terms with how I performed. [Metaocgnitive 
Beliefs] 
18. Thinking about this speech will give me an opportunity to go back and check how the 
audience member reacted. [Mental Checking] 
19. Thinking about this speech will help me figure out how poorly I did. [Metaocgnitive Beliefs] 
20. There are advantages to going back and thinking about the speech. [Metaocgnitive Beliefs]  
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Appendix 8 
 
POST EVENT PROCESSING QUESTIONNAIRE – REVISED (PEPQ-R) 
 
Please answer the following questions pertaining to the speech task you completed earlier 
this week at the University of Waterloo. Please answer by circling the number that best 
represents how you have felt since the speech. 
 
 
 
 
 0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
Not                                                                                        Totally 
at all                                                                                       agree 
 
1.  How much anxiety did you experience?  
 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
2.  After the event was over, did you find yourself thinking 
about it a lot?  
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
3.  Did your memories and thoughts about the event keep 
coming into your head even when you did not wish to 
think about it again? 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
4.  Did the thoughts about the event ever interfere with 
your concentration?  
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
5.  Were the thoughts/memories about the event ever 
welcome to you?  
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
6.  Did you find it difficult to forget about the event?  
 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
7.  Did you try to resist thinking about the event?  
 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
8.  If you did think about the event, over and over again, 
did your feelings about the event get worse and worse? 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
9.  If you did think about the event, over and over again, 
did your feelings about the event get better and better?  
 
 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
10.  While thinking about the event, I viewed it from my 
point of view.  
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
11.  While thinking about the event, I viewed it from 
another person’s point of view. 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
12.  Did you ever wish that you could turn the clock back 
and do it again, but do it better? 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
13.  As a result of the event, do you now avoid similar 
events and did this event reinforce a decision to avoid 
similar situations? 
 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
14.  Did you ever wonder about whether you could have 
avoided or prevented your behaviour/feelings during 
the event? 
 
0        1        2        3        4        5       6        7        8        9        10 
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Appendix 9 
 
STUDY 2 WORD DEFINITION TASK 
 
Below is a list of 24 randomly selected English words. Your task is to provide accurate 
definitions for these words. Try to make the definitions as thorough and comprehensive as 
you can in the 3-minute period.  
 
Most university students are able to provide correct written definitions for 11-12 words in 
this amount of time.  
 
Please note, this task is completed privately, and you will not be asked any questions about 
how you did on this task or to provide your definition to the researchers. It is nevertheless 
important that you try your best and define as many words as you can. 
 
 Petulant:  
 Alacrity:  
 Superlative:  
 Harangue:  
 Capricious:  
 Modicum:  
 Dissonance:  
 Poised:  
 Sedulity:  
 Communicate:  
 Esoteric:  
 Idiosyncratic:  
 Gregarious:  
 Meretricious:  
 Abate:  
 Dubious:  
 Moderate:  
 Imperturbability:  
 Abysmal:  
 Compliment:  
 Deliberate:  
 Extemporize:  
 Debacle:  
 Conflagration:  
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Appendix 10 
 
MOTIVATION QUESTIONNAIRE - SPEECH 
1. At this moment, to what extent do you want to review or think about the speech task you 
completed, including any aspects of your performance, any thoughts, sensations, feelings or 
observations that came up for you during the task? 
 
 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
Not at all        Slightly   Moderately        Very                 Extremely 
 
2. Please take a few moments to explain why you responded the way you did in the previous 
answer: 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
MOTIVATION QUESTIONNAIRE – WORD DEFINITION 
 
1. At this moment, to what extent do you want to review or think about the word definition 
task you completed, including any aspects of your performance, any thoughts, sensations, 
feelings or observations that came up for you during the task?  
 
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100 
Not at all       Slightly   Moderately        Very                 Extremely 
 
2. Please take a few moments to explain why you responded the way you did in the previous 
answer: 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 11 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE (PANAS) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then 
mark the appropriate answer (number) in the box next to that word. Indicate to what extent you are feeling this 
way currently.  
 
 
Use the following scale to record your answers: 
1                 2                   3               4            5 
|_____________________________________________________________________________________| 
          very slightly or         a little             moderately            quite a bit                         extremely 
              not at all 
 
□ (1) interested     □ (11) irritable 
□ (2) distressed     □ (12) alert 
□ (3) excited      □ (13) ashamed 
□ (4) upset      □ (14) inspired 
□ (5) strong      □ (15) nervous 
□ (6) guilty      □ (16) determined 
□ (7) scared      □ (17) attentive 
□ (8) hostile      □ (18) jittery 
□ (9) enthusiastic     □ (19) active 
□ (10) proud      □ (20) afraid 
 
